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Abstract 
This study argues that the experience of reading comics is 
comprehensible as a series of intersubjective relationships represented in 
physical form. Considering concepts of self-conciousness, perception, 
embodiment and social experience, it develops a narrative model that brings 
the physical forms of self-expression into a series of relationships generated 
and made meaningful to embodied subjects. 
I seek to develop the theoretical work of a minority of comics 
narratologists. In particular, theorists who focussed on the relationship 
between content, form and enunciative context, rather than focussing on the 
study of enunciation alone. 
Following cultural theorist Martin Barker, I adopt a cross-
disciplinary theoretical approach, which considers the relationship between 
the ideas, forms and methods of one discipline and another. However, I adopt 
an interdisciplinary method in two practical Drawing Demonstrations, that 
makes instrumental use of studio methods in solving two theoretical problems. 
I argue for practice-based research as problem solving. 
My argument has a main axis: readings of philosophical 
descriptions of self-consciousness and perception on one hand, and readings 
of the work of narratologists who focus on the relationship between histoire 
and discours, on the other. My argument establishes a set of theoretical 
predecessors in works that I bring together for the first time. This constitutes a 
new set of ideas from which my argument derives. This set has not been 
compiled before in English language comics narratology. 
The model of narrative that I describe is also original, although 
correlates to the work of other narratologists. Also original are my analysis of 
the theory of 'mediagenius' and conditions of intersubjectivity and my analysis 
of comic strip artist Matt Madden's work in terms of concepts of self-
observation. My two Drawing Demonstrations provide an original model of 
practice-based research following a problem-solving approach. 
In approaching comics narratology as a relationship between histoire and 
discours, this study develops Barker's approach. It provides opportunities for 
comics narratologists to reconsider the application of both the approach and the 
ideas that it represents. 
Introd uction 
When we read a comic strip, the particular characters and 
situations in the plot engage us. Through our reading, we get to know the 
possibilities and impossibilities of the world in which the plot takes place. We 
follow a fictional course of events, of which we make our own sense. Outside 
this course of fictional events, we also know that the strip has been drawn, 
produced and made available to us by a number of people. We know that we 
are holding it and reading it. We understand that the situation we are in 
comprises a series of relationships that we have with other people, some of 
whom are fictional, none of whom we have necessarily met, but all of whom 
have taken part in directing our reading. 
Although comic strips are polymodal, engagement with them is 
termed reading. This reflects a longstanding semantic issue. We read the text, 
but view the drawings that comprise comic strips. However, the overall 
designation 'read' in relation to comics is not lexical. It does not indicate a 
syntax and grammar of comics. Rather, use of the term is derived from the 
activity of engaging with the characteristic media in which they have 
appeared, such as books and newspapers. Even as those media change, the 
term reading remains. 
Research questions and approaches in English language comics 
scholarship 
In this study I will consider and discuss the experience of reading 
comics in terms of sets of relationships between people. To do this, I aim to 
answer two questions. Can intersubjective relationships be described as 
narrative? Are intersubjective relationships evidenced in the making and 
reading of drawn narratives in comic strips in particular? 
These questions arise from a review of the English-language work 
of a small number of theorists whose interest in comic strips is narratological, 
as distinct from the majority of comics scholars, whose interests are historical 
or sociological. 
Narratology falls into two distinct areas of study that might be 
broadly called the 'study of telling' and the 'study of what is told'. Although 
these areas impact upon one another, they reflect two distinct approaches to 
defining narrative itself. Because the word 'narrative' means both the activity 
of telling and the content of what is told it is important to bear this distinction in 
mind (SchOtz 1970, Benveniste 1971, Chatman 1978). 
Theories of narrative that are exclusive to comic strips are few, as 
are applications of general theories of narrative to the medium. They have 
emerged only recently in comparison, say, to the emergence of a large body 
of film theory in the same period (Hatfield 2005). They reflect the distinction 
between the 'study of what is told' and the 'study of telling to' in the wider 
discipline of narratology by approaching comic strips as either a relationship 
between form and content (or 'what is tOld') or as the analysis of the 
relationships between content, form and enunciative context (or 'telling to'), 
the study of which defines the comic strip medium through these relationships 
themselves. 
Amongst comics narratologists the tendency has been towards 
the study of 'what is told', As a result, they have taken approaches that locate 
and describe structural or systemic conSistency in the comic strip as 
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enunciation only, particularly identifying knowledge with structural archetypes 
(reflecting Propp, Greimas and Levi-Strauss), experience with systems of 
signification (reflecting Peirce and de Saussure) or frequently theorising a 
combination of the two (Eisner 1985, McCloud 1993, Groensteen 2007, Wolk 
2007). 
The comics narratologists who study 'telling to', or the relationship 
between 'telling to' and 'what is told', are even smaller in number. They 
consider enunciator, enunciatee, context and medium to be topics affecting 
both the form and content of what is expressed. This approach brings alterity 
to bear on the semic analysis of structure (Barker 1989, Baetens 2001, 
Madden 2007). I use the word alterity here to mean the prinCipal of taking the 
point of view of another, following the work of Emmanuel Levinas (Levinas 
1970). 
The distinction between these approaches is not absolute in the 
theoretical field. For example, McCloud describes reader response in relation 
to a broadly structural analysis (McCloud 1993:205) and Barker undertakes a 
'deep' structural analysis of a particular comic strip according to Propp (Barker 
1989: 117). Overall, however, the study of 'what is told' is the approach that 
currently dominates the field of English language comics narratology. 
This state of affairs suggests that there is further work to be 
undertaken, addressing the possible narrative relationships that describe 
'what is told' in terms of 'telling to'. In this study, I refer to, analyse and seek to 
develop the theoretical work of comics theorists who have approached the 
relationships between content, form and enunciative context as a definition of 
the comic strip medium. 
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Martin Barker's "Comics: ideology, power and the critics" (1989) 
applies the narrative and sociological theories of Valentin Volosinov to the 
experience of making and reading comic strips. Barker extrapolates a list of 
principles through which the form of comics can be analysed relative to the 
experience of the people who make and read them. Barker's introduction of 
Volosinov's ideas to the study of comics is unique, and has not been pursued. 
The ideas themselves beg questions that both locate the comic 
strip medium as unique in its narrative functions and bring into focus a 
network of other ideas rooted in theories of self-consciousness, perception 
and subjectivity across a number of disciplines. 
Jan Saetens' discussion of a definition of the comics medium as a 
physical trace of its producers, the meaning of which is relative to a reader, 
implies more comprehensive theories of embodiment, depiction and 
intersubjectivity (Varnum and Gibbons 2001). 
Although not interrogative, Matt Madden's 'Exercises in Style' 
represents a practical demonstration of the relationships between 'what is 
told' and telling to', referring to the physical representation of functions of 
mutual misunderstanding that are theorised in the work of SchOtz, and which 
comprise a function of intersubjectivity (Madden 2007). 
These comics theorists take a dialogical approach to the medium, 
compelled by their narratoJogicaJ focus on 'telling to' relative to 'what is told'. 
In this study, I analyse Baetens' discussion and Madden's drawings in detail 
and refer to Barker (and to Volosinov) repeatedly in relation to descriptions of 
relative subjectivity. 
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My conscious point of view in the promotion of these theorists' 
work is expressed in my research questions. In this study, the absence of a 
wider explication of canonical works of comics narratology by theorists who 
broadly approach narrative as 'what is told' is due to my interest, not in 'telling 
to' as distinct from 'what is told', but in approaches to the relationship between 
them. 
My questions arise out of a wider extrapolation of readings of 
these three comics theorists, developed through readings of the work of 
theorists in a number of disciplines who share a dialogical approach, and 
whose work I bring to bear directly on the study of comics. 
In this sense, my questions cannot address those issues in 
comics narratology that are exclusively concerned with 'what is told'. Rather, 
they belong to another paradigm in the field. My two questions seek to pursue 
an alternative course of study that develops the dialogic approach to comics 
adopted in English by Barker, Baetens and Madden and locate it in a wider 
context of theory that shares this approach. 
My study is confined to English language narratological theories of 
comics. In many other fields of study, a distinction made upon the basis of 
language would be unnecessary, due to the habitual translation of texts from 
one language to another, and keen ongoing debates about the quality and 
meaning of translations in international fields. However, the field of comics 
scholarship, and particularly the field of the narratological study of comics, 
does not yet have this habit. 
Translation is not simply a responsibility for the scholarly reader 
who mayor may not be fortunate enough to be polylingual. The history of 
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comics production and the cultures of comics reception are categorically split 
along language lines. A small minority of comic strips produced in one 
language ever appear in another. This not only establishes a set of distinct 
texts as objects for study, but also establishes distinct audiences and 
communities of knowledge, relative to those texts. The audiences for French 
language comic strips and Japanese /language comic strips are quite 
different. Distinctions between scholarly communities drawn along language 
lines are a corollary of this. There is much to be translated that might change 
the current state of scholarship simply by appearing in another language. 
Cross-disciplinarity 
My study refers to theoretical and practical work in a number of 
disciplines. The field constituting the narratological study of comics already 
derives from literary, film and art theory and philosophy, as well as general 
narratology. 
Compared with other fields of study, studio practitioners constitute 
a significant minority of scholars in the field, and the forms of studio outputs 
form a significant minority of its current canonical texts in the form of scholarly 
comic strips about comics narratology (Eisner 1985, McCloud 1993, Madden 
2007, Sikoryak 2009, Cohn 2010). 
I refer to work in the fields of philosophy, narratology, comics 
narratology, sociology, cognitive science and studio practice in my study. 
These references occur in a number of ways, which require enumeration and 
justification. 
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I make a general distinction between cross-disciplinarity and inter-
disciplinarity, as different ways of approaching and making use of material in 
my study. The issue of relative expertise is central to this distinction. Cross-
disciplinarity allows the discursive use of information, forms and methods from 
more than one established discipline in the development and presentation of 
an argument. The relationship between materials derived from more than one 
discipline is the topic of discussion. 
Cross-disciplinary development of relative expertise across a 
range of disciplines does not result in specialism in those disciplines, because 
the activity actively seeks to destabilise and reform definitions rather than 
adjudicate them. The existence of disciplinary specialism is a problem for any 
crOSS-disciplinary argument, in that cross-disciplinary approaches depend 
upon a contingency of expertise, whereas specialism seeks to negate this 
contingency (Candlin 2000). 
My general approach in this study has been to make expertise 
contingent upon the development of my argument. In this sense, cross-
disciplinarity presents problems as a research activity, because research aims 
to collate, review and select, based upon specialism. Insight has status 
exclusively in the context of specialist knowledge. According to this definition, 
to conduct research is to gain disciplinary expertise and utilise it to become a 
specialist. Thus, research is an activity defined by incremental development 
within an agreed frame (the discipline itself) and insight is adjudicated against 
it as specialism. 
However, because the value of cross-disciplinarity lies in 
contingency, it is the relationship between ideas, forms and methods that 
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grounds the cross-disciplinary argument. Describing and demonstrating these 
relationships constitutes a different type of research activity, in which the field 
of study is formed by these relationships themselves and in which collation, 
review, selection and insight are adjudicated by the terms of the relationship 
themselves. For example, Martin, Barker's utilisation of the ideas of Volosinov 
constitutes cross-discipinarity. Volosinov is a literary theorist. His ideas are 
expressed as a specialism in this field of expertise. Volosinov was not 
expressing ideas about comics. In describing how comic strips can be read in 
terms of Volosinov's ideas, Barker does not instrumentalise them, because of 
the possibility of category errors arising from the elision of comics and 
literature. Rather, Barker makes the topic of discussion the relationship 
between the experience of comics and Volosinov's literary specialism (Barker 
1989). 
On the other hand, inter-disciplinarity is the instrumental use of 
ideas, forms and methods from one discipline in another, in order to bring one 
body of specialist knowledge to bear on another. In this activity, there is 
absolutely no possibility of contingency, because the terms of the inter-
disciplinary relationship remain the fixed terms of the disciplines themselves. 
This has to be the case in order for instrumental effects to occur. 
This is not my general approach, although I take it on two 
occasions in my study: in the practical studio demonstrations that I make in 
answer to two different narratological questions in Chapters Two and Three. 
In these cases, I have been careful to develop and frame my narratological 
questions as problems that can be solved by making new drawings. I utilise 
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the forms and methods of studio practice instrumentally, to solve problems 
that have arisen and been focused in narratology. 
The general problem facing inter-disciplinary working is apparent 
in both cases. I had to manipulate both expert frames of reference, the 
disciplines of studio practice and narratology, in order to accommodate the 
other, so that one could instrumentally affect the other. The value of solving a 
problem set in one discipline by means of the forms and methods of another, 
lay in solving this general problem. 
The practical work that I have undertaken in order to answer 
narratological questions in this study is inter-disciplinary, although my general 
approach is cross-disciplinary, making the relationship between the ideas, 
forms and methods of different disciplines my topic. My inter-disciplinary use 
of drawing also constitutes a considered approach to the relationship between 
theory and practice encompassed by the term practice-based research. 
Practice-based research 
My study utilises both studio practice and theory appearing as 
text. This polysemic approach requires that I identify the ways in which I have 
used writing and drawing as research methods and the ways in which I have 
used text and image as outputs. 
To justify the roles of text, practice outputs and methods in my 
study, I will give an overview of the debates about the definition of practice-
based research and the issues that face the researcher. I will position my 
method in relation to them. 
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Practice-based research has been the subject of pedagogic 
debate for almost twenty-five years, in the context of both the study methods 
and the adjudication of higher research degrees. 
Since the1992 reform of the higher education system in Britain, 
represented by the first Research Assessment Exercise (RAE1), new higher 
degrees in fields of cultural study involving practical or technical traditions, 
such as Art, Design, Architecture and the Performing Arts, have been created 
and rationalised according to templates derived from the study of history and 
theory. These qualifications are intended to create parity between degrees 
pursued by practical and cross-disciplinary methods and those that already 
existed to establish theoretical competence. 
Therefore, practice-based higher qualifications in Britain are the 
result of historical changes in the structure of higher education, bringing 
traditions of practice into the established context of theoretical research (Bird 
2000:03). 
Debates about the role of practice in research have been 
underpinned by the subsequent proliferation of these qualifications. Relative 
to the structure of wholly theoretical degrees, in which they are undertaken, 
problems arise in the use of practical methods and the production of research 
outputs in forms other than text. 
These problems are not unique to higher education, but early 
attempts to address them developed largely in response to the instrumental 
issues of adjudicating research and awarding qualifications (Cornock 1988, 
Allison 1988, Frayling 1993, Gray 1993). 
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There ;s still no agreed pedagogic definition of practice-based 
research in the visual and performing arts in Britain (Candy 2006:03). A report 
of the country's Arts and Humanities Research Council, revised in 2008, could 
not identify ..... any established or accepted prior definition ... " (Rust, Mottram 
and Till 2008:10). 
This lack of definition both reflects and accounts for problems 
articulating agreed methodologies for practice-based research and 
adjudicating its outputs. Almost ten years after the emergence of the first 
practice-based qualifications, educationalist Fiona Candlin wrote that 
students, supervisors and examiners are " ... still expected to proceed without 
a clear map of what is expected and without established criteria for 
competence." (Candlin 2000:04). 
There is not a dearth of definitions, however, but rather a wide 
variety, predicated upon the developing programmes of individual places of 
study. CandJin identifies an extreme diversity of required research outputs, 
from the visual-only outputs required by Leeds Metropolitan University's PhD 
by Visual Practice on one hand, to the requirement at the University of 
Hertfordshire for a written thesis of eighty thousand words to accompany 
visual material, on the other (Candlin 2000). 
This diversity also arises from the incorporation of traditions 
belonging to particular media into the requirements for assessment of 
particular degrees. "/n the case of PhDs by CompOSition at the University of 
Edinburgh, the outcome ... is a portfolio of compositions ... No written 
component is required." (Coyne and Triggs 2007:03). 
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As well as a lack of agreement about outputs, and hence a lack of 
agreement about the adjudication of these outputs, there is also lack of 
agreement over the terminology used to describe the methodological role of 
practice. 
The term 'practice-based' is widely used to describe the use of 
practice as a method of research, and its products as research outputs in 
themselves, not requiring the mediation of a text (Candy 2006:01). The term 
'practice-Ied', on the other hand, refers to the processes and products of 
practice as topics for theoretical analysis utilising text, so that" ... the results of 
practice-led research may be fully described in text form without the inclusion 
of a creative work." (Candy 2006:01). 
However, consensus over these terms is not complete. As 
recently as 2008, the revised Arts and Humanities Research Council report 
into practice as research used the term 'practice-Ied' to mean the use of 
practice as research method rather than as the topic of research (Rust, 
Mottram and Till 2008:10). 
I have followed Candy's definition of practice-based research in 
this study. She writes: " ... whilst the significance and context of the (research) 
claims are described in words, a full understanding can only be obtained with 
direct reference to the outcomes." (Candy 2006:01). There are specific 
methodological problems with this definition, which I shall address, but the 
identification of two distinct approaches to practice as research, in which one 
definition focuses on method and the other definition focuses on topic, creates 
a framework for further discussion. It is the definition of practice as method 
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that I shall discuss in relation to my study. This study is practice-based, not 
practice-led. 
The diversity of definitions of both methods and outputs is derived 
as much from a continuing debate of theoretical questions, arising out of 
debates about the practical issues of teaching and assessing research 
degrees. 
Three theoretical questions underpin the debates. First, are non-
text outputs, and the methods of their production, able to communicate 
knowledge rather than simply constituting knowledge? Second, by what 
criteria can this knowledge be adjudicated within an academic environment? 
Third, what is the status of these outputs and methods relative to the 
production of text? 
Discussion about the ways in which artefacts communicate 
knowledge as research outputs is underpinned by different conceptions of 
intentionality and interpretation. Explicit in Leeds Metropolitan University's 
requirement for visual-only outputs is the idea that material produced in 
practice is completely intentioned and can be clearly interpreted and 
adjudicated for competence without reference to an accompanying text. 
This view is supported by arguments against the intentionality of 
text rather than arguments that make explicit how non-text artefacts 
communicate. The intentionality of both text and artefacts is considered 
mutable, but no evaluation of the ways in which mutability is a basis for 
adjudicating academic competence is forthcoming (Candlin 2000). 
This position is predicated upon the idea that artefacts presented 
as outputs require an interpretative framework, but that this framework is 
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centred upon the artefact itself. The issue is about the artefact relative to 
interpretation rather than the artefact relative to intentionality. 
Many participants in the debate argue that interpretation cannot 
be adjudicated in this sense and hence artefacts cannot independently 
communicate knowledge as research outputs (Higher Education Quality 
Council 1997:05, Burling, Freidman and Gutherson 2002:10). 
As a result, for some of these educationalists, the interpretative 
framework for artefacts is provided by text, refocusing the terms of 
adjudication upon the intentionality of the researcher relative to their own 
production (Newbury 1996, Candlin 2000:02, Rust, Mottram and Till 2007:12). 
This creates a situation unique in humanities research, although 
not in the instrumental research undertaken in science or technology. In this 
situation, the researcher is both producer and commentator. effectively 
undertaking a dual practice where process and products are methods of 
research to be studied as they occur, rather than the outputs of study alone 
(Quinn 2007). 
However. others retain a focus on interpretation, arguing that 
establishing professional consensus will provide an interpretative framework 
for artefacts as outputs, independent of text. Following Anne Douglas, Karen 
Scopa and Carole Gray, Michael Biggs argues that developing an agreed 
interpretative framework for practical outputs is the role of the institution or 
rather, of educators precisely identifying their community of expertise 
(Douglas, Scopa, Gray 2000:03, Biggs 2002:04). Candlin writes: "To become 
an expert, you have to have a specialised field, which can only be mastered if 
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it is enclosed, or defended if its borders are clearly defined and policed." 
(Candlin 2000: 02) 
Approaches to interpretation have attempted to identify a unique 
role for practice that cannot be achieved by a return to the intentionality of text 
alone or through the process of managing a dual practice. Stephen Scrivener 
has identified this unique role in what he describes as 'creative-production' (ie. 
a tradition of studio practice), requiring the representation of the researcher's 
personal journey in practice as a template for future studio practitioners to 
follow (Scrivener 2000:02). 
The detailed recording and reporting of the practical processes of 
production and reflection are necessary for practice to fulfil this role. Text is 
then descriptive rather than analytical, outlining methods of production as an 
adjunct to the research outcomes, which remain the artefacts themselves 
(Scrivener 2000:09). 
Scrivener arrives at the 'creative-production' model, requiring 
recording and reporting, because he makes a distinction between traditional 
studio processes and instrumental or problem solving models of learning, 
utilised in science and design, such as those developed by educationalist 
Donald SchOn (SchOn 1983). 
SchOn describes the process of problem solving as cyclical. A 
problem cannot be solved until it is suitably set, he argues. Each new form of 
a problem is a critique that outlines the problem in a new way. Experiments 
test the newly outlined problem and finally, unintended experimental 
outcomes change the problem, leading back to the start of the cycle. Further, 
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judgements about the value of choices made throughout the cycle are made 
in terms of past experience (Schon 1983:139). 
Scrivener argues that although the process of problem solving 
offers repeatable templates for adjudicating artefacts, as well as devising 
practice methods, these templates cannot encompass the experience of 
studio practice (Scrivener 2000:05). In his opinion, the 'creative-production' 
researcher is motivated by the desire for practical activity per se, rather than 
by the desire to frame and solve problems to an adjudicated template in order 
to communicate results. This desire will not submit to analysis, but can only 
be described and adjudicated as a template for further action (Scrivener 
2000:02). 
Biggs, Burling, Freidman and Gutterson are critical of this 
interpretative framework on the grounds that, although the model can be 
generalised, there is no way in which to adjudicate the relative competence of 
individual practices or researchers. It can only describe practice on the 
assumption that the description will be significant to other practitioners, rather 
than creating a repeatable framework for analysis in each case. Biggs writes: 
"We need to differentiate between ... personal development. .. and activities 
that are significant for others." (Biggs 2002:02, Burling, Freidman and 
Gutterson 2002:14). 
However, although Scrivener proposes the 'creative-production' 
template, aspects of Schon's problem solving model convince him. He sees 
the possibility of considering the outputs of problem solving as demonstrations 
of process, rather than as entirely instrumental outcomes that finally leave 
process behind (Scrivener 2000:07). 
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In this sense, some practical outputs are able to provide a view on 
their own production. They might appear alongside both descriptive and 
analytical text, but neither type of text is necessary for them to communicate 
as well as constitute knowledge. The production of these artefacts is directed 
as problem solving, but the outputs are not entirely instrumental. Rather they 
are demonstrative. 
As demonstration, these outputs create an interpretative 
framework that derives from the setting of a problem itself. They represent a 
type of problem solving that aims to make its processes explicit in its outputs 
rather than aiming to effect change with the output as the solution to a 
problem. Douglas, Scopa and Gray write" ... the outcomes of the research 
process are ... evidenced ... within the final product." (Douglas, Scopa and 
Gray 2000:03). 
In this sense, Douglas, Scopa and Gray write " ... the role of 
practice is part of the methodology of the research and is therefore relative 
and heuristic ... " (Douglas, Scopa and Gray 2000:05). They identify two 
possible roles for practice in research, according to a problem solving model 
generating outputs that communicate the process of their own production: 
either as evidence in support of a theoretical argument presented as text, or 
as a means of communicating knowledge that text cannot, through 
demonstration (Douglas, Scopa and Gray 2000:05). 
The stUdio drawings that form part of this study follow one or other 
of these models. The drawings representing types of co-present emotional 
expression in Chapter One act as evidence in support of my argument 
(Illustrations 02. 03. 05 and 06, Pages 109, 110, 112 and 113). The drawings 
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that I call 'demonstrations' in Chapter Two (illustrations 08 to 23, Pages 179 -
194) and Chapter Three (Illustrations 41 to 46, Pages 259 - 264) constitute 
solutions to two specific problems framed so that the drawings themselves 
demonstrate the process by which the problems are solved. 
The drawings in Chapters Two and Three do this by making overt 
visual comparisons between themselves and existing drawings made by other 
studio practitioners, alongside which they are presented. Conceiving these 
comparisons in theory was as important to the framing of the two problems as 
it is to an understanding of the drawings as outputs or solutions. They were 
not conceived through practice. That is, the drawings respond to two 
questions that were, in themselves, framed in order to allow their solutions to 
communicate knowledge as practical outputs. 
This process did not preclude the use of descriptive, theoretical or 
analytical text. However, theory predicated and framed each problem and 
theorising was not undertaken post hoc: the drawings themselves take a 
theoretical position. Neither do any descriptions I include constitute a dual 
approach in themselves. Nor were the drawings approached as a 
predetermined topic to be researched and analysed in text alone. 
The pedagogical debates about practice-based research reveal 
wider issues about the relationship between theory and practice as types of 
activity, where theory is circumscribed by the medium of text and practice is 
defined broadly as not-text. 
However, I propose that interrogation of these definitions will 
advance little in discussions that focus on media. Text or not-text is beside the 
pOint. Rather, the relationship between theory and practice can be explored 
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as a relationship between intentionality and alterity, based in an essentially 
social conception of communities of expertise, including academic 
communities of expertise. As Douglas, Scopa and Gray write: "Embodied 
knowledge within the artwork relies on the ability of the research community to 
understand the particular artwork and the research within it." (Douglas, Scopa 
and Gray 2000:03). 
Is it possible to describe any types of drawings as theoretical 
drawings? The term is unfamiliar to any number of communities of expertise 
who know theoretical text or theoretical diagrams, which are types of drawing. 
Are there theoretical comic strips? 
An example of a theoretical comic strip is provided by Scott 
McCloud's theory of comics drawn as a comic. The theory is part of the 
comic's script and the medium of comics is used to extrapolate that script 
(McCloud 1993:180). The comic strip medium acts as an intentioned text, for 
all that it includes drawings as well as words. 
Alternatively, both the comic strips of Robert Sikoryak and Matt 
Madden communicate theoretical positions utilising methods akin to the model 
I have used in this study. There is no explanatory text in either artists' work, 
because the drawings themselves communicate a point of view in relation to a 
predetermined theoretical problem. They are meta-comics, employing a 
comparative positioning that requires a specific community of expertise in 
order to be understood (Sikoryak 2009, Madden 2007). 
McCloud insists on the distinction between message and medium. 
For him, both theory and practice are defined by different approaches to the 
roJes of message and medium. Theory is a type of communication in which 
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medium and message are never confused, and in which the role of medium is 
consensually ignored by theoreticians and readers. The agreed focus is upon 
theory's object, which is what is communicated in the text. The medium is 
transparent. Meaning is approached as an object in the text. 
Consequently, a characteristic of theory is its pretence to absolute 
intentionality. In theory, what is meant is communicated only in the content of 
the text. It is not communicated in the material of the text, nor in the 
relationships represented by the text's production, nor through the interaction 
of productive intentionality and receptive alterity on the part of subjective 
writers and readers. 
Even if a theoretical text is difficult, those belonging to the 
community of knowledge to which it is directed will not look outside its content 
in order to understand it. They agree that everything they need in order to 
understand it must be found in the content of the text, because they agree on 
the text's absolute intentionality. 
However, we do not approach drawings in the same way as we 
approach theoretical text. Why not? First, we agree with each other that we 
approach the two forms of communication differently. Drawing belongs to a 
different register of communication to writing. This difference in register is 
created by the consensual adoption of a different set of rules of engagement. 
As a result, we cannot find the whole meaning of the drawing in the content of 
its text because there is no objectified 'text' in the drawing in this sense. There 
is no agreed absolute intentionality for us to focus upon . 
. Instead, we agree to find meaning in a more complex relationship 
between intentionality and alterity, represented in the physical medium of the 
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drawing. Unlike objectified theoretical text, we agree upon the inclusion of the 
subjectivity of producers and receivers in finding meaning in the medium and 
in the social situation of drawings. 
Making theories is not making drawings. Not only is this because 
theoretical text and drawing are physically different, but also because in 
making and consuming theory, we agree to the absolute intentionality of the 
text. This is not at all the agreement that makers of drawings have with 
viewers of drawings. With drawings, the medium itself is agreed to be 
communicative, so that the relationship between intentionality and alterity is 
meaningful in itself. 
Some of the confusion about practice-based research derives 
from confusion about the different roles of message and medium that are 
defined by our consensually agreed approaches to theory on one hand and 
practice on the other hand. 
Pedagogically, it might only be by considering the role of theory 
from the position of the role of practice, whilst maintaining the active 
possibility of both, that learning takes place. Practice-based research can 
manipulate these different points of view with the aim of mutual 
enlightenment. The search for agreed models for this process is the wider 
subject of debate in the field (Coyn and Triggs 2007:04). 
In this study, I have brought the agreed conventions of theory to 
bear upon practice in order to make and look at drawings as demonstrations 
of problem solving. In framing the theoretical problems to be solved, I have 
self-consciously oscillated between the agreed conventions of the two 
pursuits of theory and practice as both a producer and a reader. 
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In particular, I have considered drawing in terms of theory's 
conventions and therefore approached drawings as though they could 
represent complete intentionality, established in part by the particular way in 
which I have framed the problems which the drawings aim to resolve. I 
approached this theoretical stance itself in terms of our consensual approach 
to drawing. I brought physical form and social situation into a now wholly 
theoretical framing of the drawings, bringing subjectivity into view. In this way, 
I produced these drawings theoretically whilst being enabled to consider the 
medium of drawing as theory, not solely as theoretically objectified content. 
Method and chapter summary 
Prior to beginning this study, my research questions arose out of 
knowledge of the discipline of contemporary English language comics 
scholarship, and the sub-discipline of comics narratology in particular. 
Because the sub-discipline is characterised by a tendency 
towards the narratological study of 'what is told', I aimed to frame questions 
that could not be fully addressed within this constraint. Rather, from the 
beginning, these questions would focus the study on the relationship between 
'what is told' and 'telling to' in discussing the meaningful experience of comic 
strips. This was not a position of disagreement with a dominant tendency in 
comics narratology. but rather the sense of an opportunity to build upon work 
in the field that has taken a less popular approach and is consequently 
overlooked in relative terms. 
In choosing this approach, the number of comics narratologists on 
whose work I could build was radically reduced and the potential field of study 
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became exponentially large. The paucity of existing theorisation in this sub-set 
of a sUb-discipline (or the work of comics narratologists interested in 'what is 
told' relative to 'telling to') mitigated against the existence of a wider 
theoretical canon on which to draw. 
Because of this, I faced a cross-disciplinary study. This would 
include, but look further than, the key works in English language comics 
narratology by Will Eisner, Scott McCloud, Thierry Groensteen and Martin 
Barker, for example. It would also have to include, but look further than, the 
wider theoretical canon on which their descriptions of the experience of 
comics are based. 
Barker's 'Comics: ideology, power and the critics' was significant 
to my choice of approach. It informed my theoretical method in that it outlines 
cross-disciplinarity as a study of the relationship between ideas from different 
disCiplines. More significantly was the introduction, through Barker, of the 
ideas of Volosinov to my field of study. 
Methodologically, Volosinov's theories anchored my identification 
of theorisations from a number of disciplines that focus in some way upon 
reciprocity as a defining function of experience. These reflected the 
relationship in narratology between 'what is told' and telling to', For Volosinov, 
this reCiprocity is discussed in the context of literature as dialogue, or mutual 
orientation towards others. In the field of philosophy, for George Mead 
reciprocity creates self-consciousness in the form of a conscious 'I' and a self-
conscious 'Me', for example. 
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Therefore, my choice of approach resulted in both the framing of 
my questions and in the spontaneous appearance of a wide field of study that 
implied cross-disciplinarity as a method. 
Introduced to the field by the work of Barker and anchored by the 
work of Volosinov, I found that I could make more detailed distinctions about 
narratological theories relating 'what is told' and telling to', In making these 
distinctions, I came to consider enunciation relative to enunciator and 
enunciatee and time in relation to embodiment, for example. 
I also disestablished the identification of the 'fictional world' with 
'what is told' and the identification of the 'real world' with 'telling to'. These 
identifications derive from the narratological study of 'what is told'. They 
cannot be assumed in the study of the relationship between 'what is told' and 
'telling to'. I found substantiation for this approach in the work of Paul Ricoeur, 
who describes fiction as a method of interpreting action in both real and fictive 
worlds (Ricoeur 1984-6). 
I found that I could not fully consider subject enunciators relative 
to other subjects, in relation to objects of consciousness, without engaging 
with philosophy. Neither could I ignore sociology or aspects of cognitive 
science if I were to explore the role of embodiment or the functioning of 
depiction. 
My field became large, but it was not random. Although ranging 
across disciplines, my study would keep the narratological distinction between 
'what is told' and 'telling to' always in view. Working through the theoretical 
implications of the relationships between the two would form the content of 
the study. 
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Hence, dialogic theorisations of emotion, gesture, physical trace, 
perception, embodiment, narrative drawing, self-consciousness and 
intersubjectivity were the topics that informed my research questions and 
around which my discussion would develop, adopting a cross-disciplinary 
approach. 
From the start, I intended to utilise narrative drawing to answer 
theoretical questions. This intention arose in part from a desire to continue the 
tradition of practical theorists in comics scholarship, being a comic strip artist 
myself. 
However, my main motivation arose from my unsubstantiated 
conviction that I would be able to provide solutions to theoretical problems 
with narrative drawings. These solutions would not be limited in form to 'what 
is told' (as the plot of a new comic strip, for example), but through 
demonstrations of the relationship between 'what is told' and 'telling to' 
(through creating the meaningful context as well as the content of a new 
strip). By definition, this would be the only inter-disciplinary part of my study. 
My overall aim in the study was to promote the theorisation of the 
relationships between 'what is told' and 'telling to' in the field of comics 
narratology. This aim was not developed in disagreement with approaches in 
the field that mainly theorise the mediating structures and systems of 'what is 
told'. 
Rather, I aimed to accumulate approaches to the narratological 
study of comics, by building on the work of the small number of English 
language predecessors whose work shares a common interest with mine. 
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My study does not commence with a discussion of either comics 
or drawing. In Chapter One, I begin in a very different discipline: philosophy. I 
describe how the concept of intersubjectivity arises out of descriptions of self-
consciousness and perception in the work of Georg Hegel, Edmund Husserl, 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Alfred SchOtz, and Nick Crossley. I outline a structure 
of story telling that reflects the particular conditions of intersubjective 
relationships. 
I develop a definition of 'subjectivity' as the condition of being self-
conscious relative to experiences of the world, and a definition of 
'intersubjectivity' as subjectivity arising relative to other subjects. 
This task itself requires that I consider some of the ways in which 
acts of communication bring about physical transformations in the world, with 
reference to the work of Jack Katz, Raymond Gibbs, Nick Crossley and 
George Mead in particular. , do this in order to outline a model of narrative as 
a comprehensive series of embodied relationships involving time, movement 
and self-perception. 
I discuss how differentiations between '" and 'me' inform our 
sense of ourselves and others and I describe how this knowledge is rooted in 
the shared physiological processes of proprioception. 
This approach allows me to advance a conception of the physical 
transformations that we make to the world when we communicate with other 
people in narrative terms. I consider the physical forms of expression to be 
the traces of actions made by specific embodied intersubjects. 
I focus on emotion because in doing so I am compelled to 
consider the body. The forms of emotional expression are always body forms. 
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My aim is to consider the motive, material and temporal aspects of social 
embodiment as narrative situations. 
This underpins my focus in the study on the generation of 
embodied subjectivity on one hand, and its perception in the physical traces of 
communication on the other, both in co-presence and mediated through 
technology. 
Through this process, I am able to describe a narrative model that 
reflects these conditions of communication. This structure is derived from the 
social, motive and temporal terms of emotional expression that I discuss. 
To apply these terms, I draw on the work of narratologists t:mile 
Benveniste and Seymour Chatman and utilise Benveniste's distinction 
between 'what is told' and 'telling to' to position my approach to narrative. The 
narrative model I describe and name is central to the ways in which I theorise 
subjectivity in the rest of the study, specifically in relation to comics 
narratology. 
In Chapter Two, I refer to the work of Kendall Walton and Phillip 
Rawson to correlate the narrative model with self-consciousness as a function 
of depictive drawing. The terms of depictive drawing introduce an evaluation 
of a theory of graphic enunciation unique to comic strips, discussed by Jan 
Baetens. 
This theory re-connects physical trace with the structure of 
narrative, crossing the boundary between 'what is told' and 'telling to'. In doing 
so, it suggests that the drawn narrative in comic strips is perceived as an 
embodied relationship between enunciator and enunciatee. 
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I evaluate this theory against a number of conditions of 
intersubjectivity in the work of Crossley, Barker, Volosinov and others, 
returning to functions of self-consciousness that connect the theory to 
Gerorge Mead's theorisation of alterity. Consequently, I am able to describe 
the physical forms of expression as experiences of time. 
r am now in a position to interrogate the connections that I make 
between physical trace, embodiment, intersubjects and social relationships by 
framing a problem that provides the possibility of practical solution in the form 
of narrative drawing. 
The problem takes the form of a question: 'Is it possible to adopt 
another's forms of expression in order to communicate something new?' 
On one hand, this question is framed by establishing the 
possibility of a theoretically neutral subject (the 'other' whose form of 
expression I attempt to adopt), following Daniel Dennett. On the other hand, it 
is framed by Patricia Hamp/'s identification of the context of enunciation in the 
form of enunciation itself. 
I describe the methodology of my Drawing Demonstration One in 
detail. The practical activity entails making a series of three new comic strips 
in the manner of three existing comic strip artists (Mike Mignola, Chris Ware 
and Jim Medway). I utilise scripts extrapolated from the existing work of 
another artist as a control in each case. 
I undertake a comparative analysis of the comic strips produced in 
Drawing Demonstration One, relative to the question. Drawing Demonstration 
One formed part of three papers I presented at the College Art Association 
Annual Conference, Chicago: 'Comics and Art History', at the 'Graphic Novels 
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and Comics' Conference at Manchester Metropolitan University in 2010 and 
at the International Association for Media and Communication Research 
Annual Conference 'Comics Working Group' in Braga (Grennan 2010b). 
(Grennan 2009a, Grennan 2009b, Grennan 2010a». 
In Chapter Three I develop my discussion of the relationship 
between embodiment and time, describing both co-present expression and 
technological trace as a temporal index creating history. 
I describe and evaluate a fictional project in the work of Jorge Luis 
Borges in these terms. I extrapolate the idea that identical forms of expression 
take on different meanings in relation to different embodied subjects and 
propose that these demonstrate the relationship between embodiment and 
time. 
I consider the work of comic strip artists Seth and Chester Brown 
in this light, re-stating the connection between intersubjectivity and physical 
trace as a definition of drawing style. On this basis, I describe Drawing 
Demonstration One and the works of Borges and Seth under review as three 
different projects revealing intersubjectivity as well as functioning 
intersubjectively. 
This description prompts discussion of two further projects, each 
made in different contexts, but sharing the aim of revealing intersubjective 
relationships by consciously manipulating the relationships between 'what is 
told' and 'telling to'. 
I consider the work of artists and theorists of 'appropriation' in the 
fine arts in the 1970s and 1980s. Referring to Guy Debord and Daniel 
Buchloh, I describe ways in which the appropriation project constitutes an 
29 
attempt to substitute one embodied subjective trace for another, with the aim 
of making visible, and hence destabilising, the social milieu in which artworks 
are consumed. 
I describe the ways in which this project correlates to the previous 
projects in intersubjectivity that I have outlined. The appropriation project 
maps the ways in which self-observation at the level of self-consciousness 
constrains the development of self. This constraint is embodied as social 
consensus. The appropriation project recognised that this constraint is 
habitually invisible because it embodies social equilibrium. 
From this idea, I undertake an analysis of work by comic strip 
artist Matt Madden. Madden's project also aims to reveal the relationship 
between self-observation and social constraint, in the form of the conscious 
manipulation of comic strip genres. It does this by adapting the method of 
Raymond Queneau's experiments with literary style to comic strips. 
This analysis allows me to frame a second problem against the 
possibility of a practical solution, in the form of narrative drawing. Again, the 
problem takes the form of a question: 'Is it possible to make a new expression 
completely under the constraints of a recognised horizon of expectation?' 
This question is a verbalisation of the problem that Madden seeks 
to solve in his drawings. I describe the methodology of my Drawing 
Demonstration Two in detail. The practical activity entails making a series of 
three new comic strips from a single script. The recognised 'horizon of 
expectation' utilised to constrain each drawing is identified by historical period 
as well as genre. I attempt to draw a new comic strip each in the manner of 
commercial comics of the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. I undertake a 
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comparative analysis of the comic strips produced in Drawing Demonstration 
Two, relative to the question. Drawing Experiment Two formed part of a paper 
I presented at the Comics Forum Conference, Leeds (Grennan 201 ~b). 
In concfusion. I encapsulate my argument, identify aspects that I 
consider to be original in the field and their possible significance for comics 
narratology. I assess the study's potential for impact on the field and identify 




Intersubjectivity - emotion, embodiment and a model of narrative . 
. Intersubjectivity 
Ways of approaching and discussing the concept of self-consciousness 
and the concept of perception make repeated appearances throughout my 
study. I use them in a number of ways to define and describe intersubjectivity. 
Historically, the definitiof'1 and interrogation of both of these concepts 
has resulted in a number of detailed descriptions of human experience, in 
which theories of the human subject, society and environment are presented 
and debated. These descriptions constitute a body of theory that crosses 
boundaries between the disciplines of philosophy, cultural theory, sociology 
and science, and share a focus on these concepts rather than any 
methodology, tradition or point of view. 
The relationship between concepts of self-consciousness and 
perception is itself historically determined. Some philosophical descriptions of 
self-consciousness have required descriptions of perception (Merleau-Ponty 
1968, Schotz 1970), whilst some sociological and scientific descriptions of 
perception have required descriptions of self-consciousness (Goffman 1959, 
Mead 1967, Katz 1999). 
As a result, the body of theory, comprising the interrogation of self-
consciousness and perception as descriptions of human experience, has 
generated a broader field of related topics and approaches, which are not 
reducible to the disciplines in which they appear. 
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Rather. the field of topics and approaches displays a tendency for 
theorists working in one discipline to utilise aspects of another. Interrogating 
self-consciousness has led theorists of knowledge to become social theorists. 
for example (SchOtz 1970), and led cognitive scientists to become theorists of 
embodiment (Gibbs 2005). 
The definition of this broader field is also the shared pursuit of concepts 
of self-consciousness and perception across disciplines. The work of theorists 
sharing this pursuit is a self-selecting set. Consequently, a set of existing 
theories of self-consciousness and perception inform my understanding of 
intersubjectivity. On this basis I feel justified in considering these theorists of 
self-consciousness and perception to be also theorists of intersubjectivity 
(Crossley 1996). In this, study. as constituents of this set, I consider the work 
of Georg Hegel, Edmund Husserl, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Alfred SchOtz. 
George Mead, Erving Goffman. Valentin Volosinov. Martin Barker and Nick 
Crossley. 
The work of theorists belonging to this set broadly considers human 
consciousness as mutually relative to self, other human consciousness, the 
body and the physical environment. Taking this approach, it connects psyche 
to society. self to institution and material to meaning. Describing self-
consciousness. the work of these theorists tends towards concepts of self as 
dual, reciprocal or shared. Describing perception. their work tends towards 
concepts that are cross-moda'. motive and reciprocal. These tendencies often 
result in a further heuristic tendency to identify self-consciousness with social 
signification, and perception with physical embodiment. 
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It can be argued that other theorists take contradictory approaches in 
conceiving self-consciousness and perception, particularly identifying 
knowledge with archetypes (Chomsky 1975, Levi-Strauss 1978) and 
experience with systems of signification (Peirce 1934, Saussure 1983). 
Although these approaches might appear to be antithetical to 
theoretical conceptions based in mutual reciprocity, one tendency does not 
cancel out the other. Rather, the identification of archetypes and systems are 
ways of describing other levels of experience underwritten by self-
consciousness and perception. SchOtz describes this as a level on which the 
self is mediated in social relationships, in which he includes typifications and 
symbols (SchOtz 1972: 90). According to SchOtz, it is a semic level rather than 
an ontological one. These approaches have a bearing on this study in so 
much as they extrapolate theories of knowledge and communication from 
conceptions of self-consciousness and perception, but they are parallel to the 
field of study in which these conceptions are theorised in themselves. 
Concepts of self-consciousness develop from concepts of 
consciousness. Self-consciousness implies a relationship with conscious 
experience that exists as a distinct type of experience itself. The possible 
implications for conceptions of consciousness that constitute this relationship 
are central to theories of intersubjectivity. 
In 'The Phenomenology of Spirit' Georg Hegel describes 
consciousness as a series of types of sensate condition, each encompassed 
by the next (Hegel 1979:11). In all conscious species, he argues, 
consciousness is constituted by sensation, perception and cognition. 
However, these aggregate a type of consciousness that is unable to make 
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any distinction between itself and the objects of experience. At these levels, 
consciousness is not conscious of mediating between self and the world. 
Hegel goes on to describe two further levels of consciousness, the last 
of which defines self-consciousness for him. Beyond sensation, perception 
and cognition, consciousness is constituted by desire. Hegel identifies desire 
as a type of consciousness encompassing the other types, in that it is defined 
by experiences of lack at these levels. Lack of food produces the experience 
of hunger, which is the desire for food, for example. For Hegel, the experience 
of lack constitutes a type of self-consciousness in that it is a dual 
consciousness. Through desire, a distinction emerges between 
consciousness as sensation, perception and cognition and consciousness 
itself, or the experience of lack. 
Superseding sensation, perception, cognition and desire, Hegel defines 
a uniquely human capacity in a particular experience of lack: the desire for the 
desire of others. This type of desire arises from the distinction between 
consciousness (sensation, perception and cognition) and self-consciousness 
(consciousness of consciousness or the experience of lack), and subsumes 
them. Hegel describes this capacity as the desire for recognition, or the 
capacity for being conscious of self through consciousness of others. 
Hegel identifies the desire for recognition as a mutual human capacity. 
Being self-conscious in our desire for recognition, he argues, we experience 
our own consciousness as an object in the experience of others. 
In doing this, Hegel describes human consciousness as a dynamic 
relationship. The self is experienced as consciousness of consciousness, 
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motivated by the desire for recognition, which requires that we experience 
ourselves as others experience us. 
For Hegel, this model of human consciousness explains the 
development of human relationships at every level, from co-presence to social 
institution. As such, human consciousness has an ethical dimension and a 
historical dimension. It is also necessarily embodied. The desire for 
recognition transforms sensation, perception, cognition and desire into the 
fabric of human society, making physical activity meaningful. 
This shift from individual to social, in describing human consciousness, 
is a cause for debate amongst Hegel's commentators because of the 
ambiguity of his language (Kojeve 1969, Honneth 1995). Hegel describes the 
ways in which his model of human consciousness is the basis for social 
relationships as a 'fight to the death' resulting in 'master/slave' relationships. 
Hegel's fight to the death is an extrapolation of the ethical dimension of 
the desire for recognition, describing the human subject in relation to human 
consciousness. Only by embodying the desire for recognition in ethical 
relationships with others do human subjects emerge, he argues. He outlines 
three conditions for the creation of this subjectivity. First, individual desire for 
recognition is made pre-eminent among all other desires and this pre-
eminence is represented to others through mutual display. Second, Hegel 
argues that the individual must be prepared to risk a loss of self in order for 
this to occur, even to the point of dying, establishing the ethical value that the 
individual places upon this pre-eminence. Third, this process, creating relative 
value judgements, represents a struggle for recognition, motivated by the 
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desire for recognition. This struggle, which is continual, dynamic and often 
combative, creates social relationships at every level. 
Having described the relationship between human self-consciousness 
and the social realm as a definition of the human subject, Hegel describes its 
historic aspect. Motivated by self-consciousness (the desire for recognition), 
the struggle for recognition generates both subjectivity and social 
relationships through degrees of relative domination of other people or 
submission to them. This is the 'master/slave' relationship. 
Hegel discusses this relationship in detail, discussing classes of people 
relative to each other in terms of domination and recognition. His discussion is 
essentially a social theory seeking to describe the ways in which societies are 
structured, evolve and manage their status relationships and their 
relationships with natural and human resources. As such, the 'master/slave' 
relationship only has bearing upon his description of self-consciousness in so 
much as it establishes its historical aspect. We are born with the desire for 
recognition and join the struggle for recognition immediately, as part of a 
human history of struggle. 
In the 'master/slave relationship, however, Hegel also argues that any 
meanings that we ascribe to objects, including the consciousness of others, is 
mediated by the struggle for recognition. This idea emerges in the work of 
other theorists of self-consciousness and perception: the idea that the world is 
an instrumental arena in which this struggle takes place. 
Edmund Husserl also describes self-consciousness in describing 
human consciousness. The relationship between consciousness, self- . 
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consciousness and the consciousness of others is a major part of 'Cartesian 
Meditations' (HusserI1991). 
Husserl argues that because human consciousness entirely mediates 
our experience of the world, it is not possible to conjecture an objective world 
beyond it. Further, he defines human consciousness as self-consciousness. 
Consciousness always has an object, even if that object is unavailable to 
experience except in consciousness. 
Husserl is not interested in proving or disproving the existence of the 
objects of consciousness. He is not interested in the world, per se. Rather he 
is interested in describing our consciousness of the world. 
'Cartesian Meditations' follows a train of thought derived from the work 
of Rene Descartes (Descartes 1996), in which self-consciousness is 
described as the only possible epistemological fact. Descartes concludes with 
scepticism as to the world's existence, but does not describe how 
unembodied self-consciousness exists. 
Husserl describes a relationship between consciousness and self-
consciousness in which self-consciousness ascribes meaning to 
consciousness, For Husserl, it does not signify that the objects of 
consciousness mayor may not exist because self-consciousness can only 
ascribe meaning to consciousness. He argues that the only consciousness 
that we are aware of is a consciousness of meaningful things. 
The ways in which self-consciousness ascribes meaning, in effect 
constituting the objects of consciousness, also creates subjectivity as an 
object of consciousness. The self is constituted through the meaningful 
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relationship of self-consciousness to the objects of consciousness that it 
generates. 
Husserl recognises solipsism in his description, which also exists in 
Hegel's. Although self-consciousness is a reflective consciousness, reflection 
alone allows a single type of epistemological relationship with other people. 
Whilst self is relative to consciousness or its objects, creating agency, other 
people remain a type of object (Husserl 1991 :89). 
For Husserl, this is an ethical problem, as objects have no agency, 
making independent action and social collaboration impossible. Neither do 
objects have ethical value. In answer to this problem, Husserl jOins Hegel in 
proposing mutual consciousness of other people as having self-
consciousness. Even if it is not verifiable outside consciousness, the 
experience of other people is a type of consciousness in which we assume 
mutual self-consciousness. 
Husserl calls this type of consciousness 'empathic intentionality', 
constituted by three types of experience. First, Husserl argues that other 
people are experienced as a unique type of object. Second, as a category of 
object, other people are experienced as having reciprocal experiences: we 
assume that they are conscious of us, as we are conscious of them. Third, our 
experience of every other object of consciousness is determined by 
consciousness that others are also conscious, so that we experience the 
world as a world experienced by others. 
Husserl describes how 'empathic intentionality' creates consciousness 
of other people as self-conscious. That is, as a particular type of object of 
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consciousness. He argues that 'empathic intentionality' occurs in two ways, 
through processes he calls 'apperception' and 'pairing'. 
'Apperception' is consciousness made meaningful by prior experience. 
Our own self-consciousness allows us consciousness of objects as other self-
conscious subjects. Apperception means that we are conscious of others as 
conscious because we are self-conscious. 
'Pairing' describes the way in which we attribute like qualities to things 
that are alike. Being conscious of our own agency and subjectivity, we 
attribute similar agency and subjectivity to people as specific types of objects 
of consciousness. 
Reflecting upon the relationship between consciousness and self-
consciousness, Husserl argues that we are conscious of others both as types 
of objects and as self-conscious subjects. Husserl describes this identification 
as consciousness of relative points of view, facilitating social relationships. 
'Pairing' and 'apperception' then become functions of subjectivity and our 
consciousness of others becomes a constituent of self-consciousness. 
A number of issues arise out of Hegel's and Husserl's descriptions of 
self-consciousness. Pre-eminent is the issue of solipsism. Husserl focuses 
exclusively on the constitution of individual consciousness, even as he 
describes processes of mutual awareness. Other people remain creations of 
the individual consciousness, empathy notwithstanding. 
This isolation of the self in relation to objects of consciousness is 
underwritten by an emphasis on observation rather than interaction with 
others. It describes a private rather than shared consciousness. Further, 
Husserl's description of self-consciousness does not identify a role for 
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individual distinctiveness or alterity. There is no discussion of subjective 
demarcation in the processes of 'apperception' and 'pairing'. despite the fact 
that people can be as meaningfully un-alike as they can be meaningfully alike. 
Therefore, the isolation of individual consciousness also has 
implications for perception and communication. Husserl does not describe 
how individual consciousness and self-consciousness affect the semic level. 
He does not discuss verbal language, for example. The description of 'pairing' 
in particular is not detailed enough to account for the fact that perception, 
action and sense are quite different types of objects of consciousness: an 
individual's experience of pain is utterly different to the sight of another person 
in pain, for example. To touch is quite a different type of object of 
consciousness than to be touched. They might reflect each other, but Husserl 
does not describe how this occurs 
Hegel's description of self-consciousness also raises the issue of 
solipsism. He argues that self-consciousness is only achieved relative to 
others (in the desire for recognition), implying the existence of the world and 
others in the world as independent agents as well as objects of 
consciousness. As an object of consciousness, this world is an instrumental 
arena. However, the desire for recognition itself is a process of individual 
consciousness, only played out as human subjectivity in the struggle for 
recognition that ensues with others. 
Although the struggle for recognition defines both individual 
consciousness and the social realm as mutually relative, contradicting 
solipsism, this relationship is always antagonistic. As a type of interaction, 
struggle, rather than cooperation, communication or any other of the 
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numerous ways in which people interact, characterises self-consciousness as 
a consciousness of others, for Hegel. 
The ways in which both Hegel and Husserl discuss solipsism lead from 
concepts of self-consciousness to concepts of perception. Both Husserl's 
description of 'empathic intentionality' and Hegel's struggle for recognition 
identify types of human involvement in which self-consciousness produces a 
subject in relation to other people. 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Alfred SchOtz and George Mead describe the 
processes by which this involvement occurs in detail. In particular, they 
develop Hegel's concept of an instrumental arena in which the struggle for 
recognition takes place, and Husserl's concepts of 'apperception' and 
'pairing', Together, these developments constitute a description of 
intersubjectivity . 
According to Merleau-Ponty, consciousness (described with Hegel as 
sensation, perception and cognition) is an engagement with its objects, rather 
than an awareness of them. He argues that engagement is the particular type 
of human involvement that creates both self-consciousness and society 
Engagement replaces struggle in Hegel's instrumental arena, retaining its 
physical aspect. It allows Merleau-Ponty to extrapolate a role for the physical 
body in consciousness, conflating sensation and cognition with perception. 
The physical body then provides the basis for the relationships between 
consciousness and self-consciousness, promoting consciousness as 
perspective, or the distinction between self and other/object. 
The concept of engagement also reframes the problem of solipsism as 
one of perception. Rather than approaching self-consciousness 
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epistemologically, arriving at the problem of sOlipsism facing Hegel and 
Husserl, Merleau-Ponty approaches self-consciousness by describing 
perception as an engagement with objects of consciousness (Merleau-Ponty 
1968a: 142). 
In 'The Visible and the Invisible', (Merleau-Ponty 1968a), he discusses 
the idea of perception as a stimulus to consciousness and the idea of 
perception as a judgement which we make about that stimulus. He argues 
against both ideas. He argues against the idea of perception as stimulus on 
the grounds that it is atemporal and general: there is no place for meaningful 
discrimination between stimuli on the grounds of either prior experience or 
relative significance. As a result, self-consciousness is impossible. He also 
argues against the idea of perception as a post hoc judgement of stimulus. 
This concept of perception, he argues, relies upon a definition of conscious 
judgement that neither accounts for perceptual error, nor describes the 
relationship between physical stimulus and adjudicating mind. 
For Merleau-Ponty, neither stimulus nor judgement account for 
perception. Rather, he describes perception as an engagement with 
otherness sought in physical forms (Merleau-Ponty 1962:53). As a result, 
sensation becomes meaningful because perception provides mutual 
perspective as a physical engagement with other subjects. Engagement does 
not allow for private representations of either these subjects or other objects 
of consciousness (Merleau-Ponty 1968a:269). 
Merleau-Ponty argues that engagement, as the process of perception, 
provides the basis on which our own faculties can be accorded to the self-
consciousness of others. Physical engagement repudiates SchOtz's objection 
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to 'pairing'. Physical actions generate responsive actions in others, so that 
action and response constitute a matrix of mutual experiences. Seeing is not 
being seen, but the experiencing of both in our engagement with others is the 
basis of self-consciousness as mutual differentiation. 
Merleau-Ponty points out that this mutual action and response is not 
necessarily egalitarian, but neither is it only antagonistic, as Hegel describes. 
Its ethical dimension arises out of mutual engagement, but this ethical 
dimension does not govern the creation of self-consciousness. Merleau-Ponty 
describes this model as encompassing both ethical and unethical actions, 
individuals, institutions and society. 
Finally, Merleau-Ponty highlights the significance of motion to his 
description of perception as engagement. Motion introduces a temporal 
aspect to the description, which reflects Hegel's inclusion of history in the 
creation of the social structures arising from the struggle for recognition. He 
defines perception as dynamic. 
Merleau-Ponty's description of perception constitutes a system of 
human actions made relative to each other, without objectification. In this 
system, human subjects are not reducible to individuals and physical actions 
are mutually responsive. (Merleau-Ponty 1962:354). Accordingly, cognitive 
events are always embodied actions and self-consciousness is only perceived 
through phYSical action in mutual, that is, social performance. This description 
refines and extends descriptions made by Husserl and Hegel. It describes 
intersubjectivity in so much as its processes define human subjects as both 
irreducible to individual consciousness and mutually embodied. 
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However, an issue remains in Merleau-Ponty's outline of the precise 
processes by which engagement allows self-conscious subjects to perceive 
human action and response as mutually informed. In 'The Phenomenology of 
the Social World' (SchOtz 1972), SchOtz addresses this issue in detail, 
describing the different levels on which perception occurs through 
engagement. 
SchOtz makes a distinction between two aspects of engagement, in 
which the motives and possibilities of action are circumscribed in different 
ways. An individual's actions represent self-consciousness because they 
physically represent the motives of the individual to the person making them. 
However, the same actions might represent quite different motives to another 
person as they engage with them. The same physical action has different 
meanings for the person acting and for people responding. For example, 
whereas an observer might think of an activity as 'drawing a comic strip', the 
person drawing might think of it as 'relaxing after a hard day at the office'. 
Therefore, engagement has two aspects, representing at least two states of 
consciousness and at least two subjects. 
SchOtz is careful to point out that this distinction is not the same as 
intention and interpretation, because the person acting in each case might be 
acting unintentionally. Rather, the distinction lies in the different ways in which 
physical actions represent themselves to consciousness and in the different 
meaning that they are perceived to have. 
SchOtz argues physical action is only meaningful because it represents 
others' motivation. However, those motives are not themselves perceived in 
the action by respondents. For them, meaning lies in an interpretation of the 
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action according to their own motives. The person acting and the person 
responding cannot share meaning. Rather, their engagement with each other 
constitutes an interworld in which physical action is made meaningful by 
engagement itself. Because each person engages with different motives 
underwritten by self-consciousness, this interworld is generated as relative 
perception. Subjects' motives are irreducible to any individual consciousness, 
like subjectivity itself. 
Engagement is then underwritten by a shared assumption that action is 
meaningful, even if perception of motives cannot itself be shared. SchOtz calls 
this assumption 'affecting-the-other'. It is achieved through physical actions as 
an embodiment of the agreement that actions are motivated by an intention 'to 
affect'. Schatz defines this shared assumption as a social relationship, 
arguing that it is applicable to every type of social structure. As in Merleau-
Ponty's description, SchOtz connects the processes of self-consciousness and 
perception with the structure of society at every level. 
However, SchOtz argues that four types of social relationship emerge 
from engagement and the shared assumption of intention to affect. These are 
co-present relationships, relationships with contemporaries beyond co-
presence, relationships with predecessors and relationships with successors. 
Every subject perpetually acts within all of these relationships. 
Co-presence, is of greatest interest to SchOtz. He describes the ways 
in which co-present engagement occurs as the foundation for all other social 
relationships. It occurs between intersubjects whose lives continually generate 
mutual perception through physical proximity, who are self-conscious and 
'other-affecting'. In co-presence, subjective differences, such as perceived 
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motive and individual history are agreed to be irrelevant to social 
collaborations (such as communication) if they do not adversely affect them. 
Even if actions are antagonistic, co-present engagement involves these types 
of mutual agreement. In cases of conflict, for example, subjects are not only 
acting to inflict or avoid harm, they are undertaking social roles that represent 
these motives differently. Conflict, the task in hand, is unaffected. 
SchOtz describes the operation of co-presence as typification. This 
results from the co-present agreement to accept the other's perspective as a 
self-conscious subject, whilst simultaneously making subjective interpretations 
of their actions. Typification is a practical corollary of the process of co-
present engagement, allowing each subject to be both a type of person and 
an individual. In co-presence, self-consciousness is a way of acting in relation 
to typifications shared with others. Then co-present engagement is self-
consciousness framed as an instrumental objectification of other subjects and 
self, through typification, alongside a mutual recognition of consciousness. 
At the level of self-consciousness, SchOtz's typification reflects Mead's 
description of the subject in 'Mind, Self Society' (Mead 1967). Mead 
describes two aspects of consciousness that produce subjectivity: 'I' and 'Me'. 
'I' equates to consciousness alone, whereas 'Me' describes consciousness's 
image of itself. However, Mead does not follow Husserl in an epistemological 
description of self-consciousness. Rather, he agrees with SchOtz and 
Merleau-Ponty in according engaged perception a mediating role in our 
consciousness of the world. 'I' and 'Me' are only perceptible in physical terms. 
Mead's 'Me' resembles SchOtz's typification. It results from a process of 
engagement with a differentiated other (initially 'I') on the basis of an 
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agreement of 'intention to affect'. In this way, Mead argues, the relationship 
between 'I' and 'Me' accounts for reflection and social collaboration, 
reproducing the structure of self-consciousness (Goffman 1968). 
Finally, Schatz argues, symbolic representations of these conditions of 
co-presence constitute descriptions of group identity and social status derived 
from participants' agreement to the completeness of each typification. 
The three other types of social relationship that Schatz describes are 
modifications and derivations of co-presence. Relationships with 
contemporaries beyond co-presence are mediated by technology. SchUtz 
describes technology as types of agent other than co-present human agents, 
encompassing every type of sign, every semic level and every physical trace. 
He argues that these technologies are reducible to the subjects and subject 
histories from which they derive. They are only meaningful relative to the 
subjects they represent. 
Relationships with predecessors and successors occur through 
physical traces of co-present and contemporary engagement, either 
generated in current action and oriented towards some future perception or 
modified from the past. 
Schatz's descriptions of relationships with contemporaries beyond co-
presence, relationships with predecessors and with successors, take Merleau-
Ponty's insistence on the significance of physical embodiment further. SchUtz 
argues that every form of technology represents the particular remote 
engagement between individuals and social groups. Not only does the 
embodiment of intersubjective relationships include the body, following 
Merleau-Ponty, but also the physical transformation of the environment 
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through technological mediation, the objects of that mediation and their 
traces. SchOtz argues that these traces are significant only in so much as they 
are reducible to the co-present subjects that generate them. 
Considered together, descriptions of seff-consciousness and 
perception by Hegel, Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, SchOtz and Mead construct a 
nuanced and sometimes contradictory definition of intersubjectivity. They 
share points of insight, arrived at by quite different methods and different 
points of origin. 
Crossley refers to many of these insights in order to describe 
intersubjectivity itself. His description remains based in the concepts of self-
consciousness and concepts of perception described by these theorists. He 
outlines two levels of intersubjectivity, one arising from the other. He 
distinguishes between 'radical' and 'egological' levels (Crossley 1996). 
'Egological' intersubjectivity includes the capacity for refleCtion as a 
type of perceptual engagement. Crossley bases his 'radical' level in 
descriptions made by Hegel and Husser!. He utilises insights made by 
Merleau-Ponty and SchOtz to reconcile these descriptions. The 'egological' 
level subsumes the 'radical' level', However, his description of the 'radical' 
level, he explains, also relies upon his cross-reading of these theorists and 
others. In particular, the ideas of SchOtz are more clearly discernible in his 
'radical' description than the ideas of Husser/. 
Crossley arrives at four conditions that define 'radical' intersubjectivity: 
First, he writes: II", that human subjectivity is not." a private inner 
world; which is divorced from the outer (material) world; .. , it consists in the 
worldly praxes of sensuous, embodied beings and." is therefore public", n 
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Second, he writes: " ... that subjectivity consists in a pre-reflexive ... 
engagement with alterity, rather than in an ... objectification of it... n 
Third, he writes: " ... that human action, .. necessarily assumes a socially 
instituted form and that this form is essential to its meaningfulness, .. n 
Finally, he concludes that " ... human action ... arises out of dialogical 
situations ... that are irreducible to individual human subjects." (Crossley 
1996:26). 
These conditions of intersubjectivity reflect a group of underlying 
principles: the processes of engaged perception mitigate against solipsism; 
consciousness of the phYSical body is the basis for consensual 
misapprehension; perception is embodied and hence dynamic; human 
subjects are irreducible to individual consciousness and the physical traces of 
human actions are only meaningful in so much as they reflect relationships 
between subjects. 
There are many possible objections to these conditions and the 
principles underlying them, as an approach to describing self-consciousness 
and perception and, consequently, as an approach to describing forms of 
communication. In particular, the idea that forms of communication embody 
intersubjective relationships from which they derive meaning, described by 
SchUtz, can be contradicted by the idea that these forms are either neutral 
vehicles and by the idea that they are objects that mediate meaning in 
themselves. 
However, these contradictions are not irreconcilable. It is possible to 
designate and analyse structures of objective forms, and their development, 
without deducing either that these forms mediate meaning independently of 
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self-consciousness or that self-consciousness requires a monadic ego. For 
example, in seeking to describe the relationship between consciousness and 
the objects of experience, Husserl's logical scepticism leads him to conflate 
the two. For Husser!, consciousness of the consciousness that we have of the 
world, constitutes our total experience of the world. Consequently, the 
designation and analysis of the structures of objective forms is also the 
designation and analysis of the processes of self-consciousness. SchOtz's 
theories develop this idea in detail, identifying different structures of objective 
form with different intersubjective processes and different levels of social 
interaction (SchOtz 1970). 
Following SchOtz, Crossley's collated conditions of intersubjectivity 
constitute a set of instrumental terms for analysing social production, relative 
to the processes of self-consciousness. T~ey turn intersubjective descriptions 
of self-consciousness and perception towards specific physical situations. 
In this study, I refer to a number of theorists of social production who 
approach their own interests by analysing objective forms in terms of the 
processes of self-consciousness. In particular, I refer to literary theorist Valentin 
Volo§inov's analytical method for " ... tracing the social life ofthe ... sign." (Volo§inov 
1929/1973:21), film and comics theorist Martin Barker's principles for the 
" ... application of the dialogical approach to cultural forms." (Barker 1989:275) and 
linguists Douglas Biber and Susan Conrad's method of " ... register analysis." (Biber 
and Conrad 2009:47). 
These theorists' approaches share and develop Crossley's conditions 
of intersubjectivity, connecting their ideas to the concepts of self-
consciousness and perception that underpin these conditions. I apply them to 
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comics theory, use them to analyse existing comic strips and to frame the 
theoretical problems that I attempt to address through practice. 
Having discussed and outlined definitions of intersubjectivity, 
arising from descriptions of self-consciousness and perception, I will continue 
by describing the ways in which emotions are communicated through physical 
transformations of the body. Emotion generates a mutually comprehensible 
field of objective forms, which are equated with highly subjective experiences. 
It is an area of human experience that is both pervasive and focussed, both 
intimate and public and acknowledged as shared. 
For Merleau-Ponty, emotion is not a configuration of physical 
sensations, it is rather the contextual significance of sensation. As such, it 
provides a plausible topic through which to approach relationships between 
subject, self, objects and society intersubjectively (Merleau-Ponty 1968). 
I will correlate different types of physical transformation to specific 
emotional conditions, outlining a range of ways in which the communication of 
emotion occurs. This is an overview of the objective forms that emotion takes. 
J make selective use of results of current experimental research in cognitive 
science, in order to obviate a series of descriptions of the processes of 
physical transformation through which we experience, communicate and 
understand emotion. 
My approach to using this information from the field of cognitive 
science simply substantiates my descriptions of the physical processes and 
objective forms that emotional expression takes. These descriptions aim to 
outline the ways in which emotion is embodied. I argue that these processes 
and forms exemplify physical relationships between self-consciousness and 
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perception, encompassing SchUtz's levels of social interaction and his claims 
about the meaning of technology. 
This approach is not to be confused with the recently emerged 
theoretical programme of 'neuroaesthetics' (Zeki 2008, Onians 2008). 
Neuroasthetics seeks to equate the experience of beauty with particular 
neurophysiological brain functions. Although there is much empirical evidence 
connecting the experience of many types of pleasure with particular brain 
functions (Bozarth 1994), the entire premise of neuroaesthetics is 
contradicted by the idea that experiences of beauty are culturally rather than 
physiologically determined. Unlike experiences of pleasure, the experience of 
beauty is not shared. Rather, it is culturally distinct. Because the experience 
of beauty has only relative cultural meaning, the search for a physiologically 
empirical experience of beauty is tautological. 
I will sometimes refer to the range of phYSical transformations that 
occur in emotional expression as 'body techniques' and 'resources' after 
cognitive scientist Jack Katz (Katz 1999) and psychologist Marcel Mauss 
(Mauss 1950). This choice of words identifies these transformations as 
instrumental. Physical transformations communicate but do not constitute 
emotion. In addition, I will discuss in some detail the motive, sensual, 
temporal and social basis of these transformations, arguing that they 
constitute the specific conditions of embodiment. I will propose that these 
conditions underpin a series of relationships that allow a narrative model of 
subjectivity. I will outline this model at the end of the Chapter. 
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The conditions of emotional expression 
Our emotions are our own, as a perpetual subjective condition, 
but they are beyond our complete cognitive control. As a sensual constituent 
of subjectivity, our emotions can take us unawares and overcome us. When 
we communicate emotion, our bodies change so as to transform the world in 
which we live, even as our cognition acts to evaluate it. Klaus Scherer 
describes these physical changes as a way in which we make subjective 
sense of our place in the world by sensually transforming it, embodying our 
selves thoughtlessly (Scherer 1984:296). 
If emotional expression describes our subjectivity through physical 
transformation, then these forms of expression must be continually mobile. 
Our bodies are never still, even when we are completely at rest. Motion, 
rather than stillness, is their characteristic condition. According to Sheets· 
Johnstone, the way in which each of us moves is not only an aspect of the 
way in which we transform physically, but one of the ways in which we 
recognise and communicate our particular subjectivity. Whilst we share a 
broad range of physiological possibilities for movement with other human 
beings, our own movements are always uniquely our own. They are a set of 
physical habits, competencies and possibilities that contributes to our own 
and others' sense of whom we are. 
She also argues that this kinesthetic singularity is one of the ways 
in which our subjectivity is defined and understood by others (Sheets· 
Johnstone 1999). Our emotions do not make these sensual transformations in 
subjective isolation. Richard Lazarus describes the transformations that 
express our emotions as " ... not only embodied, but also essentially social in 
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character ... " He continues: " ... emotion is best regarded not as an 'inner being' 
but as a 'relational process." (Lazarus 1984:230). In a world we share with 
other people, emotional expression defines our subjectivity for others as well 
as for ourselves. 
An assumption that many of us share is that how a person 
behaves emotionally contributes greatly to who they are. Kai Ericson (Ericson 
1957) and Erving Goffman (Goffman 1971:340) use this definition. For them, 
subjectivity comprises our own sense of our emotional conduct with others 
(the 'self) and the identity we understand by other people's behaviour in 
respect to us. Similarly, Jack Katz argues that, " ... one is always in society in a 
active manner, anticipating how one's actions will be seen by another; and 
one is also always already in society in a tacitly embodied manner in one 
respect or another unreflectively assuming the external stance from which on 
will view one's own conduct." (Katz 1999:143). 
Verbal language and emotional expression 
Emotional communication is sensual, physically transformative, 
social and mobile. Verbal language is not one of its prerequisites. I will use 
the term 'verbal language' to indicate languages comprised of words. Of 
course, there are also non-verbal languages with systematiC semantic and 
lexical structures. For example, British Sign Language correlates the syntax 
and grammar of verbal language with visual signs. The system of touch 
bargaining used by spice traders in eochin, India, has developed specifically 
so that individual negotiations can be undertaken without anyone else being 
able to either see or hear the process. However, both verbal and or other 
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forms of language share few of the conditions that characterise the physical 
changes we utilise to embody our emotions. 
The physical transformations that emotional expressions create 
are not possible through verbalisation. In as much as emotions create forms 
of expression by physically transforming the world, these forms express 
experiences that are incommunicable in the physical form of verbal language. 
Neither do we require verbal language in order to interpret them. Expressions 
of emotion, according to artist Gary Fagin, 'need no labeJ.' (Fagin 1990:14). 
In the context of emotional subjectivity, verbal language is only 
one expressive possibility in a much broader range of the sensually 
expressive possibilities of the body. According to Katz, verbal language 
" ... might... be seen as a particular application of a broader aesthetic 
knowledge, an application of a more general technology of the 
communicative, socially-interactive body that lies behind both talking and non-
talking ... conduct." (Katz 1999: 178). 
An example of the 'broader aesthetic knowledge' is provided in 
the physical transformations brought about by crying. Crying as a physical 
expression of sadness, joy, anger or fear emerges when the expressive 
options in verbal language are too limited to physically transform ourselves 
and the world around us. Crying physically changes the world in ways that 
verbal language cannot. 
In a related demonstration of the physical limitations of verbal 
language, I made two drawings in 2009. The first is a depiction of my own 
face expressing six emotions: sadness, anger, joy, fear, disgust and surprise ' 
(Illustration 01, Page 109). The second is a depiction of my own body 
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expressing the same set of emotions. (Illustration 02, Page 110). Arranged as 
spreads of two nine-panel pages, these drawings match each expression of 
emotion to one of three textual representations of spoken words: 'You're 
fired.' 'I love you.' and 'Destroy them.' 
The effect of the drawings relies upon two things: the consistent 
nature of both the images and the text as the juxtapositions between them are 
shuffled, and the opportunity to simultaneously view the eighteen cells 
containing all of the possible juxtapositions in each drawing. The meaning in 
each cell is clear to the extent that text and image are fully co-expressive, but 
this co-expressivity in undermined when the same text or the same image 
take on different meanings as a result of a different pairing. 
We then experience the text and image independently from each 
other. At this moment, the different physical limits of both text and image as 
resources of expression are revealed. The comparisons we are able to make 
spontaneously between cells also reveal the duality that fully co-expressive 
meaning obliterates. The drawing was inspired by a drawing Will Eisner made 
(Illustration 03, Page 111), which he described as a I' ••• demonstration of the 
effects of a commonly understood set of facial postures ... which give meaning 
to a parallel set of statements." (Eisner 1985: 11 0). 
My two drawings are depictive and textual representations of a 
series of situations in which I physically express a range of emotions whilst 
simultaneously verbalising information. As representations, they are not 
communicative in the same ways as the situations themselves. However, this 
is not significant for the purpose of demonstrating differences between the 
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forms of verbal and non-verbal expression and the effects of co-expression on 
the overall meaning of each situation. 
Verbal language is a single type of physical resource among the 
many physical resources that we use to communicate emotion. It is limited as 
a resource for emotional expression not because of what it cannot say about 
emotional experience, but because of its limited power to bring about direct 
transformations of the body. 
Of course, the shout and the whisper are verbalisations, but they 
owe their transformative power to processes of embodiment rather than to 
verbal language itself. Verbal language has singular transformative powers 
unsuited to transforming the widest range of subjective conditions, and this 
unsuitability is demonstrated in the expression of emotion in particular. 
However, when we cry, expressing physically what 
verbal language cannot, we are not selecting one communicative method 
over another in order to communicate a discrete, independent message about 
our emotional self. This is not how emotional expression functions. Such an 
idea constitutes what Carolyn Abbate calls 'miming mode'. It is idea in music 
theory that music is simply a vehicle for expressing a non-musical idea or 
event. In 'miming mode', " ... the composer invents a musical work that acts 
out or expresses psychological or physical events in a sonic miming. But in 
this model, music is nothing but the pro-musical objects that it echoes in 
sound." (Abbate 1996:27). Indeed, we are making the same error ifthis model 
is applied to any form of communication . 
. Rather than 'miming' a message about emotion with the limited 
phYSical resources provided by verbal language, in emotional expression we 
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physically transform ourselves and the world around us. For example, in 
demonstrating the different communicative possibilities of verbal language 
and physical transformation, Illustrations 02,03 and 04 sUbstantiate the idea 
that what cannot be communicated in verbal language cannot be 
communicated because verbal language lacks the physical characteristics 
with which to achieve this goal. 
Jack Katz argues "In emotional behaviour, the metaphoric vehicle 
of the self itself changes. It is not just that the message the person tries to 
convey becomes different. And it is not the responses of others, realised or 
anticipated that change. It is also the locus of the grounding of action that 
changes." (Katz 1999:299). Verbal language is simply one type of 
manifestation of the body. It is a limited embodiment in a physical 
environment offering many other possible means of embodiment. 
We can find a further example of the physical characteristics of 
verbal language when we listen to someone expressing emotion through 
verbal language alone. When this occurs, we often understand the opposite of 
what they are saying. We hear what is said verbally, but we understand the 
whole communication through changes in their body. 
Vocalised-only emotions remain within verbal language's limited 
frame of embodiment and contrast the semantic content of what is said with 
simultaneously embodied forms of expression that contradict it. For example, 
consider a simple vocal-only laugh, 'Ha, ha,' made without physical laughter's 
transformation of the body. This voice-only 'Ha, ha' communicates not joy but 
cynicism. Not being fully embodied, the laughter that is only vocalised seems 
false. Such a vocal-only laugh is commonly known as hollow laughter 
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because it is physically inappropriate: it has no meaningful body (Katz 
1999:116). 
Sometimes, we intentionally match the content of verbal language 
with body forms that contradict what is being said. Such mis-matching is also 
one of the expressive resources available to us. This is how we communicate 
irony, for example. However, we should not consider the meaning of this 
intentional mismatching as a reason for according a wider range of physical 
possibilities to verbal language itself. Even in the case of intentional mis-
matching, verbal language requires the form of a physically transformed body 
to adequately express what is meant. 
Verbal language only develops along a single dimension of time, 
word by word, whereas the range of other physical resources available 
through the body provide varying, specific temporal relationships in each 
moment of action with others. Verba/language compartmentalises meaning 
and arranges it hierarchically. Unlike verbal language, the other physical 
resources of the body are syncretic, so that a single expressive form can 
combine many different meanings. 
Taking part in our own emotional expression 
As we become more or less conscious of our emotions, we 
engage with particular aspects of our wider experience in relation to the ways 
in which our body is transformed. In each transformation, our bodies draw on 
different types of physical resources in order to communicate. We also utilise 
different regions of the body in order to behave in ways that communicate 
specific emotions. These behaviours are subjective attempts to transform 
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ourselves and transform the world around us. They are also shared tropes 
that are innate in human evolutionary biology, underlining the intersubjective 
function of emotional communication. Fagin, after Darwin writes "", most 
researchers conclude there are certain universal expressions,., the same six 
categories of expression: sadness, anger, joy, fear, disgust, surprise." (Fagin 
1990:126. Darwin 1872/1998). 
There is a difference between these emotional expressions and 
sensual expressions that are the direct product of physiological states such as 
pain, drowsiness or exertion. While never emotionally neutral, these 
expressions do not describe emotions in themselves. For example, it is quite 
possible to feel joy and pain, anger and pain or sadness and pain 
simultaneously. The emotion is not tied to the physiological condition. 
Physiological states such as these are not social, sensual and mobile in the 
same way as subjective emotional expression, They are not socially reflexive, 
do not generate subjective self-consciousness and do not bring about 
transformations of the body in the same ways. 
In this context, self-consciousness is our faculty to both have 
experiences and to experience that we are having experiences. It is not a 
faculty that we direct cognitively, in the sense that we mean when we say that 
we are 'feeling self-conscious.' It is not a cognitive function alone, but is a 
function of all of our senses (Gibbs 2005:21). 
The repertoire of physical changes that we make in order to 
communicate emotions, on the other hand, are visible embodiments of 
, 
subjective conditions that we share with other people, II •• , creatively mining 
the resources (we) find at hand in order to shape the impressions that others 
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take of (our) emotions." (Katz 1999: 6). This repertoire of physical changes is 
only meaningful in relation to our experience of other people. It is specific to 
each emotional moment., It is physiologically shared and requires self-
consciousness. 
The physical transformations occurring when we communicate 
emotion connect the physical with the social aspects of the situations in which 
we become emotional. We take part physically in our own expression, 
precipitating changes in our social world as well as our subjectivity. 
Katz describes a number of examples of the way in which we take 
part in our own emotional expression. He claims that when we are angry, we 
position and re-position ourselves physically in embodied roles in a 
developing drama. He argues that this the way in which the expression of 
anger transforms our body (Katz 1999:186/190). 
For example, expressing the particular type of anger known as 
road rage, we might physically embody a number of roles in the course of our 
emotional expression. First, we might embody the role of specific victim, 
expressing a sense of loss; then we might adopt the attitude of a general 
victim in a stereotypical drama, embodying transcendence; then we might 
take the posture of an avenging hero, embodying equilibrium regained. When 
we are angry, we act in extraordinary and irrational ways, in an attempt to 
reach self-consciousness through physical transformation. We try to regain 
what we feel that we have lost (Katz 1999:186/190). 
With tears of sadness, Katz continues, " ... crying is not simply a 
part of the loss itself, but a part of a process of transcending loss through 
representing it in the dramatics of a crying body ... (S)ad crying expresses a 
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dialectical narrative in that it fe-presents loss." (Katz 1999:186/190). Each 
facial, gestural, audible and active form of emotional communication 
transforms the body in a distinctive way, creating a unique physical vehicle 
that is specific to the moment and shared with other people. 
Self consciousness and emotional expression 
Routinely, we do not pay attention to our emotional selves 
because we take them for granted as part of the habitual course of our lives. 
We rely implicitly upon the physiological and social functioning of our bodies 
moment by moment, involuntarily blinking and breathing and unself-
consciously speaking and moving so as to physically orient us to other 
people, activities and things. 
It is only when particular episodes disrupt this routine that this 
unself-consciousness is overridden. Our emotional selves then call on the 
range of our physical resources, communicating emotion by changing the 
habitual forms of our bodies and the their relationships with the world. 
However, the overall course of our emotional lives is not 
bifurcated when we make these physical transformations. We do not step 
outside ourselves when we express emotions physically. Instead, our 
emotions shift us from unself-conscious being to self-conscious expression. 
Fagin calls this movement from one condition to another 'the human drama' 
(Fagin 1990:17). In this way, Katz writes, " ... emotions give dramatically new 
and emphatically visible forms to ... themes that have been less visibly present 
in social life. " (Katz 1999:332). 
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Because physical self-consciousness is a prerequisite of these 
transformations, we are also conscious that they are meaningful for other 
people. We become aware of the way in which our body changes as we 
express emotion. Hence we become aware that other people are also 
experiencing this change in us. Because of this reciprocity, emotions are ways 
in which we experience the self in the way in which we perceive others to be 
experiencing us. When we communicate our emotions, this subjective self-
consciousness is a fundamental aspect of the physical transformations that 
we undergo. 
The repertoire of physical gestures 
The physical transformations that we use to communicate emotion 
are multidimentional, like emotions themselves. McNeill refers to this 
multidimensionality when he describes gestures as II ••• global, in that the 
whole is not composed out of separately meaningful parts. Rather the parts 
gain meaning because of he whole," (McNeill 1992:20). 
There is also no formal difference between action and meaning, 
form and content, in expressive gestures. Rather, meaning is immediately 
embodied, so that the physical forms of the changes that we make to our 
bodies are meaningful in themselves. Neither are these physical forms a 
single level of communication among others, in the way that audible words 
are only one level among other levels of verbal language. The forms that we 
make with our bodies are not emblems or substitutes for words. Instead, they 
are comprehensively meaningful. According to McNeill, they" ... exhibit 
meanings in their own right." (McNeill 1992:22, 1 05). 
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We share characteristic expressive body techniques with each 
other because we share physiology. However, this does not suggest the 
existence of a grammar of expressive body forms. These expressive forms do 
not requiring syntacticical arrangement in order to communicate. The 
expressive forms made by different people 14 ••• can present the same 
meaning, but do so in quite different forms. Moreover, the gestures of people 
speaking different languages no more different than the gestures of people 
speaking the same language." (McNeill 1992:22,105). 
For example, according to the expressive needs of the moment, 
we might use our bodies to represent someone else's body or part of a body. 
Or we might use them to represent a specific object, or a relationship in 
space, a directional force, a temporal change or our particular point of view in 
relation to others. Often, within the course of such an expressive embodiment, 
we transform our bodies in order to represent a number of different things 
consecutively. These physical forms are able to express an infinitely wide 
range of physically embodied meanings. 
The expressive forms that we make with our bodies also allow us 
a subjective understanding of abstract ideas and reveal to us previously 
unformed processes of thought. (Talmy 1988, 2000). Because they are 
spontaneously meaningful, we accumulate a repertoire of meaningful forms' 
ontologically, by simply being. 
This repertoire is a sophisticated way of manipulating the physical 
resources of our bodies through the unself-conscious accumulation of 
embodied images, known in cognitive science as 'image schema' (Gibbs 
2005:90). As a repertoire, image schema extend and animate our own sense 
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of who we are whilst we employ them in physical communication. We employ 
image schema to express complex and abstract personal knowledge, such as 
emotional states, by spontaneously correlating that knowedge with knowledge 
from another domain, such as our experience of the physical changes we 
make to our bodies. 
Therefore, image schema are metaphorical representations of 
abstract, subjective knowledge communicated through transformations of our 
bodies. More precisely, the key characteristic of this function is mixed-
metaphorical rather than metaphorical, because it makes representations of 
one type of knowledge by utilising another. 
In Greek rhetoric, there is a term for this function. Rhetorically, 
Icatechresis' is the use of an existing word in a new way to describe 
something for which no other word exists. Catechresis uses words to break 
lexical rules so as to communicate something beyond the lexicon. 
(Smyth1920: 677). This is exactly how image schema function. 
Image schema employ physical body forms to stand for a 
physically felt but abstract sense. They can represent our experience of 
others, of physical activities, of the apprehension of movement and time, of 
our use of objects and our understanding of space (Johnson 1987, Lakoff 
1987, Talmy 1988,2000). 
Where no adequate expressive form exists to embody what is felt, 
forms are unselfconsciously taken from another domain as representations 
produced actively by the body. For example, we might splay our fingers 
around and away from our heads to indicate our sense of wonder through an 
embodied image of invisible emanation or aura. When we are angry, we might 
67 
employ our arms as representations of a hammer. In grief we fold our bodies 
to create an image of physical defeat. 
Through a process of catechretic embodiment, image schema 
create homologies between sensations, ideas and images. Certain types of 
physical form appear more readily to embody some cognitive or emotional 
senses than others. We often form kinesic images with our bodies in order to 
represent abstract senses of movement, for example. Similarly, sociologist 
Geoffrey Beattie has noticed that dramatically mobile bodies communicate 
abstract knowledge about direction, speed and action more clearly than 
bodies visibly at rest (Beattie 2004: 117). 
The homologies created by image schema through catechresis 
conform to the constraints of causality in the physical world. Although they are 
images that we produce and develop within the constraints of this world, our 
bodies appear to create the possibility of any image at any scale in any time 
or place. This brings subjectivity and imagination together to make any 
representation of any situation, narrative, emotion or sense possible. 
Image schema provide vivid, recognisable representations of the 
practical topology of physical expression. These schema can represent both 
images of objects and. images of types of space. They conform to the 
conditions of emotional expression in that they are physical, motive and 
require self-consciousness. When we employ each type of schema, we also 
establish a physical relationship with the image that locates us in relation to it 
and to other people. 
McNeill names five types of image schema identified by cognitive 
scientists: Iconic images create a distinction between our physical body and 
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an abstract condition of the body's transformation. Metaphoric body images 
present abstract sense through direct depiction. Dietic images identify an 
abstraction with a particular physical place beyond our body and hence 
position the body very precisely in the world. Cohesive images produce the 
same action of the body repeatedly, to indicate narrative continuity. Beat 
images are representations of pauses in the progress of physical 
transformation (McNeill 1992:12, 16). 
In particular, these homological types of gesture reveal our 
processes of catechretic representation as direct manifestations of our 
emotional and cognitive selves in a world of fully represented spaces. times, 
people and things. This world is transformed by the body, demonstrating our 
capacity to experience the world not only both physically made meaningful by 
subjective abstract content in relation to others. As Katz writes: "Emotions in 
everyday social interaction live and die in contextually-situated metaphors. By 
changing the metaphor that describes the course of his or her relations with 
others, a person can transform the very body of his or her experience (Katz 
1999:69). 
There are other possible types of physical transformation through 
which the body communicates. Sociologist Adam Kendon identifies a scale of 
homologies that stretches from gestures that communicate unself-
consciousness at one extreme (Illustration 04, Page 112) to gestures that are 
only meaningful in conforming to grammars such as the hand gestures of 
British Sign Language or of Indian classical dance (Illustration 05. Page 113) 
(Kendon 2004:99). 
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The material transformations that we make with our bodies also 
spontaneously generate a series of points of view. These are positions we 
adopt in the process of producing each image. They are specific in time and 
place. These points of view are obvious in each physical transformation that 
we make. They can be as straightforward as the creation of an image in which 
we form either the centre or the periphery, looking out from our own actions or 
looking in. 
McNeill describes body transformations that place us at the centre 
of the image we create as showing 'character viewpoint'. He describes 
transformations that place us at the periphery of the image as showing 
'observer viewpoint'. The actions of our transforming bodies are located in 
different places depending on the image (McNeil 1992). A character viewpoint 
image includes our bodies in the substance of the image, whereas in an 
observer viewpoint image, our body is excluded. 
This distinction is a formal characteristic of each physical form as 
we create it. These physical forms are not media carrying messages, but are 
directly meaningful in themselves. As a result, the network of different points 
of view explicitly communicated in the creation of each image also describes a 
network of relationships with other people and things in the physical world. 
Beattie writes " ... iconic gestures which were generated from a 
character viewpoint were significantly more communicative than those 
generated from an observer viewpoint." because they employ a direct channel 
of communication from one person to another. A narrow focus is described 
between body and body, making a clear distinction between what is 
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communicated and what is occurring in a wider environment (Beattie 
2004:129). 
He also argues that, when produced with speech, images with 
different character viewpoints have strong correlations with different types of 
verb. Character viewpoint images are associated with transitive clauses 
(those that require a direct subject and an object or objects, 'You lifted the 
bags' for example), whilst observer viewpoint images are associated with 
intransitive clauses (those that do not require an object, for example, 'You 
sleep.') (Beattie 2004). 
Observer viewpoint images are more complex. Our body 
simultaneously creates the communicative image and stands outside it, 
regarding the image from other people's point of view. Observer viewpoint 
images are more reflective and less communicative of movement than 
character viewpoint images. The types of body transformations they involve 
are co-expressive, so that as we join others' point of view in making them, we 
also invite others to join us in viewing. 
Because the physical forms of expression are reciprocal, affecting 
both other people and us, their production has an effect upon our subjective 
understanding of the world. For example, we derive as much understanding 
as others do about a personal loss from our own embodied image of crying. 
Our hands, embodying a specific sensation or relative point of view, 
communicate as fully to us as to others. 
Therefore, self-consciousness and self-influencing are as much 
constituents of subjectivity as the effects we have on others and others' 
effects upon us. When we express ourselves physically in gesture, we create 
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visual metaphors that communicate processes of memory, sensation, emotion 
and (Jarvella and Klein 1982). Forming our subjectivity for ourselves as well 
as others, the embodied forms of expression ground our subjectivity, allowing 
us to feel about our own feeling and view our own view. 
The boundaries of the body 
When we express ourselves by spontaneously transforming our 
bodies, we adopt either an' emic' position or an 'etic' position. These are 
anthropological terms. When our gestures display 'observer viewpoint' we are 
joining the social sphere to perceive our own communication from the 
positions of other people. This is an emic position. On the other hand, when 
we display 'character viewpoint' in our gestures, we establish social distance 
from other people, creating a single position that we inhabit and from which 
we view others. This is an etic position (Pike 1996). 
The anthropological naming of these two distinct positions 
underlines the connection between the social and physical aspects of 
communication, confirming the conditions of emotional expression. We 
understand the world by drawing inferences from our experience of other 
people and their bodies. Katz argues" ... as people act, there is no gap 
between taking the standpoint of others and responding ... One's perception of 
others and one's response are of a piece." (Katz 1999:316). 
Consequently, emic and etic positions also define the boundaries 
of our bodies as constantly re-made in relation to the physical and social 
circumstances in which we exist, rather than as biological objects. Bateson 
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cites the example of a blind man who literally feels that the tip of his white 
cane is the somatic outer reach of his body (Bateson 1972) . 
. This is also what is occurring in those situations where amputees 
still feel the removed parts of their bodies as sensate, even though u ••• there is 
nothing in the physiology of an amputated leg that gives some patients the 
feel of their real legs before they were amputated. Instead, the missing limb 
remains part of... the body that continues shape how that person moves and 
feels." (Gallagher 1995). 
In these instances, physiological changes shift the boundary of 
our body subjectively, rather than along clinical lines. In the case of the blind 
man's cane and an amputated limb, an area of the world is experienced as 
within the boundary of the body that is usually experienced beyond it. 
These examples show not only an unusual extension of a 
bounded body, but a socially meaningful change effected by these people on 
others. Meeting the blind man, we perceive his cane as the furthest reach of 
his touch in the same way that he does. As much as the boundaries of our 
bodies are continually in a state of physical contingency, the world is also. 
We achieve this continual redefinition of our body's boundaries 
through the same process of catechresis that we employ with gestural image 
schema. In the case of the blind man, his cane is not only an instrument that 
enables him to receive remote vibrations. It is a physical image of his seeing 
into the world. In making this image, he endows one faculty with the 
characteristics of another. Consequently, we see him feeling, not as we feel, 
but as we see. 
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Such substitutions are habitual in our perception of the world, as 
well as in communication. For example, as cognitive scientist Jonathan Cole 
observes, our visual sense often substitutes directly for muscle sense (Cole 
1995). We infer weight from images of objects being lifted or carried (Valenti 
and Costa" 1997) and assume dynamic information about movement when 
perceiving static shapes (Babcock and Freyd 1988). These are not examples 
of mis-perception. They represent the catechretic substitution of one set of 
sensations for another in order to enhance our knowledge of what, where and 
who we are. 
Similarly, Vivian Sobchack describes a man with increasingly 
severe Parkinsonism who makes his own furniture. Finding his personal world 
changed by the disease, he re-designs and makes items that objectify his 
physical relationships with others. He " ... designs and makes furniture in the 
Parkensonian mode'- but this description subtends both (him) and his 
furniture. That is, it describes the specific and embodied materiality of both 
subjectivity and objectivity and their complex relationship." (Sobchack 
2004:291). 
Proprioception 
The definition of the boundaries of our bodies is a function of the 
body sense known as proprioception. In purely physiological terms, the 
motive, positional and spatial sense that we have of the own bodies 
constantly underpins our own terms of embodiment. However, proprioception 
is more than our sense of our biologically-bounded body in motion and space. 
The spaces and motions of our bodies are subjectively and socially 
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meaningful, as well as sensual and cognitive. They operate within a 
physiology shared with others. 
Our proprioceptive sense ties our physiological motor functions to 
perception. It draws the interoceptive senses, such as pain and cold, 
exterospective senses, such as balance, hearing, touch, smell, taste and sight 
and our cognition together when we expressively transform our bodies. It is 
the faculty that we have for feeling in ourselves the physical forms that we 
utilise to communicate. 
For example, when we contract the muscles around our eyes 
because we are angry, we feel the contraction to be stressful and 
compressive. When we contract these muscles in the same way because we 
are laughing, they feel generative and radiantly energetiC (Fagin 1990:77). It 
is our proprioceptive sense that forms this connection. because our subjective 
feeling " ... is central to how we conceive of the relation between ourselves 
and our bodies. We do not feel subjective experiences to be specific brain 
states but sensations of our bodies in action." (Gibbs 2005:27). 
Psychologist Benny Shannon describes the functions of 
proprioception as 'enactment'. This is our capacity to feel our own actions as 
distinct embodiment, as though we perceived them in others. In other words, it 
is our capacity to connect physical sensation with perception so that we feel in 
the same way that we perceive (Shannon 1997). 
Cognitive scientists T. Beardsworth and T. Buckner argue that we 
recognise light displays derived directly from the movements of our own 
bodies more accurately than we can identify similar displays derived from the 
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movements of others, despite the fact that we see our own complete bodies in 
motion very rarely (Beardsworth and Buckner 1981). 
Enactment is a physiological mimicking in our own bodies of the 
actions of others, or of representations of our selves. This is not a cognitive 
process, but a mobile, physiological response in which people's" ... imagistic 
abilities are dependent on their subjective modelling of the tasks that mediate 
motor action and the environmental consequences of that action, and how 
they can transfer that understanding to new situations." (Gibbs 2005:127). We 
use our bodies both to gain knowledge about and to represent the physical 
actions that we perceive in other people and the physical properties that we 
perceive in the world around us. 
Author Michael Polanyi describes this process when he claims 
that we become the pen when we write, feeling the action of the motivated nib 
as the course of communication. According to Polanyi, this is the dominant 
sensation of writing, rather than a cognitive sense of forming of each letter 
according to language. For him, motor sense replaces cognitive sense in an 
inter-modal exchange. In this way, enactment also employs catechretic 
embodiment in its process of generating expressive body images (Polany; 
1966). 
Cognitive scientists Botvinik and Cohen's enquiries into· 
correlations between vision and the sense of touch indicate the same inter-
modal process. In a 1998 experiment, they had participants " ... seated with 
the left arm resting on a sma" table. A study screen was positioned beside the 
arm to hide it from the subject's view and a life-size rubber model of the left 
hand and arm was placed on the table directly in front of the subject. The 
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participants sat with eyes fixed on the artificial hand while we used two small 
paintbrushes to stroke the rubber hand and the subjects hidden hand, 
synchronising the timing of the brushing." Participants quickly developed the 
feeling that they sense the stroking in the rubber hand in view and not their 
own hand, out of view. (Botvinik and Cohen 1998:766). 
A visually perceived touch is still a direct physiological touch in 
proprioception, because vision is an embodied sense. Sight is only 
comprehensible to us in the context of our total physiology. A heard rhythm is 
similarly embodied as directly perceived motion. This movement is perceived 
physically even if our own bodies do not move in the same ways. According to 
Todd and Kourtzi and Kanhisher, the same areas of the brain that perceive 
motion are activated when we perceive both actual and implied motion (Todd, 
1999. Kourtzi and Kanwisher 2000). 
The physiological base for cross-modal, enacted embodiment lies 
in a particular neurological process of the brain. The same neurons are 
activated when we sense for ourselves and when we perceive others sensing. 
This process is called Imirroring' in cognitive science and the neurons that 
undertake it are called Imirror neurons' (Hutchinson, Davis, Lozano, Troby 
and Dostrovsky 1999). 
There are two aspects to the function of mirror neurons. In one 
function, they activate the same physiological response in the person acting 
as the response felt by a person perceiving their actions, so that our own body 
transformations make us feel as others feel in relation to us. This 
physiological mirroring is known as IMead's Loop', after G. H Mead. 
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Mead sets out the conditions under which images produced 
through physical transformation become communicative. They" ... implicitly 
arouse in an individual making them the same response which they explicitly 
arouse in other individuals." (Mead 1982). Gibbs argues "Mead's Loop plays a 
role in the ability to take the perspective of others. Perspective is the core 
component of grounding in Herbert Clark's sense (Clark 1992) and is crucial 
in general to the ability to tailor messages to recipients." (McNeill 2005: 252). 
In their other function, mirror neurons also play this role in creating 
a matching but converse set of relationships. Our own physiological response 
to the actions of others reproduces in ourselves the neurological activity of the 
physical actions we perceive. This type of mirroring is known as the 'As-if-
body', in a term first used by cognitive scientist Antonio Damasio. He writes 
that the perception of" ... imagery is accompanied by sensorimotor 
sensations, or whole 'body loops', which give imagistic experience its rich 
phenomenological quality." (Gibbs 2005:138, Damasio 1994). 
The "As-if-body' function connects our own subjective 
embodiment to the perception of others' experiences, so that we feel as we 
perceive other's feeling. 'Mead's Loop' allows us to perceive our own felt 
actions in the way others feel them. Both of these functions of proprioception 
create an empathic understanding of other people's experiences and our own 
sensual experiences in relation to them. Through these physiological 
relationships, we fully understand that other people are embodied subjects 
like ourselves. Gibbs argues "Through the functions of our proprioceptive 
sense, ... shared representations of perceptions and actions underlie social 
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cognition and intersubjectivity," (Gibbs 2005:35, Gergely and Watson 1999, 
Rochet 2001, Trevarthen 1977). 
Proprioception makes our subjective, embodied communication 
directly meaningful through shared physiological functions. These functions 
underpin our relationships with other people in general, but they are always 
specific people engaged with us in relationships that have specific meanings 
in the moment. Expressive embodiment is never embodiment in general. 
Within the constraints of physiology, our relationships with others are 
characterised by continual change, but these changes position us absolutely, 
physiologically, emotionally, cognitively and socially. 
We are meaningful to others in particular, as they are meaningful 
to us. Katz argues 'The different bodies that are attended to ... in emotional 
and social interaction are ... different ways of three-dimensional being, 
different vehicles for conduct' writes Katz (1999:341). Gibbs concludes 
"Empathy is deeply grounded in the experience of our lived bodies, and the 
experience enables us to directly recognise others, not as bodies endowed 
with minds, but as persons like us." (Gibbs 2005:36, Gallese, Ferari and 
Umilta 2002). 
Correlating the conditions of expression and Intersubjectivity 
Our emotional communication is a way in which we make our 
subjectivity physical, changing other people, the world and ourselves. 
Through its processes, we create a repertoire of physical transformations that 
exploit all the physical opportunities that our bodies provide. We become self-
conscious. This self-consciousness allows us to empathise with other people 
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and to track the changing boundaries of our own bodies. We share this 
process physiologically with others. 
Crossley identifies three concepts that connect emotional function 
to intersubjectivity, according to Merleau-Ponty. He writes: "First, emotions 
are not inner states. They manifest in the way in which we act and they are,,, 
publicly and intersubjectively definable states. Second, emotion is defined as 
a way of relating ... We are joined to others by emotion. Third, .. emotion must 
therefore be dialogically constituted: .. it shapes and is shaped by our 
interactions with others." (Crossley 1998:46). These concepts of emotion 
correlate to his 'radical' conditions of intersubjectivity. He writes: "We are 
intersubjects. Our actions and thoughts aren't reducible to us alone. They are 
moves in a game that has many players, responses to a call to action that is 
expressed in every gesture of the other. And this significance is precisely 
constituted through their place in that game," and "Human beings are 
embodied beings and this is crucial to their intersubjectivity. Moreover, their 
intersubjective relations take place within and include material environments." 
(Crossley 1996:173,174). 
To recall these terms, Crossley defines the conditions of 
intersubjectivity a) " ... human subjectivity is not. .. a private inner world; which 
is divorced from the outer (material) world; that it consists in the worldly 
praxes of sensuous, embodied beings and that it is therefore public ... ", b) 
" ... that subjectivity consists in a pre-reflexive ... engagement with alterity, 
rather than in an ... objectification ofit...", c) " ... that human action, .. 
necessarily assumes a socially instituted form and that this form is essential to 
its meaningfulness,,," and 'that d) " ... human action ... arises out of dialogical 
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situations ... that are irreducible to individual human subjects." (Crossley 
1996:26). 
In this view of emotion as socially-based embodiment utilising the 
resources of the sensual body, Gibbs argues "proprioceptive information ... 
couples neural systems to bodily and environmental resources in a way that 
creates a larger dynamical system,' (Gibbs 2005:53). This places the physical 
forms of expression at an 'ecological' level of perception. For Gibbs, this 
ecology is constituted in spontaneously understanding the causal 
relationships between the things we perceive, so that " ... the listener does not 
merely hear the sound of a galloping horse or of a bowing violin; rather the 
listener hears a horse gal/oping and violin bowing." (Repp1995:59). 
In other words, when we communicate through physical 
transformation, our embodiment is meaningful to us and to other people 
because we physically join in a dynamic, social environment where perception 
is a" ... kind of empathic embodied cognition of physical cause and effect," 
according to Clarke (Clarke 2001). 
This perception of physical cause and effect arises out of our 
sense of ourselves going through physical changes and perceiving that other 
people do the same. As a result, our comprehension of the sensual world is 
derived directly from the complex range of physical and social opportunities 
that the world affords each of us. 
James Gibson coined the word 'affordances' to describes this 
complex range of physical and social opportunities that the world offers to 
each of us (Gibson1966, 1979). For Gibson, each affordance has specifiC 
properties both as information and as physical stimulus. These properties are 
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the result of physical cause and effect. We perceive that each· acts upon the 
other in a way that conforms to Gibbs' 'ecological' level of perception. 
The specific range of properties available to us individually 
pOSitions each of us in the world, by allowing us some opportunities for action 
and disallowing others. We are each constrained by a set of physical 
possibilities, within which we act to express ourselves and comprehend others 
through embodiment, by effecting physical changes. According to historian 
Hayden White, every action we make within the possible range of actions 
available to us represents our subjectivity. This is who we are for ourselves 
and who we are in relation to other people (VVhite 1999). 
Crossley writes: "Assuming the presence of others gives us a 
sense of ourselves, including a sense of our body and what we should do with 
it," (Crossley 1996:95). Our perception of cause and effect within a physical 
ecology comprised of specific things, places, people, emotions and 
sensations is the basis for our intersubjectivity. Our relationships with other 
people are also affordances in the world in that they contribute to and limit our 
own thoughts and actions. Collins argues" ... social order must necessarily be 
physical and locaL" (Collins 1981: 995) .. M. L. Lyon and J. M. Barbalet also 
claim "Emotion is preCisely the means whereby human bodies achieve a 
social ontology through which institutions are created." (Lyon and Barbalet 
1994:56). 
When we express ourselves physically, our subjectivity is defined 
and communicated through the transformation of our bodies. Our subjectivity 
is defined relative to other people within a network of distinct subjective 
positions. We have experiences and simultaneously perceive that we have 
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them. This self-consciousness provides us with a sense of ourselves from our 
own and from other people's point of view. Based on our shared physiology, 
we share this capacity with other people. Katz describes this reciprocal self-
consciousness as a 'two-fold narrative'. By using the term 'two-fold' he 
identifies our capacity to take a position relative to other people as a 
prerequisite of subjectivity. He writes "The two-fold sense-making project 
emerges in emotional moments, .. in the sensual form of metamorphosis: the 
subject's ongoing narrative work becomes visible to self, to others ... as a 
distinctive incorporation of conduct. n (Katz 1999:324). 
Ontological changes are also social changes, and vice versa. We 
do not experience our own and others' bodies in their biologically 
circumscribed, individual form. but as part of a network of physical and social 
relationships in the larger world. In a world of affordances, our bodies are 
communicative resources that we share with other people. Viewing the world 
in this way, none of our actions are private because our every action is 
significant. That is also to say, all of our actions are expressive. 
Narrative 
Sociologist Paul Cobley claims that this capacity for perceiving our 
own actions as though they were the actions of other people is a primary 
condition of narrative. enabling us to establish a subjective identity in relation 
to others (Cobley 2001). 
Narratologist Gerald Prince writes "". narrative ... underlines the 
contract between narrator and narratee; that contract on which the very 
existence of narrative depends." He defines narrative as "The representation 
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(as product and process, object and act, structure and structuration) of one or 
more real or fictive events communicated by one .. , or several (people) ... to 
one .. , or several (other people) ... " Prince lists other definitors that typify 
narrative content, such as sequence and continuity, as well as specific media, 
such as vocal language, considered by some narratologists to be 
prerequisites of narrative itself (Genette 1980). 
However, in Prince's opinion, definitions of narrative made 
through content and media are all contingent upon the single definitive 
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relationship between the person producing an expression and the person 
receiving it (Prince" 1989:60). 
This is a very broad definition that does not distinguish narrative 
from " ... representations of a random series of situations and events, .. " 
(Prince 1989:58). Nor does this definition exclude any from of representation 
made by one person in relation to another. Arguably, narrative encompasses 
every form of representation according to this view. How, then, can this 
definition allow distinctions between different media or between types of 
content? 
In Prince's definition, these questions are subsidiary because 
neither media nor content define narrative. Any medium for representation 
and any content can become narrative. Narrative is distinct from other ways in 
which communication is structured and understood. Uniquely amongst forms 
of expression, narrative encompasses the context in which communication 
takes place as an indivisible aspect of the meaning of what is communicated. 
This context is the subjective relationship between people who 
communicate with each other, represented in the physical form in which they 
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communicate. In terms of intersubjectivity, this defines narrative as much by 
the relationship between the people who make the situation in which it occurs, 
as in the content of what is represented. 
We utilise narrative when we make spontaneous catechretic 
representations in order to communicate directly through our bodies. This is 
particularly true when the body generates images of space in order to 
communicate relative points of view. These representations belong to the 
metaphorical world that is depicted, as part of the meaningful content that is 
communicated. 
Narrative also structures our relationships with other people in the 
world outside the world of representation. For example, visual mages of 
specific spaces in image schema bear a relationship to spaces articulated by 
our bodies in the phYSical world. The represented space is generated 
spontaneously as part of our own body's expressive transformation, 
immediately placing us in relation to others. In this way, narrative comprises 
both a resource for communication through the body and also underpins the 
way in which our relationships with others are formed. 
The physical techniques that we use to express ourselves mirror 
the structure of what we express (McNeill 1992: 183). The form and the 
content of our expression exist under the same physical conditions. We know 
that what we express makes sense to other people because we perceive our 
own expression from their point of view. This occurs because we share the 
both the same physiology and a world of specific affordances. 
In the case of narrative drawing, or example, cognitive scientist 
Gregory Bateson argues that the brush that an artist uses to draw becomes 
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the artist's body. Both the form of the expression and its content are perceived 
by artist and viewer alike as motivated by a particular body. in the same way 
as we perceive crying as an image of physical defeat, or understand a 
complex space in an image made by our hands (Bateson 1972). 
The physical process of expression is perceived as the process of 
what is expressed. This description applies without modification to all 
narrative, whatever the particular physical form of its expression. The 
accumulated technological traces of other bodies do not contradict this. In the 
case of comics, these are the traces of the processes of manual and 
mechanical reproduction. 
Neither is physical co-presence required for us to enter into these 
specific relationships. The 'Mead's Loop' function applies to every trace of the 
physical transformations through which we communicate. The proprioceptive 
connection between saying and hearing, showing and being shown, seeing 
and being seen is maintained however it might be mediated by technology or 
by distances of place and time. Prince's definition of narrative does not 
proscribe any form of representation. It focuses instead upon subjective 
positions relative to each other and upon transformation as prerequisites. He 
argues" ... narrative is not only a product but a process, not merely an object 
but also an act... " (Prince 1989:59). 
Therefore, the physical traces left by the actions of other people 
can also be expressive, even when those people are no longer present, even 
in memory. We enter into relationships with other people by means of every 
affordance that retains their slightest physical trace. For example. we even 
infer the presence of other people. and make inferences about the types of 
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people they are in relation to ourselves, when viewing a clear sky recently 
traversed by a now-vanished airplane. 
With these conditions in view, it is possible to model the ways in 
which narrative creates a structure for our communications with each other. 
Doing this makes explicit that each relative component in this model can be 
described as a distinct temporal component, a distinct subjective identity and 
a distinct social situation in which communication takes place. 
Narrative's different subjects 
In everyday speech, when we speak of any form of narrative 
expression, we invariably mean a eplot', which is the expressive content rather 
than the expressive form. When we speak in this way, we mean that narrative 
sense is derived entirely from what is being told rather than from the situation 
or form of its telling. 
Consequently, we make an habitual assumption that conflates the 
structure of plot with the structure of narrative. We take the sequential and 
linear structure of plots as the defining principle of narrative itself. When we 
do this, we describe narrative erroneously as " ... just a sequence that starts 
and moves inexorably to its end." (Cobley 2001: 9). 
However, as Frank Kermode rightly points out: " ... sequence goes 
nowhere without its doppelganger, causality." (Mitchell 1981:80). With stories 
told through direct expressive embodiment, this habitual confusion is less 
likely to occur. We perceive the form of embodiment itself as directly 
meaningful. We grasp immediately that we are part of a subjective exchange 
with another person that generates a number of relative positions in time and 
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space, even if we understand the content of what is being expressed as a 
linear, sequential plot (Ricoeur 1990:71). 
In fact, the linear and sequential time we expect of a plot is only 
one of the possible temporal conditions contributing to the way in which 
narrative structures communication. Narrative is structured by a number of 
different, co-existing times, always in attendance, which act in particular ways 
to create a network of intersubjective relationships between people and their 
specific expressive actions and expressions (Abbate 1996:14). 
To identify these different times requires keeping motive and 
embodied subjects always in view. We must resist our tendency in everyday 
speech to simply conflate narrative with types of content and thus fall into the 
error of objectifying it. Rather, we must follow Prince's definition of narrative 
as a situation in which subjective relationships themselves bring meaning to 
communications. These subjective relationships are neither linear nor 
sequential but created through the emergence of different temporal events 
and ..... the imputation of causality." in E. M. Forster's opinion (Forster 
1927/1955:86). Karen Parna writes ..... - the very definition of narrative is 
dependent on temporality." (Saetens and Ribiere 2001 :32). 
For example, when we communicate with another person, the 
content of our representation inhabits a distinct time. This 'content time' is 
created from everything that is explicitly represented. In verbal language, this 
content is everything that we are explicitly told. It is the time of the plot (lacey 
2000:16). 
Causally, this time exists in a wider frame of other temporal 
events, because every action and affordance occurring in the time of the plot 
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also has both implied antecedents and an implied future, even though these 
remain untold or unrepresented. As Nelson Goodman writes: "A picture of a 
forest tells implicitly of trees growing from seedlings and shedding leaves ... ": 
(Mitchell 1981 :111). 
The people depicted in comics, as much as they are fictional, 
create coherent positions in the time of the plot that require a past and future. 
Although this past and future are not represented, they are as specific as the 
content on the page. This necessary causality creates a different time from 
that of the plot. This time is constituted of all the unrepresented events and 
affordances of the world in which the time of the plot takes place. 
Linguist Emile Benveniste groups all of these unrepresented past 
and future events together and calls them the 'story' (Benveniste 1971 :208). 
The time of the story cannot be described as linear or sequential, as it is not 
represented. We cannot assume that causality (the reason for the story's 
existence), is necessarily linear either, simply because it is effective. The 
unrepresented story required by the plot is not another plot. 
Whereas the world of the plot is absolutely fixed through the 
process of representation, the world of the story is multidimentional, motive 
and unconstrained. It is the world of all possibilities, communicative resources 
or affordances, anchored alone by the causal requirements of the plot. The 
wide range of possibilities of the world of the story also contributes to the 
habitual confusion that is made between the structure of plot and the structure 
of narrative itself, in everyday speech. 
Because the situation in which we communicate with other 
people, the forms that we use and the content of our communication appear 
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simultaneously, there is a danger of confusing one with the other. Their 
synchronicity might imply that the means by which content is expressed are 
part of the content itself, or even that the person communicating forms part of 
the same temporal event as content in the act of communication. Causally, 
this cannot be the case. 
Characters in comics do not see the world in which they act as a 
world made of ink and paper, but as a complete world of affordances. In the 
same way, characters in an opera do not hear the music through which they 
communicate to an audience, or even their own singing, because " ... music is 
not produced by or within the stage-world, but emanates from other loci... for 
our ears alone." (Abbate 1996:199). 
This is the case even with meta-narratives, where the characters 
in the plot refer to either the medium in which the expression is formed, or to 
situations outside the plot itself, pulling these situations into the plot. Plot 
remains plot relative the other positions that constitute narrative, even when 
the content of the plot explicitly refers to these other positions. 
This causal coherence is known as the 'verisimilitude' of the 
represented world. "(V)erisimilitude is a principle of textual coherence rather 
than ... an area in which there exists some relation between the fictional and 
the real world." (Cobley 2001 :219). Though not described, either in the plot or 
in the means of telling, the times of the story are not causally random. They 
have verisimilitude as the plot has verisimilitude, for which the specific 
affordances of the plot act as anchor. The story's temporal world is implied, 
and so always generating untold possibilities, but these possibilities are 
always causal (Todorov 1977, Ricoeur 1990, Abbate 1996), 
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There are also instances where the act of telling is explicitly 
brought into the plot. These are sometimes described as a shift of narrative 
position or 'metafiction' (Waugh 1984). For example. a fictional character in a 
plot refers to the expressive means by which the plot is told. Rather than 
being a shift in narrative position or a rupture in the structure of narrative. as 
Cobley argues. metafiction is simply another affordance in the world of the 
plot. Metafiction does not conflate the time of the plot with the time of telling. 
even though the act of telling has been referred to in the plot (Cobley 
2001:173). 
In this model of narrative, occurrences in the times of the story 
and plot take place in the past, relative to the time in which they are 
expressed. Although the story causally holds a future for the plot, the very 
telling of the plot makes it a world of the past. not within the time of the events 
that occur within it (which might be set at any time), but in relation to the act of 
telling itself. The plot and its story are always 'recently told'. 
This locating of the story and plot in the past, by comparison with 
the present time in which each communication is made, creates one of the 
central relationships that structure narrative. This is the identification of a 
subjective narrator relative to what the narrator communicates as content. 
The word narrator also conforms to Prince's definition of narrative. 
It does not imply any definitive type of content or expressive medium in 
particular. Instead, the word narrator simply identifies the person who is 
making the expression, distinct from that they express. Musicologist Carolyn 
Abbate describes this relationship between the time in which someone 
communicates and 'content time' as a relationship between subjects. She 
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writes " ... the notion of a subject's distancing reformulation, the 'voice' is the 
basic criteria for narrative ~ as the ordering and re-ordering discourse of a 
subject-voice ... " (Abbate 1996: 27). 
In relation to the past time of the story and plot, the narrator's time 
always exists in the present, in the immediate time in which communication 
takes place. It is characterised by the specific enunciative techniques used by 
the narrator in order to communicate. These techniques constitute the 
physical and material forms of expression. They are the wide range of media 
that we employ to make ourselves understood, from co-present embodiment 
on one hand to emails on the other. Therefore, the time of the narrator is 
defined entirely by the affordances of the narrator's world. 
In examples of expressive embodiment, this time is predicated 
upon the physical body, which we make use of as our primary resource for 
communication. Directly embodied expression takes place in the time of the 
body. The expressive forms of the body are shared with other people, co-
present in the same time, so that discourse between you and I, in embodied 
communication, is entirely synchronous. For example, I see you crying as you 
cry, and I hear you sing as you are singing. The time of the person 
communicating and the time of the person receiving that communication are 
defined by their shared physiologies, so that the body dictates the time as well 
as the means of telling. The crying stops and the singing dies away. 
This does not occur if the physical form of expression is not 
comprised of the body. This is the case with any technology that shifts the 
form of communication away from direct expressive embodiment and 
relocates the communicative means to the traces of the body's actions. Comic 
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albums are one such technology, as are all expressive media that 
communicate by producing new affordances in the world that trace a body no 
longer present. 
In this type of communication, the narrator's subjectivity reflects 
the technological characteristics of the medium in which the expression was 
made. Rather than communicating directly with the body, the narrator 
communicates with the traces of the body's past actions. Still occupying a 
single temporal position in the narrative structure, the narrator's trace might 
have been made by many people as by a single person. The narrator is no 
longer necessarily identified with the body of a single person, nor with a single 
person's subjective identity. Rather, the physical characteristics of each trace 
define the narrator's subjectivity. When we open a comic, we are more likely 
than not holding the traces of many bodies made through a combination of 
media. All of them, communicating solely through the material we have to 
hand, represent a unique subjective narrator existing in a particular time, 
defined as a subject by the physical form of the book. 
These traces of a body or bodies no longer present represent a 
subjective narrator existing in narrator time. They communicate when the 
bodies of the people who made them are no longer present. All that they 
require to do this is for a person to perceive that they carry meaningful 
content. That person is also a subject and occupies a distinct temporal 
position in the structure of narrative relationships, as the receiver of meaning. 
In comics, this person is the reader. 
Specific physical resources characterise the reader as well as the 
narrator. The reader's resource is the technological trace left by the body or 
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bodies of the narrator. This trace provides the only way in which the reader 
can know about the narrator as a subject. In the case of comics, this is the 
comic strip itself. The subjectivity of the reader is created, moment-by-
moment, by the infinite techniques of reading. The traces of others people's 
actions, traced in the physical medium of the comic, are subsumed in an 
infinite variety of ways into the world of the reader. The time of reading 
subsumes all of the other times in the structure of narrative (Abbate 
1996: 123), so that the content of what is read becomes an affordance in the 
lived experience of the reader (Ricoeur 1990). 
There is a final temporal position in this causal model of narrative. 
The narrator is defined by the telling of the story, regardless of whether the 
story is expressed directly though the body or in a technological trace made 
by one person or many. The narrator's role obscures the final position in this 
model of narrative structure. This is the the position of a subjective author. 
The author and the narrator are not the same, unless their distinct 
identities and the times in which they exist are entirely synchronised in a 
direct act of embodied expression, in co-presence with other people. Author 
and narrator have different causal relationships to the other temporal positions 
in the narrative, and these appear more clearly in types of communication 
made through technological trace. 
With comics, we know that an author exists because we have in 
our hands a comic where a single person, or maybe two or three, are explicitly 
named as being responsible for the production. These statements of 
authorship are made regardless of how many people contributed to the 
production of the trace and to getting it into our hands, including paper 
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manufacturers, printers, distributors, booksellers, advertising agents etc. 
Authors are still frequently identified as sole omniscient motivators of the 
physical traces of their own and others' bodies. They are announced as " ... 
creative minds whom we assume to have made the work as a whole ... all it's 
utterances are heard as emanating from a single ... subject" as Abbate writes 
(Abbate 1996:11). 
When we communicate directly through expressive embodiment, 
the times in which the author and narrator exist are the same, because we are 
directly using the resources of our own bodies in their unique time, to tell a 
story. But this cannot be the case with the traces of bodies no longer present. 
The causal relationship between 'content time' and the time in which the 
narrator communicates creates a subjective narrator, even when there is 
nobody directly present. 
In the case of communication through trace, the subjective author 
appears as the absent body of the narrator. It is impossible to know anything 
about the author's subjectivity and temporal location other than it exists. As 
Gerard Genette writes: " ... behind the explicit image of that narrator I 
construct, as well as I can the image ... of the author." (Genette 1988:141). 
Attempting to identify the author according to biographical 
principles is also impossible. To do so would be assume that " ... the identity 
of a text's producer is to be found almost unmediated within the text itself and 
that the text's production therefore takes place within a transmission model," 
which, in the same way as the 'miming model', previously mentioned, is 
causally incorrect (Cobley 2001: 118). The relative position of the author is 
only perceived by readers through the subjectivity of the narrator. 
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The constituent parts of the model of narrative that I have 
described can be thought of as a series of inclusive, overlapping or exclusive 
effects. Illustration 06 (Page 114) visually represents the relationship of these 
areas in the form of a Venn diagram (Venn 1880), showing the relationship 
between each subjective position in the model. 
In this diagram, plot is wholly subsumed by story. The time of the 
former cannot take place outside the time of the latter, although they 
represent distinct subjective positions. The time of the narrator is constituted 
by the medium of expression, which is the physical means by which 
representation is achieved. The time in which the narrator exists 
encompasses both plot and story. However, the story also lies outside the 
time of the narrator because it remains untold. Both the subjective time of the 
author and the subjective time of the reader overlap with narrator time. They 
are only related by the medium of expression. 
This model provides a structure for temporal relationships that 
also represent different subjects. These subjects can be both fictional, 
appearing as part of the content of what is represented, and actual: the 
people in communication with each other .. 
Other models of narrative 
This narrative model outlining relative subjective positions is 
described in part by Emile Benveniste. He placed the story and plot in a 
distinct realm of time which he called histoire or what is told (in my translation) 
and the narrator, author and reader in another realm of time, which he called 
discours or telling to (in my translation). 
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In Benveniste's model, the realm of story exists in the past and 
the realm of telling to exists in the present. However, Benveniste's telling to 
makes no distinction between the temporal positions, physical expressions 
and communicative traces of absent bodies that I have described (Benveniste 
1971). 
Seymore Chatman developed his structure further, with the 
addition of what Chatman describes as 'background information' to the 
structure of telling to, in the present. Chatman describes this background 
information as everything that the reader brings to the situation in which they 
read, apart from the communicative trace itself (Chatman 1978). 
These narrative analysts argue that causal distinctions between 
types of embodied time are the structuring principle of narrative. They also 
define narrative as representing the context in which communication takes 
place as an indivisible aspect of the meaning of what is communicated. Unlike 
Prince, they do not make explicit the network of causal events that lead from 
these positions to the creation of different subjects. 
The analysis of narrative, or narratology, historically falls into two 
distinct areas of study that might be broadly called the 'study of telling' and the 
'study of what is told'. Although these areas impact upon one another, they 
reflect two distinct approaches to defining narrative itself. Because the word 
'narrative' means both the activity of telling and the content of what is told it is 
important to bear this distinction in mind. 
Narratology as the study of what is told has the longer history. It 
focuses on the relationship between text and hiatolre: on the form and 
content of the enunciation. According to this tradition, Genette also maintains 
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that narrative is defined by verbal language alone, as a subset of linguistics, 
although this is by no means a majority view (Genette 1982, Prince 1989:66). 
Alternatively, narratology as the study of telling to. considers 
enunciator, enunciatee. context and medium as topics affecting both the form 
and content of what is expressed, unconstrained by medium. The study of 
telling to opens itself to the analysis of the relationships between story, form 
and enunciative context, defining narratology broadly as the study of these 
relationships and defining narrative as these relationships themselves 
(Todorov 1977, 1981). 
Narratology. defined as the study of what is told, seeks to 
establish and develop the structural principles of histoire. For example. 
Gustav Freytag identifies the structure necessary for the creation of types of 
emotional intensity, such as suspense, in dramatic narrative through an 
analysis of fictional tragedy, which he outlines as a pyramid (Freytag 1984). 
Highly complex descriptions of histoire have developed according 
to this approach. Viktor Shklovski has identified categorical distinctions 
between types of time in the emergence of histoire, describing a chronological 
sequence of events (which he calls the 'fabula') that provide the source 
material for the plot, but which remain unknown except in the organisation of 
the histoire through which they appear (which organisation he calls' sjuzet') 
Fabula and sjuzet are not analogous to 'what is told' and 'telling', Nor is any 
relationship outside histoire implied, The fabula is a structural function of the 
story only (Shklovski 1965), 
Developing the idea of an untold sequence of events that 
encompasses and precedes the histoire, Hayden White's identification of 
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'anticipation' as a structural function of history narratives alludes to a 
relationship between telling and what is told, without breaking its theoretical 
bounds. In the case of the telling of history, it is simply the case that the fabula 
is constituted of experiences that actually occurred, according to White (White 
1987:122). 
Mikhail Bakhtin ascribes the structural potential for multiple voices 
to the histoire. These voices, he argues, particularly in the narrative genre of 
the novel, are the products of many possible sequences of events, which are 
only partially represented through the sjuzet. 8akhtin describes how the entire 
narrative voice, as well as the sequence and time of the histoire, is structured 
by the relationships between these fictional voices (Bakhtin 1981). 
Gerard Genette also ascribes multiple relative voices to the 
histoire in the concept of focalisation. These voices establish pOints of view 
relative to each other. For example, an omniscient narrator is described as 
representing 'zero' focalisation, remaining unconstrained by the verisimilitude 
of the narrative itself. 'Internal' and 'external' focalisations represent types of 
constraints derived from the position of voices relative to others within the 
histoire (Genette 1982). 
A narratological focus on what is told has also been adapted to 
analysis of visual and polysemic media. Writing about comic strips, 
Groensteen describes types of voice in the text/image histoire of comics as 
types of knowledge rather than relative points of view. Comics' polysemicism 
constitutes a unique type of histoire, he argues, structured around three 
voices and three types of knowledge in the form of narrator, monstrator and 
recitant. Because he identifies narrative voice with the physical characteristics 
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of the medium itself, writing and drawing, Groensteen's description of the 
structure of what is told in comics edges towards the broader field of the 
analysis of telling (Groensteen 2010). 
The identification of explicit and implicit time, points of view and 
multiple voices in descriptions of the structure of histDire have allowed 
theorists who focus on what is told to also describe ways in which 
enunciatees impact upon it. 
In particular, Roland Barthes and Tzvetan Todorov describe types 
of structure in histDire that exist in relation to types pf reception, and the 
histDire is only comprehensible in their terms. In novels, for example, Barthes' 
identifies 'codes', or a system of social norms, in terms of which the histoire 
appears. These include linear sequence, character traits, disclosure and 
equivocation, delay and binary oppositions. These codes derive from 
discours, but they aim to describe the structure of histoire and do not in 
themselves represent an analysis of discours or a description of the wider 
relationships implicit in telling relative to what is told (Barthes1974). 
Similarly, Todorov's description of verisimilitude outlines a 
relationship between enunciator and enunciatee as the way in which genres 
are structured, but this relationship is an instrument for textual comprehension 
rather than a description of discours. Narrative verisimilitude is an effect of 
discours, but only as a principle of coherence in the histoire rather than a 
relationship between the real and related worlds (Todorov 1977:87). 
An older tradition in the study of what is told belongs to social 
anthropology. Vladimir Propp describes an invariable number of motifs that 
structure every hisfoire. These motifs can have different relative functions in 
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specific uses, but they retain their identities. The combination of these motifs, 
Propp argues, constitutes a 'deep' or invariable structure of histoire, 
consistent across cultures and historical periods (Propp 1968). 
Similarly, Claude Levi-Strauss, Claude Bremond and A. J. 
Greimas describe structural homologies among histoires from different 
cultures and historical times. Levi-Strauss describes a small and unchanging 
number of relationships between structural components such as 'phenomes'; 
the smallest meaningful elements of verbal language; 'mythemes': repeated 
situations, events, actions and relationships; and cognitive 'principles' 
represented by verbal language, such as antonyms. He argues that this 
structure of histoire provides a general definition the human condition, in a 
sense defining discours absolutely in histoire (Greimas 1970, Levi-Strauss 
1977:230, Bremond 1982). 
The identification of 'deep' structures in what is told establishes a 
relationship between histoire and discours described by Ferdinand de 
Saussure. For de Saussure, the deep structure of histoire derives from verbal 
language, and governs every unique narrative expression in discours. 
Sussure's description is analogous with the 'deep' and 'surface' structures 
described by Greimas and Levi-Strauss, turning the relationship between the 
two into a matter of performance and giving it a historical aspect. De 
Saussure's 'deep' verbal language structure, which he calls 'langue', has the 
characteristic of being changed over time by the accumulation of habits and 
innovations made at the level of 'surface' structures, which he calls 'parole' .. 
Over time, present discours meaningfully changes the 'deep' structure of 
histoire. 
101 
The study of telling to constitutes narratology that analyses 
discours, histoire and the relationships between the two. A shared feature in 
descriptions of narrative that follow this approach is the concept of dialogue. It 
is the relationships between either participants or between structural aspects 
of the whole situation of story-telling that define narrative in this view. 
Indicative is Paul Ricoeur's description of narrative as a 
hermeneutic process of understanding action, through the interpretative 
functions of anticipation and memory. For Ricoeur, narrative represents time 
as the mediation between 'objective time', which is the theoretical time of the 
universe, according to Ricoeur, and 'subjective time', which is constituted by 
subjective experience. 
For Ricoeur, narrative mediates past experience, through 
memory, and anticipation of future events, by providing a structure for 
referring to both. There is no also distinction between experience and 
representation in the structure of narrative. Enunciators and enunciatees 
agree to treat representation for experience. Rocoeur defines narrative as a 
transformation of intention (or orientation towards the future) to action, 
creating the axis around which memory of past events and anticipation of this 
transformation take place (Ricoeur 1984-6, 1981: 170). 
Therefore, narrative is not reducible to component parts (such as 
histoire and discours, or discrete elements that structure either), but is the 
process by which one mutually transforms the other. Neither what is told 
about, nor telling to, can be categorised as fact or fiction in this sense. What is 
told about is not a fictional realm, but is a method of interpreting action in both 
real and fictive worlds. 
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Because Ricoeur describes narrative as a process of 
transformation, for him it is a function of self-consciousness that allows human 
beings to experience representations of time (one's own and others' past and 
anticipated actions), as socially and historically coherent (Ricoeur 1981:181). 
Similarly, a conception of narrative as an irreducibly reciprocal 
relationship between what is told and telling to, informs descriptions by 
Roman Jakobson, Wolfgang Iser, Schlomith Rimmon-Kenan, Stanley Fish 
and Valentin Volosinov. 
Jakobson describes the structure of telling to and what is told with 
six components, non of which are reducible to either discours or histoire, and 
in which the relationships between the components constitutes the meaningful 
function. For example, what he calls the 'referent', (or what the narrative is 
about), cannot appear without the mediating effect of the 'code', by which he 
means the socially agreed form of expression, unsaid in the plot but explicit in 
the 'message' (which I call plot and story) and the 'contact' or the physical 
form of expression. At the same time, these aspects have an effect on both 
enunciator and enunciatee (which he calls an 'emotive function' and a 
'conative function'). All of these aspects are required to function 
simultaneously for narrative to exist, encompassing real and fictive worlds 
(Jakobson 1960). 
Iser structures narrative around the type of relationships that are 
socially possible between enunciator and enunciatee. He describes the roles 
of unseen and unvoiced subjects, which he calls the 'implied reader' and the 
'implied author', the existence of which represent the mutual expectation of 
intentionality or the impact of discours on histoire. The enunciator expects the 
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enunciatee to understand what is told and the enunciatee expects to find 
meaning. Following one of SchUtz's descriptions of communication, Iser 
argues that what is told is constituted in the form of an agreed mutual 
misunderstanding (Iser 1989:31). This relationship between enunciator, 
implied author, enunciatee and implied reader is developed by Rimmon-
Kenan as a structure of narrative. There is no functional boundary between 
histoire and discours. They are mutually affecting (Rimmon-Kenan 1983), Fish 
and Volosinov also reflect this idea. Fish argues that the reception activities of 
the enunciatee transform what is told into affordances in the real world (Fish 
1980, Cobley 2001). Volosinov describes the reciprocal relationship between 
telling to and what is told as a mutual mediation of the experience of 
enunciator and enunciatee expressed in physical form. What is told mediates 
telling to, and telling to mediates what is told. For Volosinov, distinguishing 
between fact and fiction is not a structural aspect of narrative in this sense, 
because narrative is defined as discours encompassing histoire (Volosinov 
1929/1973). 
The analysis of narrative as what is told (including telling to), both 
distinguishes narratology from linguistics and suggests sociological 
interpretations that bring alterity to bear on the semic analysis of structure. In 
the context of this study, this way of approaching narrative suggests an 
intersubjective description of the relationships required to make a story. 
Narrative actions defined as telling, including what it told, are types of actions 
that conform to Crossley's conditions of intersubjectivity, for example. 
Approaching stories in this way, non-verbal and polysemic media, real and 
fictional actions and representations, social milieux and the physical forms of 
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expression can be considered relative to each other, bringing descriptions of 
embodiment, cross-modality and relative subjectivity together. 
Naming the narrative model 
The narrative model conforms to a definition of the word diegesis 
used by Plato in Book'" of 'Republic' (Artistotle 1974). 'Oiegesis' is frequently 
used as a neologism for the world of the story and plot (that is, only what is 
told about and its causal environment). For example, Pascal Lefevre 
describes diegesis as " ... the fictive space in which the characters live and 
act. .. versus the extradiegetic space, visualised versus non-visualised 
space, .. " (Heer and Worcester 2009:157), and this is a typical contemporary 
distinction. 
However, Plato defines diegesis as a mode of communication that 
includes both narrator and story, so that the act of telling itself is a prerequiste 
of the definition, alongside what is told. Nothing can be told that is not told by 
someone. The presence of the narrator is a prerequisite of telling and vice 
versa. As Martin Barker writes, it is as though the story occupies, for both 
author and reader, " ... a place in a parallel world with our own, always near at 
hand, yet requiring special means to gain access. Reaching it, you don't leave 
behind what you were." (my italics, Barker 1989: 81). 
Because it includes the act of telling as well as what is told about, 
diegesis is a description of a structured relationship between different 
subjects, not a description of fictional content. It describes the structure of 
narrative as the whole situation in which expression occurs, bringing what is 
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told into a relationship with the physical means of expression and the 
subjectivity of the people in communication. 
Another mode of expression described in 'Republic' is mimesis. 
Mimesis is typically described as a mode where communication occurs 
through simulation rather than narrative. Lacking a structure of different 
subjective positions, simulation takes place entirely in the present. It obscures 
its origin as a trace of the expressive actions of other bodies in other times 
(Abbate 1996: 54). Mimesis is the mode of the icon, the commodity and the 
object as an asocial category of time (8audrillard 1996). 
Genette's discussion of the use of both the terms diegesis and 
mimesis describes the range of different inflections that the words have taken 
on and the contradictions that they represent. He writes that for Plato, 
"Diegesis is pure narrative (without dialogue), in contrast to the mimesis of 
dramatic representation and to everything that creeps into narrative along with 
dialogue ... the French and Greek words unfortunately neutralise each other in 
the single English term diegesis." so that "(t)he pair diegesislmimesis is 
therefore unbalanced, unless we decide as Plato did, to read mimesis as an 
equivalent to dialogue, with the sense not of imitation, but of transcription, 
or ... quotation. This is obviously not what the Greek word (mimesis) connotes 
for us, ... In narrative, there are only rhesis and diegesis - or, .. the characters' 
discourse and the narrator's discourse." He concludes: II ••• the only 
acceptable equivalence for diegesislmimesis is narrative/dia/ogue .. , which 
absolutely cannot be translated as telling/showing, for 'showing' can hardly be 
applied to legitimately to a quotation ... " (Genette 1988:18,43,45). 
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Genette summarises both the departure of the contemporary uses 
of the words from their Greek origin and the range of different uses. The 
contemporary confusion over the word requires new definitions based in the 
logic of narrative itself. The narrative model I have outlined is one such 
definition. 
Therefore, I will call the model of the subjective relationships 
required in narrative 'diegesis'. This encompasses the whole situation of 
narrative, including narrators, authors and readers. It is a subjective situation 
made explicit in the physical forms of expression and their traces. It is 
characterised in each case by the types of intersubjective relationships it 
represents. 
It is not an abstraction in so far as it structures specific types of 
causal relationships between people. Whenever we express ourselves, 
creating shared meaning through the processes of proprioception, " ... we 
share in social situations, which have a material and ideological history." 
(Barker 1989:269,271). 
That history is acknowledged and embodied in the rules that 
structure successful communication, so that " ... in speaking to you, I am not 
only trying to get you to orient to the meaning of my words. I am also trying to 
get your agreement to establish a certain social relation between us - and 
thus, by implication, reorganising your relationship with others." (Barker 
1989:269,271). Meaningful distinctions that each of make about the physical 
forms of our own and others' expression, as we communicate 




In this Chapter, I have correlated a narrative model with some of 
the physical conditions of intersubjectivity. I have described the relationships 
between subjects as limitations of cause and effect. This has required these 
subjects to occupy temporal positions, to conform to constraints on action and 
to the physical limitations of expression. It has also allowed subjects to be 
either flesh and blood people or fictional characters, either participants in 
communication, the physical forms of expression or its content. 
Finally, these subjective positions are the originators of unique 
physical traces and specific partners in intersubjective relationships. I have 
brought time, place, expressive form and people into a relationship which is 
described as a narrative model. To do this, I have self-consciously conflated 
the physical expression of emotion with all forms of expression, technological 
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The 'mediagenius' of comic strips, Intersubjectivity and a first practical 
demonstration with narrative drawing 
The model of narrative that I propose results from an extrapolation of 
causal relationships between people, linking histoire to discours. It is embodied in 
a number of different subjective positions, solely in the physical forms of 
expression. These forms always encompass the situation in which that expression 
is made. 
As a condition of this model, communication is based exclusively in the 
specific physical and temporal conditions derived from all intersubjective 
relationships and which constitute their ontological field. Bakhtin argues that each 
expressive act, is " ... a single but complex event that we might call the work in the 
totality of all its events, including the external material givenness of the work, and 
its texts, and the world represented in the text, and the author-creator and the 
listener or reader." (Bakhtin 1981 :255). 
This 'material givenness', Bakhtin continues, is " ... the world that 
creates the text, for all its aspects - the reality reflected in the text, the authors 
creating the text, the performers of the text ... and finally the listeners or readers 
who ... review the text - participate equally in the creation of the represented 
world ... " (Bakhtin 1981 :253). 
Another necessity of the physical basis for expression is motion. 
Diegesis is never motionless, because motionlessness is a theoretical condition 
that is physically antithetical to embodiment. The relative positions that constitute 
the narrative model are also revealed in the motive character of the events and 
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things being expressed (the plot), and their untold but necessary histories and 
future possibilities (the story). 
As much as the content of expression is motivated by sequence it is 
also motivated by the act of expressing in itself. The forms of expression are 
mobile, as well as the contents of expression. Bakhtin writes ''Those things that are 
static in space cannot be statically described, but must rather be incorporated into 
the temporal sequence of represented events and into the story's own 
representational field." (Bakhtin 1981 :251). 
Oepictive drawing . 
Consider these two conditions of the narrative model in relation to 
depictive drawing. The word 'depictive' is defined by Maynard. "",not only are we 
to imagine, on seeing the depiction, that we are seeing its subject matter, we are 
also to imagine of the former seeing that it is the latter act of seeing." (Maynard 
2005:117). 
The continual motion represented in expression is particularly explicit 
in drawing, because the trace of the body's movement in the form of expression 
itself depicts motion, when we made a mark on a page. The perceived correlation 
between actual body motion and depicted motion is much less with other depictive 
technologies, such as film, although it is never absent. 
Philosopher Philip Rawson writes: "A stroke, even a dot, takes time to 
make and so shows the spectator its beginning and end. Herein lies the vital 
unique quality of drawing", its expression of time, movement and change." 
(Rawson 1987:24), so that ..... movement is the fundamental nature of drawing. 
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Therefore, in comprehending depictive drawings ", .. one has to be 
continuously aware of the sequences (of action) which went into their 
composition." (Maynard 2005:190). Drawing evidences its sequence of production 
and particular motivation in a way that is materially different to say, a printed 
literary text, film or song. It is particularly capable of employing this physical 
correlation in order to depict a situation that is also moving. As philosopher 
Michael Podro writes: " ... (in drawing) ... Iine relates itself to figure twice over, once 
by its shape and once by its apparent impulse ... We recognise a figure in the lines 
of a drawing, and when it is a figure in movement we may ... imagine the impulse 
of the line." (Padro 1998:9). 
As people are always in motion, then people depicted by drawing are 
motivated both through the recognition of the sequence of the production of their 
drawn images and through the recognition that they are people being depicted. 
A number of theorists, including Patrick Maynard, Ernst Gombrich 
(Gombrich 1960) and Kendall Walton (Walton 1990) have defined depictive 
drawing as this physical congruence of the trace of a body and the consciousness 
that an embodied world is what is being depicted. 
Depiction, writes Maynard, " ... is not. .. a matter of one thing 
resembling another; it is a matter of our own activities of seeing the one being like 
our activities of seeing the other." (Maynard 2005:15), so that " .. ,we are dealing 
with two ... situations: the situation set out by the drawing and a wider situation that 
includes it but also includes our activities of perceiving. 1\ (Maynard 2005:90). 
Kendon Walton also describes these two positions, seeing and being 
conscious tliat we see, as conditions of depiction: " ... seeing and imagining 
(seeing) are inseparably bound together ... They must be thus integrated if the 
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picture is to qualify as a depiction rather than as something like a map or a chart." 
(Walton 1990:224). 
There might seem to be a contradiction here between the claim that all 
depictive drawing represents movement on one hand and the distinction between 
diegesis and mimesis on the other. Not all depictive drawing is narrative drawing. 
On the contrary, some drawings would appear to be mimetic. Either the distinction 
between mimetic and diegetic forms of expression contradicts the representation 
of motion as a condition of depiction, or the distinction between diegesis and 
mimesis is itself an error. 
However, this is not the case. It is possible to argue without 
contradicting either definition that a/l drawings have stories, but only narrative 
drawings have plots, or the course of action told about. Depictive drawings that 
show a single scene or fragment of a scene a/one fall into this category of plot-less 
depiction. They still physically express movement. The trace of their production 
embodies the movement that made them and we perceive that this trace motivates 
the moment depicted. 
With drawings that depict single scenes, we still recognise ourselves in 
an act of looking and recognise someone in the act of drawing. But drawings of 
this sort are not narrative, because they have no plot. Being plot-less, they appear 
to have no teller. However, if the narrative model is applied to mimetic drawings 
and the subjective relationships outside plot and story are included as aspects of 
the form of expression, then mimesis can be described as a type of plot-less 
telling. 
Certainly, mimesis is also characterised by an insistence that 
expressive content carries its own meaning regardless of context, unuttered and 
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timeless. The absence of a plot represents a self-erasure of context. It 
communicates that everything except the depicted moment is meaningless, even 
as it emerges from the broader situation of expression in order to communicate 
this. By this logic, our existing definitions of depictive drawing, diegesis and 
mimesis survive. 
Baetens' discussion of comic strips' 'mediagenius' 
The self-consciousness that is a condition of depictive drawing bears 
upon a theory of narrative drawing in comics discussed by Jan Baetens in 
'Revealing Traces: A New Theory of Graphic Enunciation' (Varnum and Gibbons 
2001: 145-155). 
This theory is unusual as a narrat%gical description because it 
approaches the particular characteristics of the comic strip medium as dlscours 
relative to histolra (to recall Benveniste's distinction between 'telling to' and 'what 
is told'). The narratology of comics frequently displays an analytical bias towards 
hlstoire alone, following the older tradition in narratology. Consequently, this 
approach is often troubled by the polysemic condition of comic strips. The study of 
histoire then focusses on describing the structural relationships between image 
and text rather than considering discours as a wider field of action and experience 
relative to what is told (Legrady 2000, Magnussen 2000, Kannenberg 2001, 
Groensteen 2007, 2010, Lefevre 2009). 
Alternatively, accepting as indivisible the dlscours constituting the 
medium of comic strips (as text with image, produced and read), this theory ties 
what is told to telling to, by categorising the medium as a unique type of physical 
trace. 
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Baetens' discussion is an extrapolation of the narratologicaJ work of 
Phillipe Marion, describing the types of physical trace specific to the medium of 
comic strips as expressions of a series of embodied subjective relationships, 
dependent upon self-consciousness (Varnum and Gibbons 2001:145, Groensteen 
2010:04). It describes a dialogic approach to the analysis of narrative in comic 
strips, similar to the approach taken by Martin Barker, but otherwise undeveloped 
in comics scholarship in English. 
It is also possible to compare the theory to conditions of 
intersubjectivity described by Crossley and others. These comparisons both 
support a narrative description of intersubjectivity and introduce the possibility of 
making practical demonstrations in response to speCific questions raised by the 
comparisons, by drawing new comic strips, 
For the purpose of discussion, Saetens accepts all of the specifically 
visual elements of comics as indivisible. These visual elements constitute the 
comic strip rather than the whole situation in which a comic is produced and read. 
They are described as a ..... 'trace', that is, a reflection, a symptom, an index, of 
the subjectivity of a narrator, .. " who can only be known as a subject relative to a 
reader. through the physical trace itself (Varnum and Gibbons 2001:146). 
This group of comics-specific elements is underwritten by elements 
which are shared with other media. but which contribute to the specific trace of 
comic strips. These represent the possible ways in which hlatoire is structured. 
They are the semic structures shared with hiatoire in other narrative media. 
although the comic strip medium is not reducible to them. 
The neologism 'mediagenius' is used to describe this combination of 
media specific and shared elements. 'Mediagenius' describes the way in which 
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any type of narrative is made specific though the interaction of trace and reader by 
means of what Saetens calls 'style', 'storytelling' and 'medium'. Therefore, comic 
strips have a specific 'mediagenius', which is quite distinct from the 'mediagenius' 
(the 'style', 'storytelling' and 'medium') of other narrative media, such as film or 
literature. 
Comic strips are drawn narratives. As such, there is a unique form of 
expression at the heart of the 'mediagenius' of comics, involving a technical mix of 
language, drawing and writing. Physical trace is the emanation of a particular type 
of narrating subject that is not only a teller, but is also a draughtsperson and a 
calligrapher. 
Consistent with the function of ' media genius', a second neologism 
describes comics' polysemic form. 'Graphiation' constitutes comics' unique 
physical form of expression, including text and image, and its enunciator is 
therefore a 'graphiateur.' The 'graphiateur' isn't directly observable in the physical 
form of expression, but is rather a causal pre-requisite of the 'mediagenius' of 
comic strips: the idea that a producer is necessary for the trace. 
According to this description, the style of facture of a comic strip 
represents individual intentionality. Although the 'graphiateur' is not directly 
observable in the physical trace of drawing and writing, the 'graphiateur's' intention 
is perceived more clearly by a reader in types of drawing that are immediate, 
spontaneous and unmediated by revision. 
Thus, 'graphiation' represents a relationships between discours and 
histoire that is unique to comic strips: the performance of an active subject (in the 
realm of discourse) represented in drawn trace (in the histoire), with more rather 
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than less spontaneity in the performance of drawing being equal to less mediation 
between reader and the subject 'graphiateur: 
Readers are also instrumental in the relationship that constitutes 
'graphiation', although their role is relative to 'mediagenius' rather then constitutive. 
Reflecting the action of the motivating 'graphiateur', the reader's perception of the 
subject in the trace mirrors the subjects' performance in tracing. Readers are only 
engaged in discours according to the intentionality of the 'graphiateur', whose 
performance is traced in the physical form of the comic strip. Readers are not 
described as intentioned themselves. 
Rather, the reader is defined in an innate identification with the 
productive moves of the 'graphiateur', achieved by recalling memories of childhood 
experiences shared by social convention with the author and embedded in the 
psyche (Varnum and Gibbons 2001:150). 
Although this description of the structure of narrative in comic strips 
centres on the relationship between histoire and discours, there is a danger of 
confusing the subjective 'graphiateur' and the author of the work, Baetens argues. 
This confusion would conflate authorial biography with both intentionality and with 
the physical form of expression, whereas the 'graphiatuer' is a theoretical subject 
whose appearance represents the relationship between performance and trace. 
There is also the possibility of wrongly considering the 'graphiateur' a . 
'complete author' or a single motivating subject responsible for the whole trace. As 
a conception of drawing style, this would erroneously identify graphic expression 
with a specific author, whereas Baetens considers 'graphiation' to be a 
" ... socialised act involving many codes and constraints." (Varnum and Gibbons 
2001:152). 
122 
Baetens identifies no contradiction between the introduction of a 
psychic, rather than embodied, theorisation of the relationship between 
'graphiateur' and reader in the structure of comics' 'mediagenius'. But he highlights 
a problem with the concept of identification, which requires the reader to subsume 
their subjectivity in that of the 'graphiateur' with the necessary erasure of self and 
loss of control that that entails. 
In this, Baetens is in accord with Martin Barker. Barker has been 
particularly critical of the idea of identification, for exactly the same reasons as 
Baetens. Barker describes the It ••• implication that 'identification' has - vulnerability 
to messages, loss of our own identity, submergence in the identity of the media 
character, with a residue of influence, .. " (Barker 1989:96). 
For Baetens, 'identification' erroneously implies a passive reader, for 
whom reading is a psychic recall of forgotten shared experiences under the 
direction of a dominant or even dominating subject (the 'graphiateur'), whereas, he 
argues, It ••• we don't read to remember or express ourselves, but to transform 
ourselves." (Varnum and Gibbons 2001:155). 
These two issues reveal the objectification of both the reader and the 
'graphiateur' in the context of 'mediagenius'. First, the possibility of confusion 
between the 'graphiateur' and author biography leads towards a conception of 
complete intentionality. Second, a psychic description of the process of 
communication as 'identification' places the reader beyond the relationship 
between discours and histoire that constitutes 'mediagenius', effectively 
objectifying it. 
Hans-Christian Christiansen and Anne Magnussen also objectify 
narrators and readers in their commentary on the concept of 'mediagenius', 
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misunderstanding the physical form of expression as a direct index of an author. 
They write "A proximity to the absent artist is triggered through the graphic trace." 
(Christiansen and Magnussen 2000:16). 
The idea is a re-statement of a dualism between physical form and 
expression. But Barker refutes this when he writes " ... a narrative is never made of 
anything other than functions: in varying degrees, everything in it signifies ... 
everything has a meaning or nothing has." (Barker 1989:124). Comics theorist Neil 
Cohn also misconstrues trace for complete intentionality in his essay on time in 
comic strips. He argues for the communicative comprehensiveness of the image, 
so that depiction occurs in its 'conceptualising' (that is, in viewing depictions entire, 
as viewed depictions). (Cohn 2010). 
Rather, the concept of 'mediagenius' itself ought to suggest what 
Baetens call the 'socialised' act of reading. This 'socialised' act requires a reader 
whose subjectivity is relative to the expressive traces of other people on one hand 
and the situation in which reading takes place on the other. In other words: in an 
intersubjective relationship. 
Similarly, the conflating of relative degrees of spontaneity or mediation 
in facture with degrees of 'expressiveness' is a result of an objectification of the 
'graphiateur'. Groensteen makes a similar objectification of authors and readers 
when he writes: "With a drawn image .. " it is the particular style of the illustrator 
that determines the image's degree of precision." (Groensteen 2007:123). By 
'degree of preciSion' Groensteen means the level of information provided in a 
drawing, equivalent to the thing being depicted. 
But depiction does not function in this way. The information provided in 
any depictive drawing is always complete and precise in every case. It is our 
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cognisance of our own act of seeing that determines depiction, not the relative 
visibility or invisibility of any depicted pinhead or finely cross-hatched shadow. 
(Walton 1990). 
Crossley's conditions of intersubjectivity also contradict the idea of 
relative 'expressiveness'. Communication is achieved in the subjective 
relationships experienced in the physical forms of expression. It is not derived from 
other, immaterial realms of intention. As Volo~inov writes: "Every ideological 
product bears the imprint of the individuality of its creator or creators, but even this 
imprint is just as social as are all other properties and attributes of ideological 
phenomena." (Volosinov 1929/1973:34). 
Christiansen and Magnussen's mis-reading cannot be traced back 
entirely the objectification of biographical authors in 'mediagenius' and readers 
who 'identify'. Both the concepts of 'mediagenius' and 'graphiation' are attempts to 
describe comics' specific communicative situation: how subjective relationships 
are created in the physical forms of expression. These attempts point to a dialogic 
conception of subjects who participate in communicative situations. 
The theory Saetens extrapolates in 'Revealing Traces' is a partial 
description of a network of relationships that embody relative subjectivity in the 
physical forms of expression. As such, it approaches an intersubjective description 
of communication. However, It fails to fully describe the causal relationships 
between embodied subjects and the physical forms of expression. Instead, it 
proposes a psychic relationship between objectified agents such as a biographical 
author and reader, who are 'activated' by the particular 'stimulus' which constitutes 
comics' 'mediagenius'. . 
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Comic strips' 'mediagenius' and intersubjectivity 
Keeping two conditions in mind, inconsistencies in the narratological 
description of comic strips represented by the concepts of 'mediagenius', 
'graphiateur' and 'identification' can be explored in more detail. These derive from 
Crossley's conditions of 'radical' intersubjectivity. First, that communication only 
occurs by means of physical transformations produced and perceived by people in 
relation to each other. Second, as such, that narrative is based in movement, 
underwritten by embodiment. 
Baetens discusses 'mediagenius' as a complete description of the 
physical forms of expression unique to comics. This definition includes two things 
that do not characteristically contribute to definitions of objects: the subjectivity of a 
narrator (the 'graphiateur') and the non~media-specific conditions of story-telling 
(which Saetens calls 'external' conditions [Varnum and Gibbons 2001:146]). 
'Mediagenius' describes an indivisible relationship between the physical form of 
expression and subjectivity. The creation of a new word fulfils this function. 
However, if we apply conditions of intersubjectivity to 'mediagenius', 
the relationship between discours and histoire it describes lacks a causally integral 
constituent: the reader. 'Mediagenius' dictates that the physical history of an 
expressive form makes the form meaningful as the trace of a particular subject. If 
this is the case, here is no logic in placing the reader beyond this relationship, as a 
retrospective 'activator' of meaning. 
Having moved towards an intersubjective description of 
communication, 'mediagenius' falls short by making a distinction between forms of 
expression which are perceived as intentioned (through 'graphiation') and a·reader 
who is only intentioned through 'identification'. Because 'mediagenius' does not 
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include an intentioned reader, except through the process of 'identification', 
psychoanalytic theory is utilised in order to describe the relationship between 
'mediagenius' and reading. 
This is a self-contradictory model that causally connects the historic 
time of production with the physical form of expression on one hand and then 
describes psychic relationships between these forms and the reader on the other 
hand. 
In terms of the motive aspect of narrative, this contradiction has 
several corollaries. The theory cannot describe the function of different times 
generated by narrative, which playa necessary part in establishing relative 
subjectivity. It describes the time of the reader as both all encompassing 
('activating' the material) and directed by the time of the author (identified-with). 
Rather, the time of the reader is continually revised as a series of new temporal 
relationships in the act of reading. 
Evidence of this is found in the description of drawing, which is defined 
as an objectified record of past actions fixing the subjectivity of the tgraphiateur', 
rather than as a motive force amongst relative motive forces embodied in the times 
of production, the narrative and the situation in which reading takes place. 
The idea that spontaneous drawing is more expressive than revised 
drawing further evidences this objectification of time and motion. It reinforces the 
idea of an unmediated psychic connection, or 'transmission', between reader and 
'graphiateur' that also results from the contradictory shift from 'mediagenius' to 
psychoanalytic function. This objectification re-establishes the bifurcation in the 
situation of reading that 'mediagenius' was meant to repudiate. 
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However, considered without the psychic description of the reading 
relationship, 'mediagenius' makes its central conceit the generation of subjectivity 
through the production history unique to the form of comic strips. 
Setting aside the utilisation of specifically psychic functions, as types 
of relationship beyond 'mediagenius', the concept alone can be considered as a 
description of relative subjectivity to be compared with other descriptions. 
The descriptions of intersubjectivity utilised in this study are based in 
conceptions of self-consciousness and perception. Psychoanalytical conceptions 
of subjectivity, on the other hand, describe our relationships with others and with 
our wider experience as motivated in part by cognitive process not fully revealed to 
us. Although these approaches might appear, to be contradictory, one approach 
does not cancel out the other. Rather, the identification of subconscious functions 
of subjectivity is a way of describing other levels of experience underwritten by 
self-consciousness and perception. 
Following this, justification for setting aside these functions in order to . 
compare 'mediagenius' to other descriptions of intersubjectivity, extrapolated from 
conceptions of self-consciousness and perception themselves, is provided by 
Voloiinov. He writes "What is the reality that pertains to the subjective psyche? 
The reality of the inner psyche is the same reality as that of the sign. Outside the 
material of signs, there is no psyche: there are psychological processes, 
processes in the nervous system, but no subjective psyche as a special existential 
quality." and " ... psychology in fact is not located anywhere within, .. but entirely and 
completely without - in the word, the gesture, the act. There is nothing left 
unexpressed in it, nothing "inner" about it - it is wholly on the outside, wholly 
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brought out in exchanges, wholly taken up in material, above all in the material of 
the world." (Volosinov 1929/1973:26,19). 
Focussing exclusively on 'mediagenius', we can consider the 
relationships between physical traces and subjects that it describes in light of a 
number of other descriptions of intersubjectivity. 
Again, recalling Crossley's conditions of intersubjectivity, we can see 
that the 'mediagenius' corresponds to them in particular ways. Describing these 
particularities illuminates 'mediagenius' as a partial model of relative subjectivity 
and substantiates its central conceit. 
Crossley's conditions of intersubjectivity state a) II ••• that human 
subjectivity is not. .. a private inner world; which is divorced from the outer 
(material) world; that it consists in the worldly praxes of sensuous, embodied 
beings and that it is therefore public ... ", b) " ... that subjectivity consists in a pre-
reflexive ... engagement with alterity, rather than in an ... objectification of it...", c) 
" ... that human action, .. necessarily assumes a socially instituted form and that this 
form is essential to its meaningfulness, .. " and that d) " ... human action ... arises out 
of dialogical situations ... that are irreducible to individual human subjects." 
(Crossley 1996:26). 
In these terms, 'mediagenius' does not fully describe the relative 
subjective relationships that constitute communication. The objectification of trace, 
which also places the reader outside 'mediagenius', reveals an objectification of 
alterity rather than an engagement with it. Similarly, the possible conflation of 
biography and physical trace conjures an objectified author out of a situation of 
relative subjects. However, 'mediagenius' does describe the physical form of 
expression as a relationship between enunciator and enunciatee, coinciding with 
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Crossley's 'worldly praxes'. Also, the media-specificity of the 'external' elements 
(Varnum and Gibbons 2001 :146) of comic strips is synonymous with the 'socially 
instituted form ... essential to meaningfulness' that Crossley lists. 
In Crossley's terms, 'mediagenius' is an incomplete description of the 
relationship between one person and another that constitutes relative subjectivity. 
Even setting aside the location of the reader in a purely private realm, the subjects 
in 'mediagenius' are not fully subjects in Crossley's terms. Their relative status lies 
in an imposed series of subject/object dualisms which embodiment disallows. 
Alongside Crossley's conditions of intersubjectivity, we can compare 
three further descriptions that reflect upon the types of subjectivity expressed in 
'mediagenius'. These are Volosinov's analytical method for" ... tracing the social 
life ofthe ... sign." (Volosinov 1929/1973:21), Barker's principles for the 
" ... application of the dialogical approach to cultural forms." (Barker 1989:275) and 
Biber and Conrad's method of " .. register analysis." (Biber and Conrad 2009:47). 
Volosinov's method has three prereqUisites, which can be used to 
discuss 'mediagenius'. He writes: "1.ldeofogy may not be divorced from the 
material reality of the sign (i.e. by locating it in the "consciousness" or other vague 
and elusive region); 2. The sign may not be divorced from the concrete forms of 
social intercourse (seeing that the sign is part of organised social intercourse and 
cannot exist, as such , outside it, reverting to a mere physical artefact); 3. 
Communication and the forms of communication may not be divorced from the 
material basis." (Volosinov 1929/1973:21). 
In this context we must be careful to define Volosinov's word 'sign' as 
'expression'. He doesn't explain his use of the word and his sense may be 
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tautological, particularly as he insists that meaning is solely generated in social 
interactions (Volosinov 1929/1973). 
Volosinov's method frames the types of subjective relationships in 
'mediagenius' in ways that are very similar to Crossley's, with broadly similar 
points of dissimilarity. They are congruent in terms of identifying the physical forms 
of expression alone as meaningful. 'Mediagenius' connects physical trace to the 
history of production in the creation of the 'graphiateur'. Crossley lists 'material 
praxes' and Volosinov insists that the 'material basis' is a prerequisite for any 
analysis of communication. 
However, 'Mediagenius' is incongruent with Volosinov's analytical 
method in the following ways. Although physical trace is defined in 'mediagenius' 
as the entire work, this does not include the reader and hence is " ... divorced from 
the concrete forms of social intercourse ... 1/ (Volosinov 1929/1973:86). According to 
Volosinov, the reader is a constituent part of the 'entire work. In this sense, 
Volosinov's communicative subjects are intersubjects, whereas those required by 
'mediagenius' are not. Volosinov's subjects are formed only in relation to others, 
even as they are formed in the situation in which reading takes place as relative 
readers, so that the subject " .. , taken from within, so to speak, turns out to be 
wholly a product of social interrelations. Not only its outward expression but also 
its inner experience are social territory." (Volosinov 1929/1973:86). 
Alongside Crossley's conditions of intersubjectivity and Volosinov's 
method, Barker's principles for the " ... application of the dialogical approach to 
cultural forms ... " provide an opportunity to consider the aspects of 'mediagenius' 
that generate the reader's subjectivity in particular. 
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Barker outlines his principles: "1. Form in a cultural object is 
understood as a proposal to a typical kind of imaginative projection. 2. Any such 
form sediments within itself some typified social experience ... 3. All forms are 
produced out of determinate production histories ... 4. In investigating form,,, we 
need to investigate ... regularities oftransformation; and the ways in which such 
regularities constrain what actual characters, settings problems etc can appear, ... 
5. To study readers, .. (we) have to discover both who are likely to be willing and 
able to orient themselves to the dialogue proposed, and what transformations they 
are thereby involved in. 6. Responses other than those of the 'natural' readers 
themselves represent socially-typified orientations." (Barker 1989:275) 
Again, 'mediagenius' formulates the subjectivity of the 'graphiateur' 
along similar lines to Barker's prinCiples, in relation to the physical forms of 
expression. Again 'mediagenius' differs from Barker as it differs from Volo§inov 
and Crossley, in excluding the reader from any relationship with physical trace 
except as an object. 
However, Barker is more forthcoming about the particular relationship 
between reading subjects, producers and the physical forms of expression than 
either Crossley or Volo§inov. Barker's principles number five and six add detail to 
Crossley's " .. socially instituted form ... II and Volo§inov's " ... forms of social 
intercourse ... II Barker writes that the reader orients him or herself towards the 
physical forms of expression through the function of one or other set of social 
conventions. These could be said to equate to, but are not included in the physical 
trace described in 'mediagenius'. They ought to contribute to the 'external' 
elements identified by Baetens 
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According to Barker, the 'proposition' that the physical forms of 
expression make to the reader, is one in which the reader finds meaning through 
subjective self-transformation. For Barker, readers might or might not be the 
'natural' audience for a type of expression but they can be communicated with 
nonetheless, and hence transformed. They mayor may not respond to a particular 
physical form of expression in a single typical way, but instead might reform their 
subjectivity through dissent, rejection or avoidance. All of these positions constitute 
'reading' for Barker. Intentionality on the part of readers constitutes being willing 
and able to orient themselves to the dialogue proposed. 
A similar description of reading as an intersubjective relationship is 
found in the work of linguists Biber and Conrad, as part of their methodology for 
studying language genres. Biber and Conrad distinguish between ·register' which 
"(c)haracterises the typical linguistic features of text varieties and connects those 
features functionally to the situation context ... " I genre and style in the use of 
language. (Biber and Conrad 2009:16). They provide a summary of a method for 
analysing register that contains a similar formulation of reading as an 
intersubjective activity I particularly in terms of social conventions. 
As with Barker, Conrad and Biber identify the " •.. three major 
components of register analysis: (1) describing the situational characteristics of the 
register; (2) analysing the typical linguistic characteristics of the register and (3) 
identifying the functional forces that help to explain why those linguistic features 
tend to be associated with those situational characteristics." (Biber and Conrad 
2009:47). 
They argue that the situation in which reading takes place comprises 
'functional forces' that make the physical forms of expression meaningful, rather 
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than the other way around. Their method of register analysis requires the 
identification of these' forces' in order to understand what is being expressed at all. 
These 'forces' are always people relative to each other, although they 
do not necessarily exist in the same times and are not objectified. It is these 
people's subjectivity that is in play. Subjectivity constitutes the functional force in 
the situation in which reading takes place, creating meaning. The reader is 
transformed in the situation as much as the physical trace generates the 
'graphiateur' in the case of 'mediagenius'. This transformation is brought about as 
the reader comes into a dynamic relationship with all of the other participants in 
communication. 
According to Biber and Conrad, Barker, Volo§inov and Crossley, the 
reader is a constituent part of the entire work or the physical situation in which 
communication occurs. Contrary to 'mediagenius', the physical form of expression 
is not an emanation of the situation in which expression was produced, distinct 
from reading. It is only an aspect of the reader's participation in the intersubjective 
situation in which the reading subject is also transformed. 
Self-consciousness and subjectivity 
Crossley maintains we experience the world intersubjectively, in the 
sense that we experience it as a world experienced by others. He writes" ... we 
experience others as subjects who experience and know the world and who 
experience and know us as part of that world." (Crossley 1996:04). 
Crossley considers " ... how the different positions of our body, relative 
to the other,,, facilitates a sense of otherness, (in that) we perceive the other as 
'there' in relation to our 'here'; .. and thus recogise both that they have a distinct 
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point of view in the world and that the world can be seen from different points of 
view and under different perspectives. It (Crossley 1996:06), so that, according to 
SchOtz " ... each agent recognises (and assumes that their other recognises) that 
their 'here' is the other's 'there' and vice versa. It (Crossley 1996:85). 
These relative subjective positions, the 'here' and 'there', are a 
metonym of Mead's 'Loop'. Mead writes: "In reflecting upon himself, the agent is 
both a reflecting subject (I) and an object of reflection (me)." (Mead 1967:174). In 
this reciprocal perception, 'here' is 'I' and 'there' is not only other people, but the 
perception that other people perceive. This is self and self-consciousness, or the 
'me' that Mead describes. 
As literary theorist Steven Connor writes: 1& ••• giving voice is the 
process which simultaneously produces articulate sound and produces self, as a 
self-producing being." so that "(w)hat a voice, .. always says is this: this, here, this 
voice, is not merely a ... particular aggregation of tones and timbres; it is voice, or 
voicing itself. Listen, says a voice; some being is giving voice." (Connor 2000:03, 
04). 
This self-consciousness (perceived as the point of view of another 
person) is one of the conditions of intersubjectivity. Crossley writes "For Mead, self 
is a socially instituted and temporally mediated reflexive process. It involves the 
subject turning back upon themselves (through time) to view themselves ... as 
another would view them." (Crossley 1996:55). Cognitive scientist Daniel Dennett 
argues "That is what it is for there to be an observer in the world, a something it is 
like something to be." (Dennett 1991 :137). 
Mead's inclusion of time in the process of self-consciousness concurs 
with embodiment. It points to the physical grounding of communication, making 
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self-consciousness an intersubjective faculty through the generation of two 
subjective positions relative to each other: the 'I' and 'me' and 'here' and 'there'. 
Nothing is communicated outside the physical forms of expression. Although it 
might seem self-contradictory, this must also include self-consciousness. 
What is the physical form of expression in self-consciouness? The 
answer lies in the causal structure of the narrative model. 'Telling', 'told about' and 
'being told' are relative subjective positions that occupy entirely different times, 
even in the creation of a single subject. Dennett writes: " ... the space and time of 
the representing is one frame of reference; the space and time of what (is) 
represented is another. n (Dennett 1991: 137). 
The physical form of expression in self-consciousness, therefore, is 
time. More specifically, it is different times, because time is only the name for 
different embodied experiences. There is no problem conflating expression and 
self-consciousness in the context of the self because self (I) and self-perception 
(me) are embodied conditions occupying different times. The consciousness of 
self, achieved by the self, can never be produced as an expression of the body 
known to other people: the other in the case of self-consciousness is the self. 
As narratologist Roy Schafer writes: " ... we are forever telling stories 
about ourselves. In telling these self-stories to others we may, .. be said to be 
performing narrative actions. In saying that we also tell them to ourselves, 
however, we are enclosing one story within another ... On this view, the self is a 
telling, n (Mitchell 1981 :31). Crossley writes: " ... the me is often housed in an 
autobiographical narrative. Our sense of ourselves ;s based in stories we tell about 
ourselves ... to ourselves and to others." (Crossley 1996:59). Dennett agrees with 
Crossley. He writes: "We ... are constantly engaged in presenting ourselves to 
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others ... and ourselves - in language and gesture, external and, internaJ." (Dennett 
1991 :147). 
Dennett's theoretlcal.ly neutral subject 
The relationship between these temporally-distinct, embodied and 
physically distinct self-representations is described by Dennett in his book 
'Consciousness Explained'. He attempts to create a 'neutral' model of what it is to 
be a subject in the subjects own terms. In the book, Dennett attempts to construct 
a model of consciousness. Intersubjectivity poses a number of methodological 
barriers to directly analysing other people's consciousness. The problem is that he 
cannot stand outside the reciprocal subjective relationships that generate his own 
subjectivity. To theorise a direct (that is, 'neutral') position from which to make his 
analysis, he describes self-consciousness as a theoretical fiction, drawing upon 
the structure of narrative in exactly the way this study has done. 
This self-consciousness is a theoretical condition that he calls 
heterophenomenology. Because it is fiction, he can place it in its own ontological 
domain and approach it directly, whilst at the same time theorising it as a subject. 
In fact, Dennett has created a subject theoretically independent of intersubjectivity 
(Dennett 1991 :80). 
Dennett writes that this theoretical self-consciousness offers a 
" ... method for investigating and describing phenomenology,,, extracting and 
purifying texts and using those texts to generate a theorists fiction, the subject's 
heterophenomen%gica/ world. " which is " ... a world determined by fiat of the text .. ; 
our experimenter, the heterophenomenologist, lets the subject's text constitute that 
subject's heterophenomen%gica/ world." He concludes: "the subject's 
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heterophenomenological world will be a stable, intersubjectively confirmable 
theoretical posit, having the same status as, say, Sherlock Holmes' London ... " so 
that "(m)aximally extended, it is a ... portrayal of exactly what it is like to be that 
subject - in the subject's own terms." (Dennett 1991 :80,81,98). 
Dennett creates his theoretical fiction for purposes far outside the 
scope of this study. However, he describes subjectivity as a relationship between 
self and self-consciousness, structured as narrative. The physical and temporal 
aspects of this narrative allow him to position the subject as both a self and a self-
expression. They allow him to make use of a theoretical position himself. This 
position is his relationship to a 'neutral' subject. It is not the theoretical subject that 
is rendered neutral in his model, but the analyst's relationship to it. 
Dennett's fiction, however, also provides an actual description of self-
consciousness. It represents a functional description of the narrative structure of 
subjectivity. Walton utilises a similar description of self-consciousness in his 
solution to the subject/object problem at the heart of visual depiction" ... not only 
imagining something and imagining seeing it, but also imagining something about 
our own perceptual actions." (Walton 1990:224). The physical forms of expression 
do not directly affect the subject, except through self-consciousness. 
Terms of Drawing Demonstration One 
Novelist Patricia Hampl writes "Every story has a story,,," although she 
contradicts herself by adding: "This secret story which has little chance of getting 
told is the history of its creation. Maybe the "story of the story" can never be told, 
for a finished work consumes its own history, renders it obsolete, a husk." (Ham pi 
1989:37). Every story has a story, in the sense that everything that is told also 
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communicates the story of its telling, but Hempl is wrong in her qualification. In 
fact, what is told, telling and telling-to all constitute what she calls the ·story.' 
If this is the case, then it should admit of some practical 
demonstration. For instance, what changes in meaning will occur if we select any 
narrative and change one or other of the subjective conditions under which it is 
expressed? To use Hempl's words, if we change the story of the story, then the 
story itself should change. If lI(m)eaning is the effect of interaction between 
speaker and listener produced via the material ... " as Volosinov argues, then 
making a change in these conditions should produce an entirely new form of 
expression as part of an entirely new intersubjective situation (Volosinov 
1929/1973: 1 02). 
The general terms of a demonstration that aims to interrogate 
intersubjective relationships in story telling are provided by 8akhtin. He writes: 
..... (V)ariants on the theme of another's discourse are widespread in all areas of 
creative, ideological activity, ... such an exposition is a/ways a free stylistic 
variation on an another's discoursel it expounds anothers thought in the style of 
that thought, even while applying it to new material, to another way of posing the 
problem; it conducts experiments and gets solutions in the language of another's 
discourse." (Bakhtin 1981:347, my italics). 
These terms are met every time we express ourselves. Each 
expression is a demonstration of the relationships that make it meaningful. 8akhtin 
was not writing the general terms of an actual experiment so much as describing 
the way in which the particular form of each expression comes. 
However, if we take these terms in just that way, an outline of a 
practical demonstration in intersubjectivity begins to take shape. 8akhtin continues 
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" ... there is no external imitation, no simple act of reproduction, but rather a further, 
creative development of another's ... discourse in a new context and under new 
conditions." (Bakhtin 1981 :347). Such a demonstration would interrogate what 
happens if we 'expound another's thought in the style of that thought, even as 
applying it to new material', so that 'a further creative development of another's 
discourse' occurs. 
In the demonstration, we cannot simply reproduce the physical form of 
an existing expression and the subjective relationships it represents. Such an 
exercise would be retrospective. Retrospectively, it would confirm the relative 
subjectivity embodied in its constituent narrative positions. It would only produce a 
new situation of reading. To copy the form of an expression is to place oneself in a 
characteristic relationship with it. Although this might be interesting in itself, it does 
not fulfil Bakhtin's terms. These terms require that the demonstration produce a 
new expression in the form of someone else's expression. This is to be achieved 
by substituting one subject for another in the narrative model, in order to gauge the 
effect this change might have on the meaning of the expression itself. 
The aim of such a demonstration will be to attempt to self-consciously 
adopt another person's forms of expression in order to communicate something 
new. This will bring about new subjective relationships focussed entirely on 
expressing, and observing oneself express, the other's subjectivity. The 
demonstration will require the adoption of another person's self-consciousness by 
the only means possible: in the production of a new form of expression that 
appears to make their phYSical trace rather than one's own. 
This is a complex aim. It is simply not possible to be someone else. 
But being someone else isn't the aim. The aim is to attempt to adopt another 
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person's forms of expression in order to communicate something new. It's 
complexity and ultimate plausibility lie in the subjective relationships that we have 
with each other that are represented in the physical forms of expression. 
If we adopt Bakhtin again and take the 'internally persuasive word' for 
this other person's self-expression, then "(a) few changes in orientation and the 
internally persuasive word easily becomes an object of representation. n (Bakhtin 
1981:347). Of course, we can no more produce another person's forms of 
expression than we can become someone else. But we can familiarise ourselves 
with the physical forms of another's expressions and perceive completely the 
whole of our own diegetic relationship with them. Because it is our own perception, 
it does not require external verification of any kind. 
From the position of a reader, we can use our own subjectivity and our 
self-consciousness as a complete guide to another person's. Then we can 
produce expressions that allow us to scrutinise and self-consciously comment 
upon the particular diegesis itself. In doing this, we will index " ... the variety of alien 
voices (which) enter into the struggle for influence within an individual's 
. consciousness (just as they struggle with one another in surrounding social reality) 
All this creat(es) fertile soil for experimentally objectifying another's discourse." 
(Bakhtin 1981: 348). 
There is an immediate problem. There is no theoretically constructed 
neutral position with which to benchmark results. Such a demonstration has no 
control. If we adopt another person's forms of self-expression in order to express 
something new, we are in danger of a procedural elision. As soon as we select 
them, we are in a reading, listening and viewing relationship with the other 
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person's forms of expression. These forms are the only way in which we know 
them. 
The other's self-expression and our reading are in danger of appearing 
to be the same. This cannot be the case, but it might appear to be the case. This 
results from the fact that everything we can know about the other person whose 
forms of self-expression we aim to adopt is derived from our reading alone. This 
problem is a version of Dennett's problem in 'Consciousness Explained'. How do 
we examine a network of relationships of which we are already a constituent part? 
Dennett responds by creating a fictional self-consciousness. In the 
case of our possible demonstration, the physical basis of communication provides 
an answer. The form of every expression has multiple physical aspects, some of 
which we can retain as control by designating them theoretically neutral. 
For this demonstration, I have in mind comics as a particular form of 
expression. I intend to select other people whose self-expression I will attempt to 
adopt from the ranks of contemporary anglophone comic artists. 
Rawson writes I/(I)mplicit in every drawing style is a visual ontology," 
(Rawson 2005:221). It is this ontology that the demonstration will seek to change. 
This choice is not medium-specific. The aim and general terms of the 
demonstration could be applied to any physical form of expression. 
The choice of comic artists' self-expression as the practical focus for 
the experiment is specific only to their works in relation to me, subjectively. The 
demonstration could be conducted with poetry, casual conversation at a bus stop, 
newspaper journalism or a National Constitution. It would produce results both 
specific to those forms of expression and theoretically admissible to comparison 
across the range of every form of expression. Connor writes "To say that we 
142 
produce ourselves in voice is to say that we stage ... the setting in which the voice 
can resound." (Connor 2000:06). 
However, there are practical considerations that frame the method of 
my demonstration that belong uniquely to comics. The written verbal 
language/image combination unique to comics provides the source of a neutral 
control. The demonstration will aim to make new expressions in the form of the 
pages of comics. It will take as control a script that directs the final form of 
expression but. is only an oblique part of the form of expression itself. 
A comic script is an abstract plan of a comic. It is utilised in the 
process of producing the final expression. It bears no other relation to the 
expression itself. Such a script could exist for the purpose of the demonstration for 
any form of expression where a degree of planning anticipates the expression 
itself, such as musical scores, choreography, architects plans and film scripts, for 
example. 
As particular forms of expression, comics are usually the work of 
multiple authors including printers, ink and paper manufacturers and distributors as 
well as comic artists. We must not confuse the attempt to adopt another person's 
forms of expression with an objectified or biographically verifiable author. The 
script for a comic is already a form of expression. It is already an embodied, 
communicative form reflecting its own unique diegesis. It is utterly distinguishable 
from the comic that it prefigures. This demonstration will designate it theoretically 
neutral. The script will be an objective function of the demonstration itself. 
A script will be used as a control for the new expressions I intend to 
produce. The choice of script lies within the frame of the demonstration, even if its 
own expressive form, designated neutral, does not. The demonstration begins with 
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the choice of script, and with the theoretical designation of the script as neutral. 
The field of comics production and consumption is characterised by the 
institutionalised reformation of properties across many different productions. 
Characters, plots and stories are reworked in very different situations, producing 
very different forms of expression. It is usual for a script-writer or artist to adopt an 
existing character, set of paradigms, place or publication history. 
As a result, there is no contradiction between a new expression and 
the choice of aspects of existing material with which to direct it. To begin the 
demonstration it is simply a question of selecting material: a script from which to 
take direction and a subject whose forms of expression I will aim to adopt. I could 
make this choice from any script, plot or extrapolated fragment and choose any 
comic artist. Considering the field of comics, this seems both historically justifiable 
and theoretically appropriate. 
It has the advantage of rendering the control provided by a script 
infinitely richer as information in terms of comparative analyses. As part of a final 
analysis of each new expression, it admits the possibility of comparisons with the 
work from which the script is derived. The theoretically neutral script will have both 
its own expressive form, discounted in order to allow the demonstration to function, 
and will bring with it other utterances made by other people in the times related to 
it, even as they are placed outside it for the purpose of the demonstration with 
which to compare it as control with the demonstration's results. 
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Drawing Demonstration One 
Demonstration One comprises three distinct strands. Methodologically, 
these strands are identical in that they repeat the same process, but they are 
distinct in that this process in undertaken with three different sets of material. I will 
call these three strands One(a), One(b) and One(c). I undertook three 
methodological repetitions with different material in order to self-consciously 
regulate both my production and my reading of what I produced. Working on three 
drawings focused my attention on the process rather than on a specific form of 
expression, which might have been the case if I had undertaken only one new 
drawing. It also allowed me to compare the final drawings I produced with each 
other. 
Demonstration One followed this method: in each, I selected a double 
page spread from an existing comic and extrapolated a written script from it, within 
the constraints of the form of Anglophone comic strip scripts (Talon 2003:13). 
I discarded the double page spread from which the script was derived, 
only returning to it as part of a comparative analysis. I then selected a person 
whose forms of self-expression I would adopt. In each case, this was another 
Anglophone comic artist known to me only through their comics. 
My reading of the selected artists' comics was comprehensive. It 
aimed to provide me with a complete subjective sense of the characteristic forms 
of the artist's expression in as much detail and depth as' possible. Fortunately, in 
terms of time, comic strips have characteristic forms shared by different artists. As 
a result, I was able to arrange my reading according to these forms. These forms 
included the page size, the structure of page layouts, the colour palette, types of 
line, calligraphy, drawing technology and the distribution of text. They also 
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included narrative and depictive characteristics such as story, plot and narrator, 
including characterisation, point of view, focalisation, pace and dramaturgy. 
Having undertaken this comprehensive reading, I attempted in each 
case to make a new series of pages based on the script, such that the new set of 
pages appeared to me to conform utterly to the characteristic forms of expression 
of the selected artist. To do this, I followed a practical studio process that I share 
with many other comic artists. This follows a process from script to page layout, to 
storyboard, to rough drawing, to final drawing, lettering and colouring. 
When a drawing technology visible in the artists' works was available 
to me, I used it. When it was either not visible, incomprehensible to me or outside 
my technical capacity, I substituted it for another, which I understood or could 
master. Finally, I read the new pages I had made and compared them with the 
pages from which their script had been extrapolated as a theoretically neutral 
control. 
To summarise my method in Demonstration One [One(a), One(b) and 
One(c)], I attempted to draw a double page spread by one comic artist in the style 
of another. This description has the advantage of being short and carrying with it 
an immediate sense of the technical difficulty of the activity, but it is not accurate. It 
admits the possibility of a definition of style that disconnects the meaning of 
physical trace from the intersubjective relationships that frame it. Style becomes a 
quality distinct from its physical form, implying either some ineffable cause or a 
biographical one, both equally in error. 
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Drawing Demonstration One(a) method 
To begin Demonstration One(a) I chose pages six and seven from 
'Teen Witch', produced by Jim Medway in 2007 (Medway 2007:06-07 [Illustration 
07, Page 179]). From these two pages, I extrapolated the following script: 
Demonstration One(a) Script: 'Teen Witch Pages 06 and 07. Jim 
Medway. 
Cell 01: 
ZOE, PERLA, PERLA'S MOTHER AND FATHER. 
PRESENT DAY. INTERIOR. MARIO'S RESTAURANT. 
ZOE IS SERVING A DISH OF LOBSTER TO PERLA AND HER PARENTS. 
Narrative: Five minutes later-
Zoe (to Perla): Your lobster, Madam. 
Perla (loudly): LOOK OUTI It's the world's clumsiest waitressl 
Perla's Mother: HA HAl 
CeU2: 
PERLA. 
PRESENT DAY. INTERIOR. MARIO'S RESTAURANT. 
Perla (to Zoe): I don't want it any more. Bring me the dessert menu instead-





INTERIOR. MARIO'S RESTAURANT. 
ZOE IS HOLDING THE DISH OF LOBSTER. 




INTERIOR. MARIO'S RESTAURANT. 





INTERIOR. MARIO'S RESTAURANT. 
ZOE IS WRITING ON THE PORTABLE DESSERT MENU BOARD. 





INTERIOR. MARIO'S RESTAURANT. 
ZOE IS WRITING ON THE PORTABLE DESSERT MENU BOARD. 
Zoe (to herself): This will be a REAL special dessert! 
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Cell 2: 
ZOE, PERLA, PERLA'S MOTHER. 
PRESENT DAY. 
INTERIOR. MARIO'S RESTAURANT. 
ZOE IS SHOWING PERLA AND PERLA'S MOTHER THE PORTABLE 
DESSERT MENU BOARD. 
Zoe (to Perla): Anything take your fancy Madam? 




INTERIOR. MARIO'S RESTAURANT. 
PERLA IS CHOOSING FROM THE PORTABLE DESSERT MENU BOARD. 




INTERIOR. MARIO'S RESTAURANT. 
AS PERLA READS THE NAME OF THE DESSERT (A SPELL), SHE 
CHANGES INTO A SEALION. 
Perla: "Praline Truffle Triple Cho Chic - By the Sword of the Cyclops, Zing, 
Zing, Zipl" 
Sound Effect: KA ZAMI 
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CeliS: 
ZOE, PERLA, PERLA'S MOTHER AND FATHER. 
PRESENT DAY. 
INTERIOR. MARIO'S RESTAURANT. 
THE SEALION PERLA (STILL RECOGNISABLE) BOUNCES ON THE 
TABLE TO THE HORROR OF HER MOTHER AND FATHER. ZOE LOOKS 
ON, SMILING. 
Perla's mother (to Perla): Ooh Princessl You've turned into a - a -
SEALlONl 
Perla: YELP Yelp! 
Perla's father: How embarrassing I 
Zoe (thinks): Hee Heel My spell workedl 
End Page 7 End Script. 
Having extrapolated this script, I set aside Jim Medway's work 
and attempted to make a drawing from it, adopting comic artist Mike Mignola's 
forms of self-expression. I read the six comics that Mignola had created, 
written and drawn to date as complete works or col/ections of works (Mig nola 
1996,1997,1998,2000,2002,2006). The drawings Mignola makes for other 
authors, his writing for other artists, his novels and film productions are 
aspects of the forms of expression in these albums I but they are not 
practically relevant to this Demonstration .. 
Illustration 08 (Page 180) is an indicative example of a double 
page spread by Mignola from 'Box Full of Evil', a story in the compilation 'The 
Right Hand of Doom' (MignoJa 2000). Through reading, I compiled a list of 
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technical specifications that typify Mignola's story-telling across all of this 
albums. His pages are always 167mm x 257mm. The layout of cells on each 
page (of which there is a wide variety of sizes and densities) is anchored by 
an invariable template grid of nine panels of 47mm x 74mm with internal 
gutters of 2mm. Page margins change according to whether the page is on 
the right or the left (so that the right hand page margins are 10mm inside, 
17mm outside and 12mm top and bottom. The left hand pages reverse the 
outside and inside margins of the right hand pages). 
The line Mignola uses is invariably 5 pixels wide, including the line 
that outlines cells, speech balloons, thought bubbles and narration, when it is 
seen. The colour palette comprises a long list of print Pantones and process 
colours that changes very little across all six albums. In the 1996 album, the 
background to cells is black. In the other albums, it is white. Speech balloons 
and thought bubbles contain black calligraphy on white. Narration contains 
black calligraphy on cream (C:O,MO, Y20, KO). The calligraphy is hand-drawn. 
So much for a list of specifications understood from close reading. 
There are many, many others, all of which contribute to typify Mignola's 
expressions. To borrow Saetens' words again, these specifications are both 
internal (such as the plot, story and narrator and ways of depicting through 
drawing) and external (such as paper and print details, distribution, 
consensually recognised genre and type of reader). 
These technical specifications informed my division of the script 
into scenes depicted in each cell. This was the start of a transition from written 
to visual story telling. Each specification provided an underlying condition of 
the others. Taken as a group, the specifications were mutually conditioning, 
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with the effect of constraining my actions in visuaJising the narrative at every 
stage. 
By conforming to formal specifications, I was able to create a 
visual drama characteristic of Mignola's self-expression, including 
characterisation, story and plot through scene division, cell layout on the page 
and final drawing, calligraphy and colour. My division of the script into scenes 
depicted in cells was produced as a planned layout of the plot on two pages 
(Illustration 09, Page 181). In conforming to 'Mignola' specifications, this 
division into scenes did not follow the division of scenes in the script, which 
belong to Medway. 
The layout of pages was almost the conclusion of my new visual 
structuring of the plot and was also the moment for me to visualise the 
possible relationship between speech balloons and scenes (Illustration 10, 
Page 182). Mignola has been vocal about his work on this pOint, commenting: 
"You're manipulating the background to put in these word balloons, rather 
than just pretend that these things are not there." (Talon 2003:82). 
From the layout of pages I was able to create a storyboard 
(Illustration ii, Page 183). The development of the storyboard was much 
more complex than either the extrapolation of a script or the creation of the 
visual structure of the narrative in the layout. Although I was able to specify 
such constants as line width, colour, calligraphy and types of balloon, bubble 
and narrative box, the plot and story and the characters, places, times and 
things that comprise them were much more difficult to quantify. 
However, according to the general terms of the Demonstration, 
my own perception was compete guide to adopting Mignola's forms of self-
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expression, because everything I know about him is communicated in the 
physical form of his expression. In visualising the world of the plot and story in 
these two new pages in the way that Mignola might, I had only to decide for 
myseff if my choices, actions and expressive traces were like the choices, and 
actions communicated to me in Mignola's physical traces. 
Rather than compiling technical specifications in order to achieve 
the types of places and people who might be active in the whole story, I 
looked for models derived from Mignola's own comics and made use of them 
to visualise the story in detail. In doing this, I also looked for ways in which . 
light, gravity, temperature, time of day, point of view, smell, sound and 
movement appear as aspects of character as well as aspects of narrative, 
including more distant genre conventions and echoes of other expressions. 
For example, throughout his work, Mignola uses a verbal 
language for magic that is derived directly from the work of H. P. Lovecraft 
(Airaksinen 1999). It made sense to use this language for the spell that Zoe 
tricks Perla into reciting, rather than replicating the spell in the script, the 
language of which is uniquely Medway's. The use of this language informs 
Perla as a character as well as contributing to the plot. 
For Zoe, the teenage waitress witch, I imagined a character in 
appearance, age and temperament like Mignola's Kate Corrigan. For Perla, 
the snobbish and petulant daughter, I imagined a character like Mignola's 
Annie Hatch; for Perla's mother (an older version of Perla), Ilona Kakosy (all 
Mignola 1998); for her father (a long-suffering and hence silent family man), 
Adam Frost (Mignola 2000). 
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I based the overall scene where the action takes place on the 
interiors of nineteenth century buildings that appear in all but the most recent 
of Mignola's albums, and specifically on the interiors in the story ·Christmas 
Underground' which appears in the album ·The Chained Coffin And Others' 
(Mig nola 1998:41-61). 
This identification of models represented almost entirely my 
visualisation of the narrative in the two new pages, by which I mean the 
adoption of a specific type of world inhabited by specific types of people, 
where some things are possible and some impossible. This is a coherent 
fictional world of cause and effect, with a past and hence an associated story, 
and a plausible number of possible futures. 
After completing the detailed storyboard, my only criteria in 
deciding that the final drawings, calligraphy and colouring of the two pages 
were complete was on the basis of degrees of similarity with other forms of 
self-expression made by Mignola. (Illustration 12, Page 184). I made this 
adjudication of degrees of similarity as a reader. I stopped work as soon as , 
considered myself able to read the two new pages in the way' read any 
pages by Mignola, and able to access Mignola's fictional world in the two new 
pages as , feel' access Mignola's worlds in his other work. 
This was the most difficult phase of the work. In order to feel that 
the pages had successfully adopted the forms of Mignola's self-expression 
rather than remaining my own, I had to become a habitual reader again, 
feeling that I was reading pages by Mignola. rather than a reader with the 
production of a demonstration in mind. which is an entirely different sensation 
altogether. 
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Drawing Demonstration One(a) analysis 
When I had completed these tasks, I opened Jim Medway's 'Teen 
Witch' again. Let us recall Patricia Hampl's 'story of the story' and my aim to 
change the story by changing the story of the story. The aim of the Drawing 
Demonstration One was to adopt another person's forms of self-expression in 
order to express something new. 
Let us also recall that the script extrapolated from Medway's script 
acts as a neutral control in the Demonstration, allowing us to produce a new 
subjectivity through the use of another person's self-expression without falling 
into tautology. 
The script in Medway's drawing and my new 'Mignola' drawing is 
very similar. Described simply as a series of actions undertaken by named 
characters in a unified time and place, the two plots are identical. In the script, 
only differences of language and in the grouping of actions appear. But my 
'Mignola' pages and Medway's pages depict entirely different fictional worlds, 
despite the identical plot. They communicate entirely different things involving 
different authors, producers and reading milieu. 
There is a great deal of difference between the two new pages 
drawn in Demonstration One(a) and pages six and seven of 'Teen Witch' from 
which they are derived. In Medway's fictional world, human beings are always 
anthropomorphised cats. Curiously, this signature trait becomes less and less 
significant in reading Medway, until it becomes completely insignificant. 
Medway'S anthropomorphism is general, so that we understand that this is 
simply the way that Medway always depicts human beings of all types. In 
general, it might render his characters innocent, simple or infantilised, but in 
155 
fact, it is a device which enables him to depict a wide variety of human 
emotions and actions very simply, even if these are always in some way 
finally benign. 
Medway's plot develops in the very recent past. It is set in the 
north west of England. Both of these facts are evidenced by the dress of the 
characters, among other things: the hairstyles and clothes are information rich 
and completely specific to this time and place and no other. 
There is a coincidence that has an effect on the outcome of 
Demonstration One(a). I chose Medway's pages without thinking them typical 
or untypical of Medway's work. It was Mignola's self-expression that I aimed 
to typify. In utilising a script derived from these pages as the basis for drawing 
new pages in the manner of Mignola, I hadn't realised how untypical of 
Medway these pages are, for the simple reason that their plot contains magic. 
This inclusion of magic is unique in Medway's output. So 'Teen 
Witch' pages six and seven are uncharacteristic Medway pages in this way. 
Magic is one of the things that does not occur in the contemporary north west 
of England as depicted by Medway, even in a community of people who look 
like cats. 
The overall social tone of Medway's pages is gentle and comedic, 
so there doesn't feel like there will be lasting harm in the spell that Zoe has 
tricked Perla into reciting. This concurs with all of the actions in Medway's 
drawings. On the other hand, magic is a staple ingredient of MignoJa's fictional 
world, as is the possibility of harm. 
My new 'Mig nola' pages also take place in the recent past, but the 
part of the world in which the action takes place is difficult to establish with 
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certainty. It could be taking place in an eastern European castle or a long-
established restaurant in New York. These differences between Medway and 
Mignola are partly differences of genre. They are consensually agreed forms 
of expression that are pervasive even as they allow specific examples of work 
within them to have their own individual characteristics. 
The traditions of supernatural narrative across media are 
contributed to by Mignola's fictional world, represented by lovecraft's magic 
language and visual hints of ancestral lineages, wealth and tenebrous 
histories as much as the actual magic transformation itself. 
On the other hand, Medway contributes to the tradition of comedic 
visual anthropomorphism by bringing it into specific social currency in the 
present day, with hairstyles and clothes. Both a possible setting of a castle 
and an lold New York' restaurant are plausible Migno/a locations, as a high 
street restaurant in Greater Manchester is not, and vice versa in the work of 
Medway. 
These generic differences are reflected in the ways in which each 
world is depicted. Medway's three-colourway and moire dot half-tones 
establish a codified way of depicting the atmosphere, light and shade of his 
world which refers overtly to old (and hence now demeaned) print technology 
and its past use in cheap production. This technology is now a focus for 
sentimentalism and commodification as nostalgia. 
Alternatively, Mignola's world is built of high contrasts of light and 
shade, representing drama, heightened emotion and psychological extremes. 
These are represented on the page as graphic patterns of silhouette and 
flashes of acid colour, arranged one on top of the other in layers of tightly-
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managed space, dense with ink. My Migno/a pages in Drawing Demonstration 
One(a) follow these prescriptions completely. 
In describing the different characteristics of trace that I have 
highlighted in Medway's pages and my new pages, I have freely mixed 
aspects of depiction, production technology and the social consensus that 
contribute to the physical form of Mignola's self-expression (with terms such 
as 'silhouette', 'flashes of acid colour', 'moire', 'dense with ink' 'north west of 
England' and 'Lovecraft'). I have utilised aspects of both the 'story' and 'the 
story of the story' to describe the 'story', without contradiction or inadmissible 
change of mode. 
The narrative in both Medway's pages and my new 'Mignola' 
pages, although the same in terms of a script, is different as a whole because 
it is comprised of all of its accumulated forms of expression. Individual 
aspects of trace are identifiable within this accumulation of forms, but they are 
not divisible. 
There is a single good example of this in the possible different 
readings of Perla's mother's exclamation, which is the same in both drawings 
"Oh princess, you've turned into a sealiont" In Medway's drawing, the word 
'princess' is a term of familial endearment in a mother/daughter relationship, 
similar in use to the word 'darling'. It is impossible to read the word 'princess' , 
literally, as the Greater Manchester that Medway depicts does not contain 
princesses. 
However, in my new 'Mig nola' pages, the word 'princess' could 
easily be taken literally, because the whole form of Mignola's typical self-
expression includes the possibility of such a reading. Princesses are to be 
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found therein, as are 'old New York' restaurants and eastern European 
castles, black shadows and Lovecraft's magic words. As Volo~inov writes: 
-The speaker's subjective consciousness does not. .. operate with language 
as a system of normatively identical forms (but is) ... brought about in line with 
the particular, concrete utterance, .. the centre of gravity lies not in the identity 
of the form but in that new and concrete meaning it acquires in the particular 
context." (Volosinov 1929/1973:67). 
Drawing Demonstration One(b) method and analysis 
Demonstration One(b) and Demonstration One(c) followed exactly 
the same method as Demonstration One(a): I chose a double page spread by 
a comic artist. I extrapolated a script and chose another comic artist the form 
of whose self-expression I was to adopt. I undertook a comprehensive reading 
of that artist's work in order to compile a detailed list of speCifications 
describing the typical formal characteristics of their expression. I drew a new 
set of pages based on the script utilising these characteristics and undertook 
a comparative reading with the pages from which the script was derived. 
I shall not duplicate my descriptions of method in the case of each 
of the strands of the Drawing Demonstration One. Some details of 
speCification, such as page sizes, grid structures and colour palettes, I will 
omit here altogether. They can be read directly in the illustrations provided. 
Others, such as the extrapolated scripts in each case and lists of 
characteristic works, I will include. 
To begin Demonstration One(b) I chose pages one hundred and forty 
four and one hundred and forty five from the story 'Almost Colossus' included in 
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the anthology 'The Chained Coffin and Others, produced by Mike Mignola in 1998 
(Mig nola 1998:144-145 [Illustration 13, Page 185]). From these two pages, I 
extrapolated the following script: 
Demonstration One(b) Script: 'Almost Colossus' Pages 144 and 145. 
Mike Mignola. 
Cell 01: 
HOMUNCULUS, HOMUNCULUS' BROTHER, KATE, SLAVE. 
RECENT PAST. INTERIOR. LABORATORY IN THE TOWER OF THE 
CAPATINENI MONASTERY, ROMANIA. 
THE SLAVE IS PRESENTING THE ROPE-TIED KATE CORRIGAN TO 
HOMUNCULUS' BROTHER AND HOMUNCULUS. 
Slave (to Homunculus' brother): Master ... ? 
Homunculus' brother (to slave): What have you got there, slave? A living 
human? Shall we use her to christen the work? 
Homunculus: You cannotl 
Homunculus' brother: Quiet brother. 
Cell 2: 
HOMUNCULUS 
RECENT PAST. INTERIOR. LABORATORY IN THE TOWER OF THE 
CAPATINENI MONASTERY, ROMANIA. 
HOMUNCULUS HEAD AND TORSO ONLY. 
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Homunculous' brother (voice off, to Homunculus): Remember what I told 
you. WE are the greater. These humans should be ours to do with as we 




RECENT PAST. INTERIOR. LABORATORY IN THE TOWER OF THE 
CAPATINENI MONASTERY, ROMANIA. 
KATE HEAD ONLY. 
Homunculous' borther (voice off, to Homunculus): ... raw materials ... 
Cell 4: 
LIZ. 
AT THE SAME MOMENT AS CELL 3 .. INTERIOR. HOSPITAL ISOLATION 
WARD, THE WAUER INSTITUTE, TIRGOVISTE, ROMANIA. 
LIZ CLOSE UP, EYES FULL OF ENERGY. 
Homunculous' borthar (voice off, to Homunculus): ... ours to use ... 
Cell 6: 
HOMUNCULUS' BROTHER. 
RECENT PAST. INTERIOR. LABORATORY IN THE TOWER OF THE 
CAPATINENI MONASTERY, ROMANIA. 
Homunculous' brother: ... and to DESTROY. Remember that brother. 
Homunculous' brother (to the slave, off): put her in the hole. 
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Cell 6 
HOMUNCULUS, SLAVE, KATE CORRIGAN, HOMUNCULUS' BROTHER. 
RECENT PAST. INTERIOR. LABORATORY IN THE TOWER OF THE 
CAPATINENI MONASTERY, ROMANIA. 
THE SLAVE IS LIFTING KATE CORRIGAN TOWARDS A BOILING VAT OF 
FAT. 
Kate: Hey! Stop it! 
Slave: Another onion for the soup. 
Homunculus' brother (to slave): DO IT NOW! 
Cell 7 
HOMUNCULUS. 
RECENT PAST. INTERIOR. LABORATORY IN THE TOWER OF THE 
CAPATINENI MONASTERY, ROMANIA. 
CLOSE UP OF HOMUNCULOUS' EYES, FILLED WITH ENERGY. 
Cell 8 
KATE 
RECENT PAST. INTERIOR. LASORA TORY IN THE TOWER OF THE 
CAPATINENI MONASTERY, ROMANIA. 





RECENT PAST. INTERIOR. LABORATORY IN THE TOWER OF THE 
CAPATINENI MONASTERY, ROMANIA. 
Homunculus: No. 




RECENT PAST. INTERIOR. LABORATORY IN THE TOWER OF THE 
CAPATINENI MONASTERY, ROMANIA. 
HOMUNCULUS STRIKES THE SLAVE AWAY FROM KATE CORRIGAN 
WITH A BUST OF ENERGY. 
Homunculus: NOI 
Sound effect: WOK 
Cell 2: 
HOMUNCULUS, KATE 
RECENT PAST. INTERIOR. LABORATORY IN THE TOWER OF THE 
CAPATINENI MONASTERY, ROMANIA. 
HOMUNCULUS IS STEADYING KATE. 
Homunculus (to Kate): Are you unharmed? 
Kate (to Homunculus):I ... I'm okay. 
Homunculus (to Kate): I will not let him harm you. 
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Cell 3: 
HOMUNCULUS, KATE , 
RECENT PAST. INTERIOR. LABORATORY IN THE TOWER OF THE 
CAPATINENI MONASTERY, ROMANIA. 




RECENT PAST. INTERIOR. LABORATORY IN THE TOWER OF THE 
CAPATINENI MONASTERY, ROMANIA. 
HElLBOY APPEARS THROUGH A HOLE IN THE LABORATORY WALL. 
KATE IS STILL TIED. HOMUNCULUS LIES KNOCKED OUT. 
Kate: HElLBOYI I don't think you had to do that - - and what took you so 
long? 
Hellboy: The stairs were a tight fit, and some smart-ass bricked up the door 
at this end. You okay? Is that our guy? 
Cell 5: 
HOMUNCULUS' BROTHER. 
RECENT PAST. INTERIOR. LABORATORY IN THE TOWER OF THE 
CAPATINENI MONASTERY, ROMANIA. 
SHOUTING. ' 
Homunculus' brother: WHAT IS THIS!? My brother tums against me and 
now my laboratory is INVADED?I YOU FOOLSI 
End Page 145 
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Setting aside Mignola's pages, I chose comic artist Chris Ware as 
the subject the forms of whose self-expression I would attempt to adopt. In 
this case, I read the following works by Ware: 'The ACME Novelty Library No. 
1 -15 (Ware 1993 - 2010), 'Jimmy Corrigan, The Smartest Kid on Earth' 
(Ware 2000: 320 - 321 [Illustration 14, Page 186]) and 'Quimby the Mouse' 
(Ware 2003). 
As guides, I modelled the visual appearance of characters in the 
script on characters in 'Jimmy Corrigan'. For Kate, us adapted Jimmy's 
grandfather's boyhood girl friend; for the homunculus and his brother, Jimmy's 
great grandfather; for Hellboy, the Italian toymaker and for the Slave, the 
toymaker's son. 
The page layout (Illustration 15, Page 187) and storyboard 
~ 
(Illustration 16, Page 188) are indicative rather than illustrative. They are 
taxonomy rather than visualisation. This was due to my realisation of Ware's 
characteristic use of single points of view cropped and repeated. I only had to 
visualise two changes of scene (one axonometric view and one elevation), 
within which only changes of scale and frame needed to be made. I 
constrained the actions of characters within scenes in the same way through 
scale and cropping, producing Ware's characteristic repetition, evenness of 
pace and particular sense of space as a result. 
My final two pages are shown as Illustration 17 (Page 189) .. 
Mignola's pages are set in the present, but are grounded in a tradition of 
supernatural story telling that is so well understood that it appears timeless. 
This genre admits generational changes, but the actions of the characters 
within it are both eternal and ever-present. In the genre, a spooky house in a 
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novel of 1900 is the same as a spooky house in a novel of 201 O. The 
narrative could be set in any present day, past or present, with only changes 
in technology to indicate which generation the protagonists represent, and 
these details are unimportant. 
I have set my new 'Ware' pages in the early twentieth century. 
This setting refers some of the depicted actions in the plot to real horrors and 
real psychoses that are utterly impossible in Mignola's narratives. These 
include re-mediated images of serial killing, terrorism and extermination 
camps. Ware's fictional world is full of banality and violence, both casual and 
purposeful, made part of that world through recognition on a reader's part of 
other specific places and times in the real world. 
As such, Ware's work conforms to a kind of contemporary 
Realism, in which the characters and places have the status of subjects in a 
documentary. Not so Mignola's fictional world. There are no supernatural 
constants in Ware's work, only dreams and fantasies of the supernatural, 
bearing the same relationship to their subjects as do dreams and fantasies in 
everyday life. 
In my new 'Ware' pages, Hellboy (the red demon hero in 
Mignola's work) is a man of strange appearance. He's coloured red all over, 
including his face, clothes and hair, with horns and a pointed moustache. 
Nonetheless, he is a man. Perhaps his adventures prior to his appearance in 
the plot have required him to dress like that, as a showman or a devil. Has he 
been to a fancy-dress party? Is his appearance a disguise put on in order to 
gain entry to the building and rescue Kate? Whatever makes him appear like 
that, it is definitely not the fact that he is a demon. 
166 
Drawing Demonstration One(c) method and analysis 
For Demonstration One(c), I chose pages one hundred and forty four 
and one hundred and forty five from 'The Complete Maus' by Art Spiegelman, 
compiled in 1996 after appearing as a series (Spiegelman 1996:144 -145 
[Illustration 18, Page 190]). From these two pages, I extrapolated the following 
script: 
Demonstration One(c) Script: 'The Complete Maus' Pages 144 and 145. 
Art Spiegelman. 
Cell 01: 
VLADEK, ANJA, MRS MOTONOWA, MRS MOTONOWA'S SON 
1940S. IN MRS MOTONOWA'S HOUSE. ANJA PLAYS 'CAT'S CRADLE' 
WITH STRING WITH MRS MOTONOWA'S SON. 
Vladek (voice over): We had here a little comfortable ... we had where to sit. 
Anja (to Mrs Motonowa's son): Remember, little one - never tell anybody 
(bold) there are Jews here. They'll shoot us aUI 
Mrs Motonowa's son (to Anja): Yes, Aunt Anja. 




1980S. IN THE GARDEN AT VLADEK'S HOME. 
Art (to Vladek): You had to pay (bold) Mrs Motonova to keep you, right? 
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Vladek (out of cell, hand-only visible. To Art): Of course I paid ... and well 
(bold) I paid. 
Cell 3: 
VLAOEK 
19808. IN THE GARDEN AT VLAOEK'S HOME. 
Vladek: ... what you think? 80meone will risk their life for nothing? 
Cell 4: 
ART, VLADEK 
19808. IN THE GARDEN AT VLADEK'S HOME. 
Vladek (to Art): ... 1 paid also for the food what she gave us from her 
smuggling business. ' 
Cell 6: 
ART, VLADEK 
19808. IN THE GARDEN AT VLADEK'S HOME. 
Vladek: But one time I missed a few coins to the bread ... 
CeliS: 
VLADEK, MRS MOTONOWA 
1940S. IN MRS MOTONOWA'S HOUSE 
Vladek (to Mrs Motonowa): I'll pay you the rest tomorrow, after I go out and 
cash some valuables. 
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Cell 7: 
VlADEK, MRS MOTONOWA 
1940S. A MOMENT LATER, SAME SCENE AS CELL 6. 
Mra Motonowa (to Vladek): Sorry, I wasn't able to find (bold) any bread 
today. 
Vladek (voice over): Always (bold) she got bread, so I didn't believe ... But, 
still, she was a good woman. 
Cell 8: 
ANJA, MRS MOTONOWA'S SON 
19405. IN MRS MOTONOWA'S HOUSE. ANJA AND MRS MOTONOWA'S 
SON SHARE A BOOK. 
Vladek (voice over): In his school the boy was very bad a German. So Anja 
tutored to him. 
Mrs Motonowa's son (reading): Ich bin ... Du bist. .. Er ist ... 
Vladek (voice over): She knew German like an expert. 
Cell 9: 
VLADEK, ANJA, MRS MOTONOWA, MRS MOTONOWA'S SON. 
1940S. IN MRS MOTONOWA'S HOUSE. THE ADULTS ARE DISMAYED. 
Mrs Motonowa's son (to Anja, Vladek and Mrs Motonowa): My teacher 
asked me how I improved so much ... 
CeU10: 
VLADEK, ANJA. MRS MOTONOWA, MRS MOTONOWA'S SON. 
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1940S. A MOMENT LATER. SAME SCENE AS CELL 9. THE ADULTS ARE 
RELIEVED. 
Mrs Motonowa's son (to Anja, Vladek and Mrs Motonowa): So I told him my 
mother (bold) was helping me. 
AnJa (exhales): Whew 
Vladek (voice over): He was really a clever boy. 
End Page 144 
Page 145 
Cell 1: 
MRS MOTONOWA, ANJA, VLADEK. 
1940S. GROUND FLOOR IN MRS MOTONOWA'S HOUSE, WITH A VIEW 
OUT OF THE WINDOW. 
Vladek (voice over): But it was a few small things here not so good ... Her 
home was very small and it was on the ground floor ... 
Mrs Monotowa (to Anja and Vladek, indiacting the window): Be sure to keep 
away from the window - you might be seenl 
Cell 2: . 
MRS MOTONOWA, ANJA, VLADEK. 
19405. GROUND FLOOR IN MRS MOTONOWA'S HOUSE, INSIDE THE 
FRONT DOOR. 
Sound effect: Nok nok (bold) 
Mrs Motonowa (to the door): One Minutel (bold)/(to Anja and Vladek): (Quick 
- get in the closet I) 
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Cell 3: 
POSTMAN, MRS MOTONOWA, ANJA, VLADEK. 
1940S. GROUND FLOOR IN MRS MOTON,OWA'S HOUSE, POSTMAN AND 
MRS MOTONOWA ARE INSIDE THE OPEN FRONT DOOR. ANJA AND 
VLADEK ARE IN THE CLOSET, SEEN CUT-AWAY. 
Postman (to Mrs Motonowa): A letter from your husband, Mrs Motonowa. 
Mrs Motonowa (to the Postman): Thanks. 
Cell 4: 
ANJA, VLADEK. 
1940'S. INSIDE THE CLOSET IN MRS MOTONOWA'S HOUSE, A MOMENT 
AFTER CELL 3. 
Vladek (voice over): But I had something allergic in the closet. .. 
Vladek (starts to sneeze): Aah (bold) 
Cell 5: 
ANJA, VLADEK. 
1940'S. INSIDE THE CLOSET IN MRS MOTONOWA'S HOUSE, A MOMENT 
AFTER CELL 4. 
Vladek (voice over): Or maybe it was a cold -I can't remember ... 
Vladek (stifles the sneeze): -chmf 
Vladek (voice over): But always I had to sneeze. 
Cell 6: 
MRS MOTONOWA, VLADEK, ANJA. 
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1940S. IN MRS MOTONOWA'S HOUSE. MRS MOTONOWA HAS JUST 
COME IN. 
Vladek (voice over): Still, everything here was fine, until one Saturday 
Motonowa ran very early back from her black market work ... 
Mrs Motonowa (to Anja and Vladek): This is terriblel (bold) The Gestapo just 
searched me - they took all my goods! 
Cell 7: 
MRS MOTONOWA, VLADEK, ANJA. 
1940S. IN MRS MOTONOWA'S HOUSE. A MOMENT AFTER CELL 6. 
Mrs Motonowa (to Anja and Vladek): They may come search here any 
minutel You've got to leave I (bold) 
Vladek (to Mrs Motonowa): Whatl (bold) 
Anja (to Mrs Motonowa): But where can we go? 
Cell 8: 
MRS MOTONOWA, VLADEK, ANJA. 
1940S. IN MRS MOTONOWA'S HOUSE. A MOMENT AFTER CELL 7. 
Mrs Motonowa (to Anja and Vladek): I don't know. But you must get out nowl 
(bold) 
Anja (to Vladek): Oh my God ... This is the endl (bold) 
Vladek (voice over): Anja started to cry ... But we had not a choice. 
End Page 146 
I decided to use the script extrapolated from the work of 
Spiegelman to draw new pages as Jim Medway might characteristically draw 
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them (see Illustration 08). The page layout, storyboards and final pages can 
be seen in Illustrations 19,20 and 21 (Pages 191 -193). 
Spiegelman's 'Maus' is one of the most celebrated contemporary 
comics in English. The series of cross-generational relationships and the 
narratives of reminiscence, confession and compassion through which it 
describes the continuing experiences of the Nazi genocide make it a deeply 
serious and emotive work. 
Its central depictive device is an extended visual metaphor in 
which race and nationality are correlated to people anthropomorphised as 
different animals. German nationals appear as cats, Polish nationals as pigs, 
Jewish people as mice. Jewish people disguised as Polish nationals appear 
as anthropomorphised mice wearing pig masks and so on. 
The donning of masks is a key rhetorical trope in the visual 
drama, which unfolds with the inevitability of tragedy. It is a story of human 
suffering in which the conclusion is seen in the beginning, through reversals of 
fortune, and it is the turns in the course of events that are important, as the 
outcomes are already familiar. Spiegelman's anthropomorphism is strongly 
directed towards this sense. 
Medway's anthropomorphism and Spiegelman's couldn't be more 
different. In my new 'Medway' drawing, the characters feel as though they are 
in greater control of their personal destinies than in Spiegelman's. This 
entirely changes the narrative. Spiegelman's characters, appear to be driven 
by events, even as they contribute to them, and this is an aspect of their (and 
our) tragedy. Personal happiness, health and life itself are at the whim of 
history, abstracted and annihilating, against which they have no choice but to 
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struggle to live, or die in the effort. The animal features that they wear 
contribute to this sense. 
My new 'Medway' pages are less monumental than Spiegelman's 
and the characters in them are more open to opportunity. There is no sense of 
unfolding tragedy, only of deadly peril, difficulty and struggle. Survival seems, 
possible, at least, and the story's end is not yet known. 
Drawing Demonstration One conclusion 
In Drawing Demonstration One, to what extent have I managed to 
manipulate the physical traces of another's self-expression in order to change 
'the story of the story' and hence change the 'story'? To what extent have I . 
simply made my own trace and hence failed in some degree? The 
Demonstration will have been successful if it produced a unique, self-
consciously-made visualisation of another's self-expression in each case. This 
will have occurred if I have created a visual narrative from each script that 
appears to have been made by the three comic artists in view (Mignola, Ware 
and Medway). This would involve perceiving each drawing as their self-
expression. Crucially, success depends on the degree to which we also 
understand each of these physical traces as manipulations of the situation of 
reading, made by someone other than the artists. 
The Demonstration's relative success will derive from the degree 
of my re-subjectivisation in each case. Although I have made each drawing, 
each drawing must appear as though the artist has made it. In the 
Demonstration, I have made the physical trace of another person and seen 
how convincingly that trace represents them rather than me. The point at 
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which the drawings become convincing is the point at which the story of the 
story is changed, revealing the way in which relative subjectivity comes about. 
The three strands of the Experiment appear to create distinct subjective 
voices, not just disembodied emblems of objects already recognised. These 
pages by 'Mignola', 'Ware' and 'Medway' are new. 
I selected the particular comic artists' work for the Demonstration 
based on the possibility of this distinctiveness, in the sense that the comics 
from which the scripts were derived and the artists the forms of whose self-
expression I attempted to adopt are very different from each other in 
emotional tone, production techniques and genre. They each have 
longstanding, deep and wide-reaching networks of associations invested in 
their forms of self-expression. 
Conversely, the degree to which I might have failed is expressed 
in the reverse. In each case it would be revealed in the appearance of my own 
self-expression, establishing and entrenching my own subjectivity outside the 
characteristic traces of the other artists. If this is the case, we will be more or 
less able to identify the particularities of trace that index me, rather then 
indexing others .. 
Finally, I am able to position myself as a reader in relation to the 
new drawings, making my own perception of them their entire effect. Reading, 
I can take my 'Ware' drawing and my 'Medway' drawing as plausibly by Ware 
and Medway. I don't think that is quite the case with my Mignola drawing. 
Mignola's unerring mastery over the spaces he depicts is achieved by 
manipulating contrast. In his fictional world no-one is ever unsure as to where 
everyone and everything is. My new 'Mignola' drawing contains areas of 
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spacial vagueness that, whilst not entirely expressing my subjective presence 
over Mignola's, makes the drawing not by MignoJa. 
I am dis-habituated by these drawings, whereas reading actual 
Ware, Mignola or Medway drawings, I feel habituated to them. The subjective 
tropes of drawings made by these artists are invisible to me, whereas my own 
remain visible to me, as hard as I have tried to destabilise and conceal them . 
. This dis-habituation occurs on the level of a comparison between 
the experience that I have when reading an drawing by Ware, Mignola or 
Medway and my experience of these new drawings. This difference might be 
simply a result of the experimental frame, which requires me to know both 
what I have done and to read it as another person's self-expression. I know 
more about the production and reading of these drawings than either a 
producer or a reader alone usually can. If this dis-habituation is caused by 
knowledge, it is the result of theoretically doubling my subjectivity in order to 
undertake the Demonstration. It is intersubjective jetJag. 
However, I think that there is more to my dis-habituation. I have 
only compared existing and new sets of drawings very briefly, highlighting 
some aspects of the changed ·story' in each case. I read a doubling of 
motives in the drawings themselves, compared with the existing bodies of 
work to which they contribute. 
It is not possible for me to be someone else, to make someone 
else's trace or to be in someone else's situation. The series of subjective 
relationships embodied in the new drawings in the Demonstration are specific 
to me, communicated through the physical form of this expression, the 
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situation of which "m a part. When Mignola, Ware or Medway express 
themselves, it is always their self-expression and always their physical trace. 
When I had completed Demonstration One, in 2010 I asked Jim 
Medway to make a drawing from the script I had extrapolated from 
Spiegelman's work, with no other guide. I asked him to do what I had done, 
excepting the fact that he draws in his own manner and I was trying to adopt 
that manner for the sake of the Demonstration. The new drawing by Medway 
to this brief is shown in Illustration 22 (Page 194). 
Medway's new drawing is unfypical of Medway's work as a whole 
and less characteristic of his work than the drawing that' had made. 
However, Medway's drawing is literally Medway's self-expression, whereas 
my new 'Medway' drawing is an adoption of the forms of that self-expression, 
with all of the inequivocal differences in situation and subjects that implies. 
My dis-habituation is a result of this difference. It is an effect of the 
deep social empathy that readers are capable of developing for the other 
participants in diegesis. This empathy is represented literally in the physical 
forms of expression themselves, in the specific traces of story telling, drawing 
and production. 
I am particularly dis-habituated to my new 'Ware' and new 
'Medway' drawings. In the case of the 'Ware' drawing because Ware's trace is 
so strongly identified, biographically, with the presumed character of the 
author. In the case of the new 'Medway' drawing, this unease derives from the 
fact that Spiegelman's work (from which I derived the script for the Medway 
drawings) now carries the social distinction of high literature. Commentary on 
the subject of Spiegelman's work by extrapolating a script for a drawing 
177 
demonstration in intsersubjectivity feels constrained by social taboo. This also 
contributed to dis-habituation. 
Testing the relative subjectivity of others by adopting their forms of 
self-expression is an activity that risks the imputation of either rhetorical or 
unscrupulous motives (as in the case of deceptions by forgery, for example). 
It institutionalises the scrutinising of social equilibrium. Such scrutiny can feel 
both personally and socially invasive and aggressive. It reveals the status 
relationships between people and also exposes to view the mutable 
subjectivity of the social institutions by which we exist. 
In Chapter Three, I shall discuss the self-conscious manipulation of social 
equilibrium in relation to a number of cultural strategies that have aimed to 
utilise subjectivity radically. In terms of Drawing Demonstration One, however, 
I claim a rhetorical motive for self-consciously adopting others' forms of 
expression . Some justification for this is provided by the terms of the 
Demonstration itself. I also lay claim to Demonstration One being more than 
Jess successful. This is evidenced both by the plausibility of the physical 
traces it produced and the dis-habituation with which I finally read them. 
178 
GRRR.' THAIS' T ! \ V E 
HAD ENOUGH ! ... 
Illustration 07 Medway, J. (2007:7,8) 
HI S WILL BE A REAL 
S PEe IA L DE. SSE RT ! 
ANYflUN <T TAI<E YOUR 
FANCY MADAM? 
OOH! NOW v..-HAT'S THIS .. P~AUf{f TRUFFLE TRIPL~ eHoc cHIP-
V£RY fXP£NSW£ ON( ? .. -BY THE C;WORPoFC 5', ZING ZAWG ZIP.' I' 
179 
L..ORV SR"TRN. 'fOUR FR\:.SVOM IS ....-r 
HI"NV. :t. . 'fOUR POOR SeRVRN"T. I'6K 
ON\-'f ON& "THING FOR MY6E:1..F= ••• R 
\-I"TIW; M~C'f. 
Illustration 08 Migno/a, M. (2000:144.145) 
180 
~w", -+ ~kC~ V~ ~ A / 
/ '------











Illustration 1 0 Grennan, S. (2009) 
J 
.. '
. . "~ 
.,-- -




IIlust ration 11 Grennan, S. (2009) 
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Illustration 12 Grennan, S. Medway as Mignola (2009) 
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Illustration 13 Migno/a, M. (1998:145, 146) 
MY 8I?OTHE~ 
"TUI<NS AGAINST 







Illustration 14 Ware, C. (2000:320, 321) 
, . 
,,-
I M11~~r-r- ~-e fM '~ A: i I I i I I ! 'I 















I I I 
- -
I I I II " 
Ii I \ I I 
-
-






I I I I II 'I J - . .. 




= I I II I II 
I 
I 
I I I ,I 1 j : il I 
I 






















I - ; I 
Illustration 15 Grennan, S. (2009) 
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Illustration 17 Grennan, S. Migno/a as Ware (2009) 
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illUstration 20 Grennan, S. (2009) 
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IllUstration 22 Medway, J. Untitled (2010) 
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Time, self-observation and a second Drawing Demonstration 
Time 
Defining communication in terms of intersubjective relationships has 
implications for the way in which we perceive time. 
To reiterate, the meaning of any form of expression is produced by the 
whole physical situation in which it takes place. This situation is not reducible to 
any of its component parts. As Bakhtin writes: "When we select a particular type of 
(utterance). we do so not for the (utterance) itself, but out of consideration for what 
we wish to express ... We select..from the standpoint of the whole utterance." 
(Bakhtin 1952/1983:0uff 2000:92). 
This whole situation comprises the physical forms of expression. 
These are the traces of the situation in which it was made, plus the situation in 
which it is comprehended. According to the narrative model, this moment of 
comprehension in a unique moment of co-production, structured by causal 
relationships between subjects, so that " ... experience exists even for the people 
undergoing it, only in the material of signs. Outside that material there is no 
experience as such. In this sense, any experience is expressible, ie is potential 
person expression ... " (Volo~inov 1929/1973:28). The structure physically 
embodies different relationships between subjects. ' 
Because we perceive these relationships between different subjects 
through physical forms of expression, each represented subject in the structure 
oCcupies a distinct historical time. The time in which a form of expression is 
produced is distinct from the time of the content of expression. because the time in 
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which the self exists is distinct from the time in which we are self-conscious. These 
times are also distinct from the time in which other people comprehend what is 
being expressed. These distinct times are not abstractions, but highly specific 
characteristics of the situation in which expression takes place. 
The particular production traces of each form of expression index the 
historic moments in which they occurred, fixing the expression in a precise 
temporal relationship with the act of comprehension. The relative temporal 
positions of addresser and addressee in relation to each other and the form of 
utterance are historically determined. 
The time in which an addressee comprehends what is expressed is 
characterised by their subjectivity relative to the past production of forms of 
expression and the time of what is expressed. We comprehend these times as 
sensual, motive, embodied and intersubjective. The narrative model requires not 
only those people who tell, are told about and listen or read, but also their own 
times of action as subjects. This identification of relative times as aspects of the 
relative subjective positions is an intersubjective historicising of the 'story of the 
story'. 
Borges' character Pierre Menard's project 
This generation of relative times is the focus of Jorge Luis Borges 
short story 'Pierre Menard, author of the Quixote', published in 1939. The story is 
framed as an obituary, written around 1900. The fictional protagonist Pierre 
Menard attempts to write his own texts so that they match word for word fragments 
of the text of Manuel de Cervantes' seventeenth century novel 'The Ingenious 
Hidalgo Don Quixote of La Mancha'. Borges' narrator tells us that "(t)O compose 
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Don Quixote at the beginning of the seventeenth century was a reasonable, 
necessary and perhaps inevitable undertaking; at the beginning of the twentieth 
century it is almost impossible. It is not in vain that three hundred years have 
passed, charged with the most complex happenings ... " (Borges 2000). 
When Menard succeeds in writing sentences of his own that match 
word for word sentences in cOon Quixote', the narrator is says that "The text of 
Cervantes and that of Menard are verbally identical, but the second is almost 
infinitely richer," (Borges 2000). He critiques the two identical fragments as 
historical documents whose meaning is entirely relative to the time of their 
production: 
"It is a revelation to compare Menard's Don Quixote with Cervantes', 
The latter, for example, wrote (part one, chapter nine): '".truth, whose 
mother is history, rival of time, depository of deeds, witness of the past, 
exemplar and adviser to the present, and the future's counselor.' 
Written in the seventeenth century, written by the "lay genius" 
Cervantes, this enumeration is a mere rhetorical praise of history. 
Menard, on the other hand, writes: ', .. truth, whose mother is history, 
rival of time, depository of deeds, witness of the past, exemplar and 
. adviser to the present, and the future's counselor.' History, the mother 
of truth: the idea is astounding. Menard, a contemporary of William 
James, does not define history as an inquiry into reality but as its origin. 
Historical truth, for him, is not what has happened; it is what we judge to 
have happened. The final phrases-exemplar and adviser to the 
present, and the future's counselor -are brazenly pragmatiC. The 
contrast in style is also vivid. The archaic style of Menard-quite 
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foreign, after all-suffers from a certain affectation. Not so that of his 
forerunner, who handles with ease the current Spanish of his time." 
(Borges 2000). 
To make sense of Borges' story, it is possible to imaginatively 
substitute the activity of reading for Menard's activity of writing. In this case, the 
story establishes reading as a function of writing. As a consequence, the story 
becomes a parable of reading. This is imprecise. The idea ignores the wider 
implications of Menard's project, which is not to re-write Cervantes' text, but to 
write a new text that is identical. Menard wants to change the situation in which the 
form of expression is produced and thus change the meaning of words, even if 
they appear to sit identically on a page made yesterday and a page made three 
hundred years previously by someone else. 
Menard's project is not a way of reading. It is not even an analogy of 
reading. Rather it is a practical demonstration of the causal effects of time upon 
meaning. Borges locates Menard precisely in time. Without doing so, he wouldn't 
be able to have the narrator conduct such a precise analysis of Menard's text. 
Only in relation to Menard's moment in time can the narrator arrive at an time in 
which he forms his expression to be part of a network of causal relationships with 
others people. 
In analysing Menard's text, Borges' narrator reflects Volo§inov's 
analytical method. He argues "Should we miss ... situational factors, we would be 
as little able to understand an utterance as if we were to miss its most important 
words." (Volo§inov 1929/1973:100). 
Menard's project is not re-writing. This would be to adopt the 
subjectivity of Cervantes - a method Menard rejects. Nor is Menard's project 
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simply a reading. This would find meaning in the text from his own point of view, 
and hence affirm his own subjectivity. 
Dennett describes a method of adopting the position of another 
person. It is very close to the method Menard rejects. Dennett outlines the . 
possibility of trying to listening to a Bach chorale in the way that a seventeenth 
century Leipziger might have listened. "It we want to imagine what it was like to be 
a Leipzig Bach-hearer, it is not enough for us to hear the same tones on the same 
instruments in the same order: we must also prepare ourselves somehow to 
respond to those tones with the same heartaches, thrills and waves of nostalgia ... 
A music scholar who carefully avoided all contact with post 1725 music and 
familiarised himself intensively with the traditional music of that period would be a 
good approximation. n (Dennett 1991 :387). 
Rather, Menard's project aims to demonstrate that forms of expression 
are only meaningful if the situation in which they occur is recognised as part of the 
expression itself. This makes the recognition of relative historical times a 
constituent of communication. Without this recognition, nothing has meaning. This 
temporal specificity is a prerequisite of intersubjectivity. It is not possible to 
separate the subjective historical moment and the physical form of expression. 
The sense of subjective displacement produced by Borges' story derives from just 
this indivisibility of people, times and traces. 
The story feels like a parlour game of misattribution or misappellation. 
Is it a trick involving a hidden agenda or motivating intent? Is it a joke, clashing 
together different social modes of language or behaviour? Menard's project is 
impossible and so the solemnity with which his project is described and his 
extreme effort are ridiculous. He wants to write his own words in his own time and 
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have them attest to the performance of a miracle - that they are exactly the same 
words as another writer's, three hundred years dead. 
Motivating our own sense of displacement in the story is a realisation 
that words themselves are incomprehensible beyond the forms that represent our 
relative subjectivity. As Volosinov argues, "(any) current curse word can become a 
word of praise, and any current truth must inevitably sound to many other people 
as the greatest lie ... accentuating yesterday's truth as to make it appear today's. n 
(Volosinov 1929/1973:23). 
The duck/rabbit drawing discussed by Wittgenstein (Kripke 1982 
[Illustration 23, Page 241]) is a parlour game in the same way as Menard's project. 
Looked at in one way, it is a depiction of the head of a rabbit. Looked at in another, 
it is the head of a duck, pointing in the opposite direction. Ears become beak. Our 
own orientation to the image reveals either a depiction of a duck or a depiction of a 
rabbit to us, but never both at the same time. 
Similarly, Menard's text is either Menard's or Cervantes', but never 
both at the same time. Even though we fully understand that the drawing is a trick 
built upon the tipping point in the biological re-visioning process of visual 
perception, our time-of-the-rabbit and our time-of-the-duck remain entirely distinct. 
Crossley writes: "Such phenomena strongly challenge the idea that the object is 
determinate, .. The visual meaning ... changes without a change in what empiricists 
would identify as the stimulus." (Crossley 1996:26). 
In the duck/rabbit drawing, the sense of displacement is generated in 
the sensation of moving from one meaning to another, which is to say, whilst 
recognising that the 'empirical stimulus' remains the same. We do not expect our 
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subjectivity to be so easily exposed as contingent, nor the relative nature of our 
own sense of time so self-consciously embodied by such a simple visual trick. 
Dennett proposes that the forms of expression are revised by each 
new situation. Their meaning is perpetually contingent upon context (Dennett 
1991 :111). The uniqueness of each situation in which the forms of expression 
appear substantiates the fact that these forms are only meaningful as a whole 
situation. Bakhtin writes " ... dialogical relations are profoundly unique and can only 
[represented by] complete utterances", behind which stand (and in which are 
expressed) reaL .. subjects, authors of the given utterances." (Bakhtin 1975/1986: 
124). 
Each expression is a unique bundle of relative times. Our individual 
sense of time is built upon an accumulation of these relationships, in which we 
have a causal part and in which we find meaning. Volo§inov writes: "Every stage in 
the development of a society has its own special and restricted circle of items, 
which alone have access to that society's attention and which are endowed with 
evaluative accentuation by that attention. In order for any for any item, .. to enter 
the social purview of the group, .. it must be associated with the vital 
socioeconomic prerequisites of the particular group's existence ... (A)II ideological 
accents, ... are social accents, ones with claim to social recognition and only thanks 
to that recognition are made outward use of ... n (Volo§inov 1925/1973:22). 
Identical forms take on different meanings as the situations in which 
they are made change. These changes explicitly reveal the temporal positions that 
constitute each situation. Our relationship to any temporal measure is our 
comprehension of the physical traces of the times in which other people 
communicate with us. Bakhtin writes ..... (T)wo externally similar forms may appear 
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at different stages, .. endowed with different meanings -like a pair of homonyms." 
(Duff 2000:Bakhtin 1952/1983:119). Literary theorist Ireneusz Opaki writes "Every 
(communication) ... has underlying it certain defined socio-historic factors, which ... 
bring with them the creation of... an ensemble of means of expression, which ... 
carry in them historically-specific meanings and functions." (Duff 
2000:0paki1963/1987:119). 
Seth, Arno and Brown 
A visible example of this can be found by comparing works by two 
contemporary comic strip artists: 'Clyde Fans Book One', by Seth (Gregory 
Gallant), published in 2004 (Seth 2004 [Illustration 24, Page 242]) and 'Louis Riel: 
A Comic-Strip Biography' by Chester Brown, published in 2003. (Brown 2003 
[Illustration 25, Page 243]). 
'Clyde Fans Book One' is a comic strip strongly influenced by the work 
of American magazine cartoonists and illustrators of the post-War period, 
particularly those associated with The New Yorker Magazine, such as Peter Arno. 
It centres around the reminiscence of an electric fan salesman. (Arno 1946 
[Illustration 26, Page 244]). Its production style is an overt attempt to give the 
impression that the historical time of the plot and the time In which the book was 
made are similar (that is, post-War), even though it is obvious that this is not the 
case. 
'Louis Riel' tells the story of the struggle for self-determination of a 
group of settlers on Canada's north-west frontier in the late nineteenth century, 
framed by the life of their charismatic leader, Louis Riel. Its methods of production 
are entirely twenty-first century in appearance. Although Brown has discussed the 
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influence of the drawings of Harold Gray (creator ofthe 'Little Orphan Annie' strips, 
which began in 1924) on the drawing of 'Louis Riel', the book is utterly 
contemporary (Arnold 2003). Drawings by Gray, made in the twentieth century, do 
not constrain the drawings made by Brown of the twenty-first. 
Seth's relationship with the past is more complex. Seth never includes 
anything in 'Clyde Fans' that either derives from the past post-1955 or that is not 
American. This visibly self-conscious self-positioning is managed so well by Seth 
that, like Wittgenstein's duck/rabbit, Seth's self-expression is made both in the 
present and also appears to have been made before1955. 
As readers of 'Clyde Fans', our own position in relation to Seth is also 
defined by our knowledge of both forms of expression that communicate 'America, 
pre-1955' and forms of expression made by comic strip artists and their 
collaborative producers in the present. Literary theorist Yury Tynyanov writes 
" ... each period selects the material it needs, but the way in which this material is 
used characterises only the period itself." (Duff 2000:Tynyanov 1924/1977:35). 
The 'period' he describes is the contemporaneous social relations of any group of 
people and the theorised times of their interaction. 
In the case of 'Clyde Fans', the plot and story time and the time in 
which the book is read all take positions relative to types of past expression 
(,America, pre-1955'). This takes place in terms of their physical form - the rich 
and clearly defined network of intersubjective experiences and expressions that 
they trace, that we know from that period and place. At the same time, it takes 
place in terms of our contemporary relationship with them, reading 'Clyde Fans' in 
the present. We know that 'Clyde Fan's was drawn and produced by Seth only a 
few years ago, but the physical form of expression that structures our relationship 
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with him and his fictional characters has the appearance of a specific type of past 
expressive form with which we still have that relationship (,America, pre-1955'). 
Seth uses a history of specific past forms of expression to self-
consciously form his own. Our own reading of Seth's book parallels this adoption 
of past forms. We participate alongside Seth in taking a position to orient ourselves 
to a specific past. In taking that position, we place ourselves in relation to the 
people whose physical forms of expression we experience in Seth's time and their 
own. This characteristic use of past forms lies in making a group of past actions an 
occasion for self-consciousness. 
Seth's project in 'Clyde Fans Book One' is unlike Menard's fictional 
project or my attempt to draw new comic strip spreads by adopting the forms of 
Chris Ware, Mike Mignola and Jim Medway. Menard wanted to write three 
hundred year old words in his own time. Seth wants to self-consciously ignore his 
own experience of any situation that has occurred outside of a definitive group of 
American situations pre-1955. He aims to represent a subject removed from the 
effects of any experience of living after 1955. My Drawing Demonstration One 
aimed to self-consciously adopt another person's forms of self-expression in order· 
to express something new. 
These three projects in intersubjectivity all constitute specific physical 
forms of expression in which different times reveal themselves within the relative 
subjective positions of the diegetic participants in each case. 
The projects demonstrate two general principles. First, cultural theorist 
Guy Debord echoes Bakhtin, Volo§inov and Dennett when he argues "(u)ltimately, 
any Sign or word is susceptible to being converted into something else, even into 
it's opposite." (Debord 1956/1981). Second, the intersubjective relationships 
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represented in such changes of meaning reveal what SchUtz calls the 'idealisation 
of the interchangibility of standpoints'. Crossley defines this as " ... the 
presupposition ... that it is only their different positions in the world that might lead 
them to experience it differently." (Crossley 1996:85). 
Both of these principles only make sense with their corollaries in time. 
In light of them, we can consider two further practical projects that self-consciously 
aim to reveal other types of intersubjective relationships. The first project is loosely 
termed 'appropriation'. It was used with radical purpose in the context of American 
fine art practice, the art market and civic culture in the late 1970s and 1980s 
(Evans 2009). The second project is my Drawing Demonstration Two, which I 
undertook in order to scrutinise a question about genre as a form of intersubjective 
relationship. 
Appropriation 
Appropriation cannot be described as a project per se. Unlike Seth's 
project, Menard's project or my Drawing Demonstration One, it has no agreed 
beginning or end, or definitive forms of expression, only forms that are members of 
a still-disputed set. Examples are found in the work of a number of artists, in a 
body of theory and criticism which continues in the present, and in a putative 
historical frame. This is not the place to summarise a history of appropriation 
theory or practice. Instead, we can make use of a number of the appropriation 
project's aims listed by cultural theorist Benjamin Buchloh. These will limit analysis 
to a small number of artworks, theories and criticism made by an even smaller 
number of appropriation's practitioners and observers. 
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They comprise fragments of the theory and criticism of Buchloh 
(Buchloh 1982:28-35), Debord (Debord 1956/1981), Isabelle Graw (Baker 
2004:59), Johanna Burton (Burton 2004), Richard Prince (Halley 1984) and 
Barbara Kruger (Stephenson 1987:55-59). Alongside this theoretical writing, I will 
include a single visual work by artist Sherrie Levine made in 1979 in relation to an 
artwork by Walker Evans, made in 1936. 
This selection is necessary in order to focus directly upon those 
aspects of the appropriation project that provide further insight into 
intersubjectivity. These works represent three of appropriations aims. First, the 
self-conscious attempt to re-embody a range of reciprocally antagonistic subjects; 
second, self-transformation and third, the radical representation of intersubjective 
relationships created through an objectified history. 
In 'Parody and Appropriation in Francis Picabia, Pop and Sigmar 
Polke', Buchloh outlines two theoretical aims that he considers underpin the 
approach to practice of visual artists Sherrie Levine and Barbara Kruger 
"(A)ppropriation," he writes, " ... may result from an authentic desire to question the 
historic validity of a local, contemporary code by linking it to a different set of 
codes ... " This adopted code might derive from other historical models and" ... may 
be motivated by a desire to establish ... tradition ... and a fiction of identity." For 
Buchloh, these two aims also involve " ... appropriation as a strategy of commodity 
innovation .. : to grant a semblance of historical identity through ritualised 
consumption. Each act of appropriation is a promise of transformation ... " (Buchloh 
1982:28-35). 
According to Buchloh's list, appropriation's theoretical aims are 
aChieved in some measure in both Seth's 'Clyde Fans Book One', the fictional 
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project of Pierre Menard and my own Drawing Experiment One. These projects 
bring about changes in the meaning of various forms of expression by changing 
the situation in which the expression occurs. In Buchloh's terms, these changes 
act to question historical validity. They substitute one set of contemporary codes 
for another. In these three projects, this comes about through a revision of the 
subjectivity, times and relative diegetic positions that each form of expression 
entails. Each project either establishes a new self-identity or creates the possibility 
of one. 
In Buchloh's terms, to question the validity of a contemporary code is 
to reform the intersubjective relationships it represents, revising the subject, 
shifting all of the temporal indices and changing the meaning of the situation. This 
is achieved in Drawing Demonstration One and in Pierre Menard's project. To 
'adopt historical models' is to revise one's self according to a fixed definition of 
other times, people and situations, as a way of revising one's relationship to them. 
This is what Seth achieves in 'Clyde Fans', 
These descriptions of the aims of appropriation reflect Debord's 1956 
use of the term 'detournement' ('hijacking') to describe the possibilities of shifts in 
relative subjectivity. His descriptions of methods of hijack fulfil Buchloh's aims. He 
describes three methods: hijacking by re-contextualisation, hijacking by addition 
and hijacking by radical re-naming. 
Hijacking by re-contextualisation involves " ... the detournement of an 
intrinsically significant element which derives a different scope from a new context" 
(Debord 195611981). 
He provides and example of hijacking by addition: "Griffith's Birth of a 
Nation is one of the most important films in the history of cinema ... On the one 
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hand it is a racist film and therefore does not merit being shown in the present 
form ... It would be better to detourn it as a whole .. , by adding a soundtrack that 
made a powerful denumciation of ... the activities of the Ku Klux Klan ... Such a 
detournement is in the final analysis nothing more than the moral equivalent of the 
restoration of old paintings in museums." (Debord 1956/1981) 
He also provides an example of hijacking by radical re-naming: Il'n 
music a title always exerts a great influence, yet the choice of one is quite 
arbitrary. Thus it wouldn't be a bad idea to make a final correction to the title of the 
'Eroica Symphony' by changing it, for example, to the 'Lenin Symphony'." (Debord 
1956/1981). 
Hijacking also achieves exactly the aim ascribed by Kruger to her own 
visual work. She argues that II In most work, received images and words are 
arranged and aligned to produce assigned meanings. I am engaged in re-
arranging and re-aligning these dominant assignments. n and that " ... in order to 
take part in a systematic critique rather than a merely substitutional one, one 
should work to foreground the relations and hierarchies that constitute power, .. n 
(Stephanson 1987:55-59). 
Kruger's theoretical strategy of bringing about a shift in subjectivity 
through a radical change in context provides the particular flavour of overt struggle 
and social antagonism that underlies Suchloh's descriptions of the aims of 
appropriation. "In the 1980's, appropriation came to be seen as one particularly 
effective means to reveal the working mechanisms of various cultural, social and 
psychic institutions - and thus considerations of subjectivity and identity 
necessarily surfaced ... n (Burton 2004). 
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Levine and Evans 
The appropriationists' critical antagonism represents a particular 
approach to intersubjective relationships evidenced in Sherrie Levine's photograph 
'Untitled: After Walker Evans' (Illustration 27, Page 245), made in 1979. 
Levine photographed a lithographic reproduction in a book of a 
photograph made by Walker Evans (Evans 1978). Evans' photograph depicts 
Alabama sharecropper Allie Mae Burroughs (Illustration 28, Page 246). Levine's 
photograph appears to be identical to Evans' photograph. Art historian Gerald 
Marzolati writes "By literally taking the pictures she did, and then showing them as 
hers, (Levine) wanted it understood that she was flatly questioning ... those most 
hallowed principles of art in the modern era: originality, intention, expression. n 
(Marzolat; 1986:91). 
The principles of art that Marzolati lists: originality, intention and 
expression require socially stable relationships between subjects. In making 
'Untitled: After Walker Evans' Levine's project aimed to bring about a change In 
relative subjectivity in order to reveal that subjectivity through the change itself. 
The project takes Debord's methods of hijack at face value, as re-attribution, 
although this isn't precisely what occurs in Levine's Image. 
Levine does not take the subjective pOSition occupied by Evans, 
although she 'takes' Evans' image (to use Marzolati's word). The title of her work 
itself describes a relationship to Evans' photograph. This alone distinguishes it 
from Evans' photograph, although the image appears to be the same. 
When we see Levine's photograph, Levine has already seen Evan's 
photograph. It forms part of the canon of twentieth century American photography. 
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It is already a physical form of expression. Because of this, Levine's photograph is 
an image of a photograph by Evans, made by Levine. We don't mistake it for the 
photograph by Evans itself. If we do, the meaning of Levine's image disappears, 
Levine's subjectivity disappears and we are simply back with Evans' photograph. 
However, we don't have the choice of not having seen Evans' 
photograph. Seeing either image, we don't decide between authors. There are 
always two images and two authors in Levine's image. Evan's photograph exists 
as an image. Levine's photograph is an image of that image. It is an image by 
Levine of an image by Walker Evans. 
Levine doesn't adopt Evans' subjective position in relation to his own 
photograph. Her re-attribution is not really a re-attribution at all, because she 
doesn't do what Evans did. Evans made a new Evans. Levine does not re-
constitute Evans' subjectivity, she simply uses Evans' Image to embody and reify 
her own. We know this because we know Evans' image already, It is part of the 
story of Levine's image, the past of that image's creation and the series of 
subjective relationships it represents. 
Levine's image only relates Evans' subjective position in the form of 
commentary. Levine's photograph is one artwork commenting on another artwork. 
It comments on Evan's social position, as a critique of one subjective position from 
another, categorically dissimilar one. 
Levine's work entrenches rather than shifts her position within the 
intersubjective relationship of which Evans' image is a part. Her photograph 
communicates her specific subjectivity rather than transforming it. Although it 
makes visible the structure of the relations that position both her subjectivity and 
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Evans' subjectivity, the project does not fulfill Kruger's aim of systematic, reforming 
critique. Levine's photograph reveals the relationship between her and Evans, but 
they both remain as they were. 
The approach to subjectivity expressed in Levine's work is 
characteristic of the small number of writers and artists' work that I have drawn 
upon. It contrasts with the reformations of self attempted in Seth's work, in Borges' 
story or my Drawing Experiment One. Buchloh characterises appropriation as a 
posture of radical subjectivity rather than an effective project. For him, 
appropriation reveals the subjective relationships that exist between people whilst 
leaving them unchanged (Buchloh 1982:28-35). 
The language used by appropriation artists and writers to describe 
what they were doing makes this clear. Appropriation is a process of consolidating 
rather than changing established subjective positions. Marzolati, Graw, and 
Debord describe the subject as a property to be stolen, confiscated, dispossessed 
or hijacked «Marzolati 1986:91, Graw 2004:59, Debord 1956/1981). Buchloh 
describes the subject as a quality (authority) to be usurped (Buchloh 1982:28-35). 
Kruger and Richard Prince aim to silence the subject and speak on Its behalf 
through ventriloquism and play-acting (Stephenson 1987:55-59. Halley 1984). 
The use of these words requires that the protagonists remain who they 
are in each case. Each word represents an assault on one subject by another. The 
identity of these subjects does not change as a result of this assault. This is what 
occurs in the case of Levine's 'taking' of Evan's image. 
In this sense, all of these words describe types of commentary. A thief 
does not gain ownership of a property through the act of stealing. Neither does an 
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actor become the fictional character whose part they play. Nor does a ventriloquist 
become a god. Rather, one subjective position is reinforced in relation to the other 
through the adoption of the appearance of that through which it aims to transform 
itself. A thief remains a thief through the act of stealing. 
Alternatively, Seth seeks to transform himself as himself by self-
consciously delimiting the possibilities of his reading. Pierre Menard seeks self-
transformation through writing, himself, another's text. Levine's photograph 
comments on Evans' photograph and she remains who she is. This is what 
8akhtin means when he writes" ... stylising discourse by attributing it to another 
person often becomes parodic, .. since another's word, having been at an earlier 
stage internally persuasive, .. frequently begins to sound with no parodic overtones 
at all." (8akhtin 1981:348) 
8akhtin's commentary anticipates 8uchloh's ultimate criticism of the 
appropriation project. "Parodistic appropriation reveals the divided situation of the 
individual in contemporary artistic practice. The individual must claim the 
constitution of the self in original primary utterances, while being painfully aware of 
the degree of determination necessary to inscribe the utterance into dominant 
conventions and rules of codification: ... Parodistic appropriation anticipates the 
failure of any attempt to subvert the ruling codification and allies itself, in advance, 
with the powers that will ultimately turn its deconstructive efforts into cultural 
success," (Buchloh 1982:28-35). 
The 'double bind' that Buchloh describes Is an unequal struggle that 
creates the sense of social antagonism in appropriation. It ultimately entrenches 
the subject in relation to the stolen, hijacked and ventriloquised subjectivity of 
others. 
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Self-observation and social consensus 
Levine's 'Untitled: After Walker Evans' can be described as 
commentary because it remains within a stable structure of social relationships, 
even if it seeks to destabilise that structure. The photograph does not change what 
Bakhtin calls the 'horizon of expectations' (Duff 2000:Bakhtin 1952/1983:131) but 
appears entirely within them. 
For Bakhtin, these horizons of expectation are the socially agreed 
functions of any form of expression. I. R. Titunik writes that these consensually 
agreed horizons of expectation are not" ... defined by the components of a work ... 
but by sets of... works which, in effect define them." (Volo§inov 1929/1973:184). 
Bakhtln writes: " ... each ... genre within an epoch or trend, is typified by its own 
special sense and understanding of the reader, listener, public or people ... (I)n 
addition to those real meanings and ideas of one's addressee ... there are also 
conventional ... images of substitute authors, editors and various kinds of narrators 
(included in each genre) ... ", which are views of others constrained by convention, 
so that " ... genres cannot be deduced or defined but only historically determined, 
delimited and described." (Duff 2000:Bakhtin 195211983:131). 
Every subject exists within specific intersubjective constraints that 
appear as social conventions. Bakhtin continues "If one follows the fundamental 
rule of the historicisation of the concept of form, and sees the history of ..• genres 
as a temporal process of the continual founding and altering of horizons, then the 
metaphorics of the courses of development, function and decay can be replaced 
by the nontele%gica/ concept of the playing out of a limited number of 
Possibilities." (Duff 2000:Bakhtin 1952/1983:132). 
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Therefore, social conventions derive from self-observation as a way of 
defining ourselves in relation to other people. The horizon of expectation in any 
situation describes both a self-constraint and a social mandate. 
We should understand that self-observation Is distinct from self-
consciousness. Self-consciousness is our capacity both to be subjects and to 
know that we are subjects. Self-observation is our capacity to scrutinise and 
constrain our subjectivity by adopting a socially agreed point of view. 
This distinction is the basis for Suchloh's criticism of appropriation. 
Appropriation fails to change the intersubjective relationships that make the 
physical forms of expression meaningful. As a result, it re-enforces those 
relationships, even if it reveals what they are. The horizon of expectation remains 
the same in each case. Although Levine and Kruger aimed to change the social 
milieu in which Walker Evans' photograph is a valuable masterpiece, their 
activities simply conformed to the social constraints upon which that milieu is 
based, turning their works into valuable masterpieces also. 
Crossley writes that self-observation is " ... achieved by way of the 
mediation of practices which are,.. diffused within and derived from a collective ... 
Viewing ourselves from the perspective of others is part of a process whereby 
certain impulses and actions are inhibited or controlled." (Crossley 2006:10). He 
continues " .. much of what seems personal and natural, because it has become 
part of us, derives from the social world." (Crossley 2006: 03). 
We do not habitually recognise the social constraints that constitute 
self-observation. They manifest social equilibrium, only becoming visible when that 
equilibrium is disturbed in some type of social crisis or when we depart from 
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socially agreed ways of acting. Kruger describes this invisible equilibrium as 
'power's self-effacement', meaning the social relationships that locate power 
[Stephanson 1987:55-59]). 
As Douglas Wolk writes "(social conventions) ... operate at a level so 
deeply entrenched that they can be hard to notice or can be taken for granted." 
(Wolk 2007:21). For Mead, this intersubjective equilibrium constitutes society, the 
genre of genres (Mead 1967). It is the mediation of self in relation to others, 
through the constraining function of self-observation. Crossley also describes self-
observation as a definition of citizenship. It is the faculty for recognising one's 
subjectivity in relation to others as part of a group. Society is the body of 
consensus represented by constrained forms of expression, as a 'generalised 
other' as Mead puts it (Crossley 1996:65-66). 
The relationships between members of a group are predicated upon 
the relative authority of the partiCipants within the constraints generated by self-
observation. Mead argues that each subject seeks recognition and validation from 
others through self-observation. This subjective search for distinction is socialised 
in power relations, which carry relative moral weights, good and bad. According to 
sociologist Erving Goffman, every self-observation is constrained by convention, 
so that" ... our intersubjective situations are governed by rules of interaction ... (A) 
sustainable sense of self is intimately bound to these rules. We must abide by ... 
such rules .. : if a (socially normative) sense of self is to be preserved." (Goffman 
1968). 
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Matt Madden's exercises with drawing style 
Comic strip artist Matt Madden aims to explore the constraining 
function of self-observation in '99 Ways to Tell a Story: Exercises in Style', 
published in 2006. Madden's book follows Raymond Queneau's literary 
experiment 'Exercises in Style' of 1947, in which Queneau tells the same short 
story ninety-nine times, each in a different literary style, mode or genre. (Queneau 
1947). 
Madden extrapolates this model as visual narrative, providing a 
'template' or originating story of one page in length and then ninety-nine versions 
of that story in different visual narrative styles, modes or genres. (Madden 2006). 
Madden's exercises reveal how completely dominant, subtle and comprehensive 
the effects of self-observation are. 
Madden's ninety-nine visual narratives are almost entirely 
unsuccessful. Each of them is more or less unsuccessful for a wide range of 
practical reasons particular to each. Douglas Wolk identifies the underlying reason 
for the failure of Madden's exercises. He writes: "Almost all the book's examples 
look like Matt Madden drawings, with his characteristic line and visual tone." (Wolk 
2007:49). 
This reason covers a great deal of ground very succinctly. Madden 
aims to tell a single story in a number of visual narrative production styles. All of 
these re-tellings look like his own narrative drawings. Rather than manipulate the 
agreed forms of expression that represent subjective self-observation, Madden 
remains unselfconsciously in their sway. Wolk only sees Madden's subjectivity in 
each draWing, even though the aim of each exercise is to draw each page within a 
different generic constraint. 
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Madden's aim in each exercise is similar to my aim in Drawing 
Demonstration One. He aims to make a new expression by adopting another 
subject's forms of self-expression. However, Madden's exercises differ from 
Drawing Demonstration One in a number of ways. 
In some of his exercises, he aims to adopt the forms of expression of 
a named narrator, as I did in Drawing Demonstration One with Medway, Mignola 
and Ware. In other exercises, he aims to adopt forms of expression that belong to 
a socially agreed horizon of expectation. These exercises aim to adopt socially 
agreed forms belonging to genres rather than particular artists. In each case, these 
socially agreed forms represent a 'generalised other'. In these exercises, Madden 
draws pages according to self-observation, aiming to submit to generic constraints 
and draw in generic styles as a result. 
We can take three of Madden's drawings as examples. I will not 
undertake the kind of comparative formal analysis of examples of the genres in 
which Madden aims to draw, as I did with the work of the artists I included in 
Drawing Demonstration One. It is relatively easy to catalogue a long list of 
comparative dissimilarities between Madden's drawings and existing examples 
from each genre. It is enough to identify one or two formal phenomena that 
communicate Madden's subjectivity very clearfy, making his drawings 
uncharacteristic of the genres in which they are supposed to appear. 
First, consider the template story (Maddon 2006: 03 [Illustration 28. 
Page 246). Then consider the story titled 'Ligne Claire' (Clear Line) (Maddon 2006: 
91 [Illustration 29, Page 247]). The term 'clear line' describes a whole school of 
largely Belgian comic production in the post-War period. exemplified by Edgar P. 
Jacobs and Herge (Georges Remi). 
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However, Madden's page specifically refers to the times, situations 
and characteristics of Herge's most famous character, Tintin. This drawing can be 
considered to be in the style of Herge, rather than simply as a 'clear line' drawing. 
Madden's character even wears plus-four trousers and straight-laced Oxford 
shoes, imitating Tintin's appearance and acting in part to establish a historical time 
for the plot. Madden's character could be in fancy dress, of course, but no-one 
works at their desk at home in fancy dress, particularly not in the context of a 
drawing exercise like this. 
Two physical aspects of the drawing mitigate against reading it as a 
new drawing by Herge, instead telling us that it is a drawing by Madden. First, the 
palette of colours used in the drawing is contemporary, although the local colours 
of things in the plot refer to the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. For 
example, the colours above and below the dado rail follow a recognisably pre-War 
institutional form, even as the colours themselves do not. These colours appear to 
be Madden's rather than Herge's because of the specific light and air depicted in 
the plot. I only derive this information from the palette in this case. 
One of the major signifiers of 'clear line' is the distinct quality of light 
and air, which always belongs to the time of the plot, which is always 
contemporaneous with the time of production, and which is now entirely 
understood as belonging to the period 1945 -1960. This is not the light or air in 
Madden's drawing, because his colours are not 'clear line' colours. Instead, they 
seem inexpertly chosen in the present. This is not a judgement of value, but a 
result of a comparison between a below-the-dado colour of the 1940s as depicted 
by Herge and the colour chosen by Madden. If we look at an example of a page 
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drawn by Herge, the comparison between different types of light and air in the two 
drawings is very clear (Herge 1947:07 [Illustration 3D, Page 248]). 
The spiral staircase provides a more straightforward anachronism. It is 
not that Herge never told a story featuring a spiral staircase. I cannot be entirely 
sure that that is true, even if I were a Herge scholar, but if Herge had, it would not 
have looked like Madden's spiral staircase. It is the manner of depiction that is 
anachronistic, more than the depicted object. 
Consider two further exercises by Madden: 'Fantasy' (Madden 
2006:49 [Illustration 31, Page 249» and 'Exercises in Love' (Madden 2006:47). 
'Fantasy' and 'Exercises in Love' are drawings in identifiable genres of comics 
production rather than in a form associated with a particular author. The 
subjectivity they embody is no less profoundly specific for that. 80th of these 
drawings aim to embody a generalised other as a constraint on the from in which 
they are expressed. 
In the case of 'Fantasy', the incoherence of the story is enough to 
represent Madden's subjectivity, immediately contradicting the genre. In my 
narrative model, the story is identified as everything required causally by the plot, 
but not told about in the plot itself. For example, when we meet Madden's 
character in the template story for the first time, he is a young man. But we know 
that to be a young man when we first encounter him, he needs to have been a 
younger man, a child and a baby, to have a mother and father, to have grown up, 
and so forth to the point we meet him, even though non of this information appears 
in the plot. 
The fantasy genre relies particularly on the presence of as complete a 
story as possible, due to the fact that the fictional worlds it creates are very distinct. 
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from our own. We cannot apply any of the rules of our world to the 'Fantasy' 
genre's fictional worlds. 
Within fantasy stories, physical laws as well as cultural conventions 
have to be built entirely from scratch. However, Madden's 'Fantasy' exercise does 
not take this prescription seriously, even though it is a central characteristic of the 
genre. As a result, despite the appearance of swords, false runes and specific 
visual references to other accomplished works of the genre, Madden's drawing 
makes no sense. 
If we compare it to an actual fantasy page, the importance of the story 
to the plausibility of the plot and to the genre itself is identifiable in the way that 
fictional place names, locations and relative historical times are used (Windsor .. 
Smith 1972:15 [Illustration 32, Page 250]). In Madden's drawing, character names 
Ma'at Madiin, Rolgan and Silverchime and place names Astar Ga'al, Oun-AI and 
Necrothania have no causal function in the plot. Neither do the false runes, swords 
and ash trees. Although they occupy the functional positions of names that should 
represent a coherent, complex past, they do not in fact refer to anything, except 
the moment on the page in which they appear. As a consequence, they have only 
a tenuous relationship to the plot and its future. 
In contrast, if we consider the names in Windsor-Smith's drawing, the 
names used are immediately part of an imagined larger history, interrelated in 
clear and specific ways, even when the plot only provides an obvious fragment of 
a much larger whole. In a single page of Windsor-Smith, the history of the world of 
Conan is made particular. In Madden's drawing, the name Ma'at Madiin is a joke 
outside the plot. It has no history, no story, no world of cause and effect. It derives 
from Madden's world as a metatextual pun on Matt Madden. 
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'Exercises in Love', (Illustration 33, Page 251) attempts to tell the 
template story as it might have been told by any of the (usually anonymous, male) 
comic strip artists working on comics for teenagers and young people in the 
American 1940s and 1950s. As historian Jenny Millar has written: "Their 
protagonists were almost always working women, and their problems were often 
quite realistic. Workplace power struggles between the sexes, out-of-wedlock 
children, marital infidelity, and divorce were tackled between stories of pure 
escapist fantasy. In this manner, romance comics responded to needs that were 
historically significant: young, working women saw representations of themselves 
as intelligent, modern people - people who valued love and dreamt of romance, 
but who also negotiated life in the real world." (Millar 2010). 
In this exercise, Madden's character, male throughout the rest of his 
exercises, is a woman. Similarly with Madden's 'Fantasy' drawing, this change in 
gender appears to have no story. There appears to be no reason why Madden's 
character is a woman and the protagonist a man. There is no emotional 
relationship with the other protagonist in the plot. This is obvious comparing 
'Exercises in Love' to the template story, in which Madden's relationship with the 
woman upstairs appears specifiC. In 'Exercises in Love', Madden adopts the 
Slightest generic forms and expects them to constitute the genre. They do not. 
Formally, "Exercises in Love', with its lack of contrast in particular, 
depicts environmental and emotional conditions that are antithetical to the 
Romance genre. Romance is typified through the depiction of strong shadows, 
tenebrous light and polished and glossy surfaces. These contribute to the 
appearance of the air as thick, plastic and luminous. The underlying emotional 
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tone of the plot is dramatic, passionate, barely controlled and holding the 
possibility of violence. 
The light in 'Exercises in Love' is, by contrast, thin. The emotional tone 
is one of ambivalence and detachment. These differences are the result of 
Madden's depictive techniques, compared to the depictive techniques typical of 
the genre. They contribute to the sense that the drawing is not an expression 
formed under the constraint of self-observation, within a genre, so much as it is 
Madden's own drawing. The difference in light is entirely the result of how the 
drawing is made. It defines the types of materials, physical bodies and 
gravitational pull in the depicted world. Madden's bodies are thinner than they 
should be in genre. The clothes his characters wear are less weighty and layered, 
his spaces are shallower, his objects lighter, the colours are less precisely defined 
by period and less dark in tone. This is communicated specifically through the 
weight, density and action of Madden's drawn marks. 
Consider an example of an anonymously drawn page from a 
Romance comic from the period when they were at their most popular. The 
differences of production and the profound effect on the plot that these differences 
make communicate Madden's confirmed subjectivity. They lie outside the genre 
within which he aims to (Anonymous 1956:06 [Illustration 34, Page 252]). 
Reading '99 Ways to Tell a Story' as a whole, we gain a sense of a 
unified narrative voice. The exercises accumulate and the differences between 
them become increasingly inconsequential. Inversely, the sense of an 
accumulation of different narrative voices in the book decreases. These voices 
reach a point of implausibility as the characters and situations that represent them 
become less specific. They appear casually objectified by Madden. They are 
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simply emblems standing for the constrained forms of expression that each 
exercise is supposed to adopt. 
Had '99 Ways to Tell a Story' been successful, it would have been a 
unique, self-consciously-made representation of the constraining effect of self-
observation. It would have presented ninety-nine drawings that re-told the template 
story as though socially constrained in ninety-nine different ways. These social 
constraints would have made specific physical traces representatives of ninety-
nine generalised others. We would have understood each of these embodiments 
as a manipulation of the situation of our reading by Madden. The project would 
have brought about a change in Madden's relative subjectivity and at the same 
time revealed the function of self-observation as a social constraint. 
Drawing Demonstration Two 
Appropriation and constraining self-observation provides an 
introduction to Drawing Demonstration Two. This Demonstration is designed to 
explore further some of the ways in which social consensus and self-observation 
constrain subjectivity. The general terms that framed Drawing Demonstration One 
can also be applied to this experiment. 
To reiterate these terms, Bakhtin writes ", .. {V)ariants on the theme of 
another's discourse are widespread in all areas of creative, ideological activity,,,. 
such an exposition is a/ways a free stylistic variation on an another's discourse, it 
expounds another's thought in the style of that thought, even while applying it to 
new material, to another way of posing the problem; it conducts experiments and 
gets solutions in the language of another's discourse (my italics), ... there is no 
external imitation, no simple act of reproduction, but rather a further, creative 
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development of another's ... discourse in a new context and under new conditions." 
(Bakhtin 1981 :347), 
Drawing Demonstration Two presents the same problems as Drawing 
Demonstration One. These problems submit to the same solutions. These 
problems are: the self-conscious recognition of my own subjectivity and the unique 
situation of my utterance; the adoption of another's written script as control in the 
production of new visual narrative utterances and the recognition of that choice of 
script as part of the material form of the utterance. Accepting these terms, Drawing 
Demonstration Two aims to focus on the consensual aspect of self-observation, 
the social constraint that functions to mediate the self. 
In Drawing Demonstration One I adopted another person's forms of 
self-expression in order to make a new expression. In Drawing Demonstration Two 
I will aim to make a series of new drawings under the constraints of a recognised 
horizon of expectation by scrutinising my own actions. In effect, this theoretical 
self-positioning views both social constraint and self in a contradictory situation 
based upon an impossible premise. As with Drawing Demonstration One, 
however, the unavoidable nature of this self-conscious subjectivity is one of the 
accepted terms of the Demonstration. From the position of a reader, I can employ 
my subjectivity as a complete guide. 
In Drawing Demonstration Two, I will not attempt to adopt the forms of 
other people's self-expression, as I did with Chris Ware, Mike Mignola and Jim 
Medway. The generalised others of social consensus are only typified. That is the 
definition of the horizon of expectation. For example, the work of the most typical 
superhero comic strip artist is never entirely representative of the superhero genre 
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nor does the genre ever entirely describe the work of the artist, although the genre 
itself is fully describable in very great detail. 
In Drawing Demonstration Two, I will adopt the forms of expression of 
a group of people constrained by social consensus and whose forms of expression 
I read through that constraint. These people are the formal exponents of genres. I 
perceive the constraint under which they have expressed themselves as 
typification. They constitute a generalised other. 
It is these constraints that Drawing Demonstration Two will seek to 
visualise. I can only approach the forms of expression that create a genre as 
typified forms of expression. 
There is a distinction between the aim of Drawing Demonstration Two 
and Seth's aim to draw as though the experiences of America post-1955 did not 
exist. Seth's project is not to submit to the social constraints dictated by a 
generalised other, but rather to constrain his own self-expression as a tool of that 
self-expression. Seth's work never actually appears as though it was made before 
1955 (when a comic strip like 'Clyde Fans Book One'didn't exist). Seth's work 
utilises and presents typification as a resource, but this utilisation never contradicts 
or overrides the constraints under which Seth himself works as a contemporary 
subject. Seth's adoption of a particular constraint is never anything but a 
characteristic of the time and place of Seth's own self-observation and Seth's own 
self-expression. 
Drawing Demonstration Two method 
In Drawing Demonstration Two I took a script from a source album 
and made use of it as the plot of three new drawings. I used the same script and 
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source as control for each drawing. The three drawings all aimed to be constrained 
by generalisations relative to each other. They are three examples of the same 
type of form of expression. All three are generic. 
I used the scriptfrom Jim Medway's 'Teen Witch', extrapolated, 
discussed and illustrated in the last Chapter (Illustration 08, Page 180). I aimed to 
use as much of the script as possible to draw a page that might have been drawn 
by a Romance or Romance/Action genre comic artist in (a) the 1950s, (b) the 
1960s and (c) the 1970s. I shall call these Demonstration Two(1950s), Two(1960s) 
and Two(1970s). 
Rather than focus on the work of a single named artist, my reading of 
works from each decade in the genre sought to establish different types of 
specification than those used in Demonstration One. These were generalisations. 
In attempting to make drawings within formal generic constraints, I attempted to 
place myself in a characteristic relationship with the material and to visualise that 
relationship. 
To begin Demonstration Two(1950s), I read works by comic artists 
Johnny Craig, Will Eisner (Illustration 35, Page 253), Milton Caniff (Illustration 36, 
Page 254), Harvey Kurtzman, Wallace Wood and Frank Hampson. 
For Demonstration Two(1960s), I read works by Kurt Schaffenburger, 
Luis Garcia (Illustration 37, Page 255), Curt Swan and the anonymous artists of 
pages in 1960s editions of 'Jackie', the British weekly paper for teenage girls 
(Illustration 38, Page 256). 
For Demonstration Two(1970s), I read works by Martin Ashbury, 
Purita Campos, Frank Langford and also the anonymous artists of pages in 1970s 
editions of 'Jackie' (Illustration 39, Page 257). 
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These artists' works are highly distinctive, but they share 
characteristics that I identified as specifications in each historic period. These were 
similarities in their forms of expression. I identified similarities of structure in each 
period, such as the layout of pages, grid templates, type-faces and drawing 
technology. I also identified general similarities of production, in methods of 
depiction, similarities of plot (the types of actions and the types of people 
undertaking them, as well as the light, smell and material of the depicted worlds) 
and of story (the social, environmental and economic histories of the protagonists 
in the plots). 
In compiling these specifications I was guided by my reading alone. 
The specifications provided a general description of the historic period in each 
case. I used my own perception as a complete guide, in that distinctions that I 
made about the forms of expression could only be made according to their relation 
to me. This was much more difficult in this Demonstration, as the field of 
possibilities is vast. It constitutes the whole body of forms of expression of the 
1950s, 1960s and 1970s. 
Any distinction that I made I was able to contradict immediately. For 
example, for every comic page made in the 1950s in the Romance or 
Adventure/Romance genre with a nine panel grid template, there is one with a 
twelve panel grid template. Both forms are characteristic of the decade. 
Fortunately, this difficulty represents the method of Drawing Demonstration Two: 
making subjective distinctions about types of form and submitting to these 
distinctions as constraints. 
As an aid to doing this with comic pages in each period, I attempted 
briefly to identify similar typical forms in films, literature, fashions for women and 
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alcoholic drinks in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. Taking my own experience of 
these things as a complete taxonomy, I noted simply what came to mind. In the 
1950s in film, the work of Welles. In literature, the work of Hemingway. In fashion, 
the work of 8alenciaga. I could not identify a typical alcoholic drink of the 1950s. 
In the 1960s in film, the work of Antonioni came to mind. In literature, 
Spark. In fashion, Quant. The vodka martini provided the typical drink of the 
1960s. In the 1970s in film, I thought of the work of Polanski. In literature, Drabble. 
In fashion, C&A. Campari was the drink that ~prang to mind for the 1970s. 
Although frivolous, this exercise was not methodologically flawed. It 
was useful in affirming that the list of specifications that I was aiming to compile in 
order to make generic drawings in each case were less a matter of historical 
record and more a subjective sense of relative possibilities and impossibilities. The 
criteria for selection rested entirely with me. 
In this exercise with film, literature, fashion and drinks, I spontaneously 
produced names with which to identify generalities. Typification was embodied 
immediately as a particular author, auteur or brand. I used the name to indicate not 
only these people's own forms of expression, but typify whole cultural sectors in 
each decade. 
Returning to my comics reading for Drawing Demonstration Two, I 
identified general formal differences between each of the three periods of 
production. Individual differences in page sizes over thirty years in the genre were 
insignificant, around a general size of 25cm high x 21 cm wide. Grid templates in 
the 1950s were more likely to be made of nine panels, changing in the 1960s and 
1970s to much more dense grids of up to thirty panels. 
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Page layout became more complex over thirty years. From scenes in 
the 1950s being viewed comprehensively through the frame of each cell, by the 
. 1970s, cells and gutters no longer appear as elements in themselves and the 
boundaries of each scene are created by elements in each scene itself, relative to 
other scenes on the page. 
Use of points of view in each scene also changes, with greater use of 
extreme juxtapositions in scale in the 1970s, allied to the disappearance of cells 
and gutters. Text in speech balloons, thought bubbles and narration spaces 
became increasingly small and in the 1960s and 1970s was mechanically 
produced, as opposed to the hand-inked text of the 1950s. 
Pages were still black and white. They were still produced by teams of 
people with the penciller and inker increasingly becoming the same artist in the 
1960s and 1970s. The production of drawings is very different in the 1950s, 1960s 
and 1970s. The use of ink and brush in the 1950s depicts glossy and dense 
materials viewed in a thick and luminous atmosphere. 
Ink and brush builds high contrasts and deep modelling. Subsequent 
variations in the physical attack of a nib as well as a brush in the 1960s creates a 
depictive protocol where thick lines define silhouettes and thin lines define interior 
details, almost without other contrasts. This creates a world of bright, even light 
and plain material surfaces. In the 1970s, there is an increased range of types of 
attack with nib and brush, utilising much more rapidly made marks to depict varied 
textures, patterns and details in a fretwork of different lights and material 
conditions. 
Alongside these technical specifications were others, equally 
important. I chose the script extrapolated from Medway's work because its main 
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protagonists are women. The Romance/Adventure Romance genre in the period in 
view differs from pre-World War Two Romance in that it was increasingly made for 
young women only and not for young women and young men: stories about young 
women for young women to read. 
In the 1970s in particular, this trend towards young women-centred 
stories for young women found another, perhaps coincidental, corollary in the 
increased number of women artists drawing these comics who emerged from the 
business of fashion illustration (Gibson 2000). The appearance of a waitress with a 
secret identity as a witch (and the magic itself) in the script supports more than it 
contradicts specifications for the genre across a" three periods. 
The types of women who appear in each period also change. The 
activities of dining and waitressing seem more adult in the 1950s than in the other 
two periods. In the 1950s there is no distinction made in terms of appearance and 
behaviour between a woman of eighteen years of age and one of forty. In the 
1960s and 1970s, however, the women seem younger, their behaviour less formal 
and the distinction between them and older people more definite and between 
themselves less definite. The social distinction between Zoe (as waitress) and 
Perla (as diner) is less pronounced in the 1960s ad 1970s. Distinction is a matter 
of personality rather than status. Perla's behaviour is entirely personally bad in the 
1970s particularly, rather than institutionally bad, as it is in the 1950s. 
With these specifications in mind, I established grid templates for each 
drawing. These comprised a nine panel grid for the 1950s (three by three), and a 
thirty panel for the 1960s and 1970s (five across and six down). I made page 
layouts and storyboards for each drawing from the script (Illustrations 40-42, 
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Pages 258-260) and completed the three final drawings (Illustrations 43-45, 
Pages 261-263). 
Drawing Demonstration Two analysis 
Looking at these drawings, I feel none of the unease that I felt looking 
at the final drawings in Drawing Demonstration One. I think this is due to the fact 
that there is no doubling of the subject in the case of these drawings. There is no 
theoretical pretension to telling the story of a specific subject's self-expression. 
That was not the aim of this Demonstration. 
Rather, I have subjectively embodied three types of social constraint, 
and attempted to visualise that constraint in the form of a generic drawing. To 
some degree, we do this every time we express ourselves. We represent the 
effects of the constraint of self-observation, dictated by knowledge of generalised 
others. In Drawing Demonstration One, here is no doubling of the subject. I 
embodied my own subjectivity in making these drawings, albeit in a self-conscious 
way and with a specific aim. The degree to which Drawing Demonstration Two 
succeeds or fails is indicated by the degree to which I have recognised and 
submitted to specific constraints, allowing my self-observation to dominate my 
drawings 
If we recall Buchloh's description of the dominance of self-observation 
in relation to Drawing Demonstration Two, it is possible to see how consensus not 
only creates authority, but how the functioning of that consensus in self-
observation is authoritarian. 
Bakhtin describes the relationship of the subject to consensus, 
aChieved through self-observation, as I/(t)he tendency to assimilate other's 
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discourse (which) takes on a deeper and more basic significance in an individual's 
ideological becoming, ... (A)nother's discourse performs here no longer as 
information, directions, rules, models and do forth - but strives rather to determine 
the very bases of our ideological interrelations with the world, the very basis of our 
behaviour: .. it performs here as authoritarian discourse and an internally 
persuasive discourse ... " (Bakhtin 1981:342). 
He concludes that every form of expression constitutes a relationship 
of relative constraints. Every relationship reflects the relative authority of its 
participants, derived from the intersubjective effect of self-observation in relation to 
the generalised other. He writes "(t)he degree to which (an utterance) may be 
conjoined with authority ... is what determines its speCific demarcation and 
individuation ... " ... " (Bakhtin 1981:343). The production of agreed forms of other 
people's expression in a situation that is both self-observed and socially 
recognised represents the authority of the generalised other in the relationship to 
self. 
In classical rhetoric, this identification with the authority of a 
consensually-created 'other' was used to project that authority as one's own. This 
was called 'prosopopoeia' or the formalised act of speaking as another subject. It 
is not a simple device. It requires the manipulation of the relative subjective 
positions that generate the complex intersubjectivity of any form of expression. It is 
described by Roman rhetorician Quintillian. He writes that it is utilised to " .. display 
the thoughts of our opponents, as they themselves would do in soliloquy, .. ", It is 
not imitation, in which the speaker remains fully an embodied subject recognisably 
adopting another's subjective position. It is self-conscious identification, with its 
consequent loss of identity. 
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The plausibility of the adoption is part of the authority of the rhetorical 
act. Quintillian continues: " ... our inventions of that sort will meet with credit only so 
far as we represent people saying what it is not unreasonable to suppose that they 
may have meditated; .. " (Quintillian 1920). This plausibility is founded in self-
scrutiny and social convention. 
Utilising prosopopoeia, any authoritative position can be identified-with 
and spoken from as long as it is a generic position" ... to bring down the the gods 
from heaven, evoke the dead and give voices to cities and states." (Quintillian 
1920). Connor notes the authoritarian character of ventriloquism, which is a type of 
propopoeia, in which the self-observed self dominates as a " ... violence towards 
the one that is ventriloquised or reduced to the condition of a dummy, .. " so that 
"(t)he ventriloquist. .. generously blended his life into the lives he borrowed ... " This 
generosity is the capacity to subsume our subjectivity in genre and submit to self-
observation without a struggle. 
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Conclusion 
This study argues that the experience of reading comics is 
comprehensible as a series of intersubjective relationships represented in 
physical form. Considering concepts of self-consciousness, perception. 
embodiment and social experience, it develops a narrative model that brings 
the physical forms of self-expression into a series of relationships generated 
and made meaningful to embodied subjects. 
To make and substantiate this argument. I refer to. analyse and 
seek to develop the theoretical work of a minority of comics narratologists. In 
particular, theorists that have made the relationship between content, form 
and enunciative context, rather than focussing on the study of enunciation 
alone. 
By dOing this, I have developed an argument that runs in some 
ways counter to the dominant tendency in the field of contemporary English 
language comics narratology. 
My argument is built on the assumption that the field of comics 
narratology is so small that comic narratologists cannot afford to neglect the 
work of scholars who take diverse approaches. This is particularly so in cases 
where this theoretical work begs questions that establish clear directions for 
further study. I believe that this has been the case with Barker's approach in 
'Comics: ideology, power and the critics' in relation to the current dominant 
approach in the field. This study addresses this state of affairs. 
Inspired by Barker, I approach the experience of making and 
reading comic strips as a relationship between histoire ~nd discours, 
understanding discours to be the social context in which enunciation takes 
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place as well as the form of enunciation itself. Also following Barker, I adopt a 
cross-disciplinary method in terms of theory, where cross-discplinarity is 
defined as the study of the relationship between the ideas, forms and 
methods of one discipline and another. 
However, I adopt an interdisciplinary method in two practical 
Drawing Demonstrations. I make instrumental use of the forms and methods 
of studio practice to solve two theoretical problems posed as questions. To do 
this, J argue for practice-based research as problem solving rather than 
reporting, or post-hoc theorisation. 
My argument has a main axis: readings of philosophical 
descriptions of self-consciousness and perception on one hand, and readings 
of the work of narratologists who focus on the relationship between histoire 
and discours, on the other. The work of the theorists I consider shares a 
dialogic approach to their individual studies, ultimately grounded in different 
ways of describing the relationship between consciousness and self-
consciousness. 
From these readings, I argue for physical embodiment as the 
arbiter of intersubjectivity both in co-presence and through technological 
trace. In this sense, the narrative model I construct maps the relationship 
between subjects and physical expressions. My naming of this narrative 
model repudiates models that study narrative as histoire, following both 
Ricoeur and SchOtz, as do the practical outcomes of my two Demonstrations 
with narrative drawing. 
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Originality 
. Arising out of the minority approach that I take to comics narratology, 
my argument contains a number of points of originality in the field. Although 
my general approach has predecessors in the work of Sarker, Saetens and 
Madden, my argument establishes a wider set of theoretical predecessors in 
works that I bring together for the first time. 
Barker is unique in discussing in detail the experience of comics in 
relation to the ideas of Volosinov. Following Barkers approach, I frame the 
experience of making and reading comics relative to the Ideas of theorists 
who share a dialogic approach across disciplines. This constitutes a new set 
of ideas from which my argument derives. 
In selecting this new set, I also establish and describe original 
relationships between them. This is an advantage of cross-disclpJinarity. 
Because the focus of cross-disciplinary study is the relationship between 
ideas, forms and methods from different disciplines, the selection of a set of 
these constitutes a pOint of view. In the case of my argument, this selection 
has not been made before in English language comics narratology. 
The model of narrative that I describe is also original. Although it also 
has predecessors in the work of a number of narratologists and is repudiated 
by the approaches of others, the model is original in describing a specific 
reCiprocal relationship that causally links histoire to the broadest field of 
discours, connecting enunciation, production and subjects. This reflects the 
relationship between self-consciousness and consciousness described by 
Merleau-Ponty and SchOtz on one hand and Crossley's conditions of Iradlcal' 
intersubjectivity on the other. 
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My argument also includes two original analyses. The first of these is 
the comparison I make between the theory of comics strips' specific 
'mediagenius' and conditions of intersubjectivity described by a number of 
theorists. This has not been undertaken before. 
The second of these is my analysis of the Madden's work in terms of 
concepts of self-observation expressed as social constraint. Madden's work 
has not been considered in terms of the idea of 'horizons of expectation' or 
the idea of the 'generalised other' before. 
Finally, my two Drawing Demonstrations provide a new example of 
interdisciplinarity. The methods they employ provide an original model of 
practice-based research following problem-solving approach. Constituted of 
both the framing of two theoretical problems and the demonstration of their 
solutions by the practical means of narrative drawing, they are original In the 
field of narratology. 
Significance for the field 
In a number of ways, my study holds the possibility of significance for the 
consideration of past work in the field of comics narratology and for future 
approaches to the field by others. 
Principal amongst these is my development of Barker's approach and 
aspects of Barker's argument. In approaching comics narratology as a relationship 
between histoire and discours, this study adopts Barker's approach. In exploring 
the wider implications of the relationship between Volosinov's ideas and the 
experience of making and reading comics, which Barker describes, my argument 
augments and develops Barker's. 
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Because of this, my study provides opportunities for other comics 
narratologists to revisit 'Comics: ideology, power and the critics' and to consider 
how the application of both the approach and the ideas that it represents, can 
broaden the narratological study of comics further. 
My study's debt to Barker provides two other possibilities of future 
significance for the field. First, the set of theorists work that my study establishes 
implies a new theoretical pOint of view in comics narratology. Second, as part of 
this new set, I explicitly link works by comics narratologists that have not 
necessarily been linked before: Barker, Baetens and Madden. This connection 
also provides a significant point of view for consideration. 
My Drawing Demonstrations also hold the possibility of significance. They 
apply the problem-solving paradigm of practice-based research to a field that 
already contains a significant minority of practical theorists. This paradigm has 
never been made use of, or theorised, in the field before. The significance of these 
Demonstrations for the field lies in their methodology. Other practical theorlsatlons 
have either utilised the medium of comics in order to communicate theoretical 
Ideas as content (such as McCloud's), or presented practical work Independent of 
an explicit theoretical frame (such as Madden's and Sikoryak's). opening them to 
non-theoretical readings. Uniquely, my Demonstrations provide a model that 
specifically frames theoretical problems in order to allow practical solutions. 
For the field. my introduction of drawing as a reproducible method of 
also opens the practical work of other theorists to review. It may be significant 
in itself that my study approaches Madden's work as theoretical work. for 
example. 
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Relative to this is the possible significance of my Drawing 
Demonstrations for theories of production and drawing sty/e. I argue broadly 
that self-consciousness constitutes intersubjectivity relative to the physical 
forms of expression, including technological trace. This argument reframes 
definitions of style and provides an opportunity for reading both comic strips 
themselves and narratological theories of comics in other ways. 
Finally, my study is significant in that it develops a minority approach to 
comics narratology and this approach can be evaluated relative to majority 
alternatives. Broadly, in approaching histoire relative to discours, my 
argument represents an alternative to the dominant approach to histoire. Its 
significance lies in presenting the opportunity to further consider the 
relationship between the two approaches in the field. 
Further research 
The broad significance of my study lies in the development of a specific 
approach to comics narratology, and in the corollaries of that approach: it 
brings together a new set of works, connects works not connected before and 
focuses attention on speCific predecessors. 
So it is the approach itself that first begs questions in relation to other 
approaches in the field, as a topic for further study. 
I identify my approach as the study of the relationships between 
histoire and discours. To what extent this description remains shorthand for 
more detailed distinctions is debateable (between approaches that consider 
wider contexts and those that consider medium and message). 
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For example, I correlate self-consciousness with intersibjectivity, and 
embodiment with the forms of expression. Narratologists who approach 
enunciation as medium and message might argue that media are embodied 
without any correlations with intersubjectivity. In other words, that they are 
objective. This is a significant topic for further study in the field. 
My argument also provides three specific areas for further study. First, 
the model of narrative that I propose might be used instrumentally to analyse 
other experiences of reading comic strips. Further research would then 
constitute applying the model across a number of situations in order to 
establish what types of descriptions of intersubjective relationships it reveals. 
Related to the instrumental application of the model, is the further 
application of SchOtz theories to the making and reading of comics. Such an 
application suggests a detailed analysis of the levels on which intersubjects 
are represented in specific social situations, such as the production and 
consumption of comic strips, and the complex relationships between trace 
and subjects in social environments. 
Finally, my argument implies a narratological reframing of theoretical 
discussions about drawing style, or the ways in which the physical marks on 
the page, produced by hand and machine, remain unique as narrative 
depiction, as index and as trace. Walton's identification of self-consciousness 
relative to trace, as the condition of depictive drawing, can be taken further 
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